The Chechen Link to Russian Activist's Death - Stratfor: There are countless explanations for what is taking place. Putin's honoring Kadyrov just as the Chechen leader re-entered the FSB's sites is a key development. It is possible that Putin wanted to make sure the FSB knows that Kadyrov is a loyalist and cannot be removed from his position in Chechnya for fear is destabilization. And it is possible that during their meeting, Patrushev wanted to ensure that Kadyrov knows his place. Adding to the confusion is Putin's disappearance from the public eye for days and his cancellation of many meetings. In addition, Kadyrov's only other ally in the Kremlin, Putin's advisor Vladislav Surkov, left Russia for a sudden vacation with his family in Hong Kong on the very day the media noticed Putin's disappearance.
There are countless explanations for what is taking place. Putin's honoring Kadyrov just as the Chechen leader re-entered the FSB's sites is a key development. It is possible that Putin wanted to make sure the FSB knows that Kadyrov is a loyalist and cannot be removed from his position in Chechnya for fear is destabilization. And it is possible that during their meeting, Patrushev wanted to ensure that Kadyrov knows his place.
Adding to the confusion is Putin's disappearance from the public eye for days and his cancellation of many meetings. In addition, Kadyrov's only other ally in the Kremlin, Putin's advisor Vladislav Surkov, left Russia for a sudden vacation with his family in Hong Kong on the very day the media noticed Putin's disappearance.
The Chechen Link to Russian Activist's Death
Summary
Since the death of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, theories have arisen about possible perpetrators and motives, leading to speculation that Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov might have been involved. Much of that speculation stems from the identities of the perpetrators arrested by the Federal Security Services, or FSB, which seem to indicate that the state security agency wants Kadyrov gone. In the midst of this, however, Putin has rewarded the Chechen leader with a medal of honor, solidifying his support for Kadyrov and possibly a stance against the FSB. In light of Putin's recent multi-day absence from the public and sudden reappearance, the intrigue surrounding the Kremlin is getting murkier.
Analysis
Nemtsov was shot in the back four times on a bridge next to the Kremlin on Feb. 27, two days before he was set to participate in a rally protesting the current government. On March 8, FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov announced the arrest of two men — Zaur Dadaev and Anzor Gubashev, who are relatives — and the detainment of another three — Shagid Gubashev, Tamerlan Eskerkhanov and Khamzad Bakhayev. All the suspects are from the Russian Caucasus. Police attempted to detain a sixth man in the Chechen capital of Grozny, but the suspect reportedly blew himself up as police approached.
Moscow's Basmanny district court said at Dadaev's arraignment that he had confessed to the assassination. The other four suspects have not confessed. On March 10, Dadaev supposedly retracted his confession, speaking with two members of Russia's Human Rights Council, Eva Merkacheva and Andrey Babushkin. Dadaev said he pleaded guilty because he was tortured and his family threatened. Russia's Investigative Committee, known to be heavily influenced by the FSB, accused Merkacheva and Babushkin of "interfering" with the investigation and said they could be charged with violating the law for visiting Dadaev.
According to Investigative Committee Spokesman Vladimir Markin, there were five possible motives for the assassination: Nemtsov's stance on the terrorist attack against French weekly Charlie Hebdo, his position against the war in Ukraine, his political activities, business activities, or certain aspects of his personal life. The committee has kept every possibility open, but the Hebdo explanation is the least convincing. Moskovsky Komsomolets, a pro-Kremlin tabloid, reported on March 10 that surveillance camera footage shows suspects tailing Nemtsov from late 2014, before the Charlie Hebdo attack in January.
Dadaev's arrest suggests a different motive. He is a former deputy commander of Chechnya's "Sever" battalion — a notorious military group set up after the 2004 assassination of Akhmad Kadyrov (Ramzan's father) that consists of Kadyrov's most zealous loyalists. Human rights groups have accused the Sever (North) and its sister battalion Yug (South) of operating as Ramzan's death squads. The commander of the Sever Battalion is Alibek Delimkhanov, brother of Russian Duma member Adam Delimkhanov, a cousin and close associate of Kadyrov.
Kadyrov immediately took to Instagram (his media outlet of choice) the day of arrests to proclaim that Dadaev is "a true patriot" who would never take action against Russia. Kadyrov went on to say that since Dadaev is deeply religious, Nemtsov might have been killed for condemning the Charlie Hebdo attack.
Kadyrov's defense of Dadaev has led to mass speculation that Kadyrov was involved in, or even ordered, the assassination. The Chechen president has spoken out against many opposition leaders, calling them his "personal enemy." Kadyrov even threatened opposition leader Mikhail Khodorkovsky (who fled to Switzerland from Russia in 2014), saying that many people in Switzerland would be willing to bring him to justice. There was little public animosity between Nemtsov and Kadyrov, though Kadyrov may still have seen him as an enemy. Rumors persist of some link between Kadyrov and the assassination; Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta quoted anonymous FSB officials as saying that Kadyrov's cousin, the parliamentarian Adam Delimkhanov, organized the hit.
The Possibility of Chechen Involvement
Comparing the Nemtsov killing with previous assassinations claimed by or thought to have been conducted by Chechens lends plausibility to the idea of a Chechen link to Nemtsov's death. Kadyrov assumed power in the Chechen Republic after his father's assassination. The power struggle that led up to his presidency coincided with several assassinations of critics or potential rivals both within Chechnya and abroad. Some of these killings bore broad similarities to the tactics used in the Nemtsov assassination.
Movladi Baisarov, who had become an outspoken critic of Kadyrov, was killed in Moscow in 2006 after gunmen shot him at point blank range as he exited his car. Ruslan Yamadayev, one of Kadyrov's primary rivals for power in Chechnya, met a similar fate. As Yamadayev left a meeting in the Kremlin with then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in 2008, he was shot several times as he waited in his car on the Smolenskaya Embankment in central Moscow.
Investigators did not officially link these cases to Chechen interests, but the killings do serve as a broad indicator that what happened to Nemtsov was not necessarily unique in terms of tactics used against political opponents, even in the heart of Moscow. That said, many of the assassinations involving Kadyrov's rivals, both in Chechnya and in cities such as Moscow, Dubai and Vienna, are believed to have been carried out or arranged by Chechens in service of Chechen interests. Thus, it is entirely possible that Chechens murdered Nemtsov in central Moscow, if doing so would serve Chechen interests or if they had a specific motivation. However, the tactics used are not the sole province of Chechens. A professional assassination, it was simple and effective and left little in the way of clues to point to a specific perpetrator.
Kadyrov's Behavior
Kadyrov's behavior both publicly and on social media since the assassination, along with his defense of Dadaev, has fueled suspicions about his involvement. On March 4, the Chechen president posted a picture on Instagram of him and Russian President Vladimir Putin laughing and embracing. Kadyrov also heaped praise on the Russian leader, bashed the West's belief that sanctions would harm Russia, and said he would lay down his life for Putin.
A photo posted to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov's Instagram account shows the Chechen leader (L) with Russian President Vladimir Putin. (Instagram @kadyrov_95)
The day after Bortinikov announced the arrests of the Chechens suspected of the Nemtsov murder, Kadyrov was in Moscow receiving from Putin one of Russia's highest awards, the Order of Honor, purportedly for his years of diligent professional and social work. The very public display of support from Putin, particularly the day after Kadyrov defended one of the arrested suspects, ignited a media storm. Russian and foreign media began speculating about whether, if Kadyrov was indeed behind the Nemtsov assassination, he did it for Putin, under Putin's orders or to impress the Russian president. Later that day, Kadyrov said on Instagram that he and his friends went to a shooting range, and he posted a video of him with his famous golden gun, supporting his tough-guy image just as he was named a hero of Russia.
A photo posted to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov's Instagram account shows him at a firing range with his trademark gold pistol. (Instagram @kadyrov_95)
On March 11, Kadyrov attended a Russian Security Council meeting on extremism in the North Caucasus and reportedly met with Security Council Chief Nikolai Patrushev on the sidelines. This meeting was particularly important for two reasons. First, the FSB and Kadyrov have not hidden their dislike for each other over the years, so a meeting of Kadyrov and the former FSB chief is always noteworthy. Second, the meeting came on the same day that rumors that Putin was either missing, ill or dead swirled out of Moscow. Some of the rumors surrounding Putin's mysterious absence pointed to a possible coup by the security forces, of which Patrushev would be a primary component, if not the leader.
That same day, Kadyrov posted a picture from October 2014 on Instagram showing him at a meeting between Putin and Emirati Crown Prince Sheik Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan. Russian media speculated that the posting was meant to highlight Kadyrov's involvement in Russia's foreign policy and to show the Chechen leader as Putin's right hand.
A photo posted to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov's Instagram account shows him at a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and United Arab Emirates Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. (Instagram @kadyrov_95)
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M.N.: By the way, compare these two photos of sheikh. Don't they look somewhat different, like two different persons?
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Rumored FSB-Kadyrov Feud
FSB chief Bortnikov's appearance on Russian Channel One television to announce the arrests of Nemtsov's killers and the fact that the suspects are Chechen — one with a personal link to Kadyrov — has reignited rumors that the FSB is targeting Kadyrov. Such an announcement would normally be handled by the Investigative Committee, not the FSB chief.
The founder of a Muslim journalist association in Russia, Orkhan Dzhemal, said that Bortnikov was targeting Kadyrov and attempting to erode the ties between Putin and Kadyrov. Reports of intensifying struggles between Kadyrov and the FSB (particularly Bortnikov, Patrushev and Kremlin chief of staff Sergei Ivanov) rose across Russian media, which has for years accepted that the FSB and Kadyrov have had a feud. Whether or not Kadyrov was behind the assassination, the FSB has made a point to link the two.
In the mid-2000s, a series of reportedly FSB-employed assets in Chechnya were assassinated, including former special forces commander Movladi Baisarov, with speculation that Kadyrov's factions were behind the killings. In 2008, there was a rumored plot by Kadyrov's forces to assassinate Patrushev. The FSB's influence within Chechnya reportedly has dwindled in recent years as Kadyrov has entrenched his own brigades throughout the Chechen security system. In June 2014, Kadyrov announced that he was setting up a center in Chechnya to train his troops to the standards of Russia's Interior Ministry, the FSB, and other security agencies. Kadyrov hired a former FSB major, Daniil Martynov, who was part of an FSB special forces unit known as Alfa and had served as the president's personal bodyguard. Martynov's comrade in Alfa, Sergei Goncharov, said the FSB had not sanctioned the move.
There have also been growing concerns throughout Russia's security apparatus over the lack of influence over Chechnya's battalions and Kadyrov's intentions. Members of Russia's Duma have even called for a hearing to discuss the matter. In December 2014, Kadyrov gathered some 20,000 of his troops, fully armed and wearing backpacks, in a sports stadium. Kadyrov told the troops they could resign and volunteer to go to fight in Ukraine, but that he was waiting for Putin's order. He ended the speech by rallying the soldiers, chanting, "Long live our national leader of Russia Vladimir Putin!" Kadyrov's flattery of Putin has led to speculation that the Chechen President is vying for a federal position in Moscow.
The issue now is whether the struggle between Kadyrov and the FSB is truly heating back up — and where Putin stands within the fray. The series of events indicates that something is brewing. First, Nemtsov was assassinated, and the FSB arrested Kadyrov-linked Chechens for the crime. Kadyrov defended one of the suspects, sparking media rumors of his involvement in the killing. The following day, Putin gave Kadyrov a federal medal. Later, Kadyrov and Patrushev met.
There are countless explanations for what is taking place. Putin's honoring Kadyrov just as the Chechen leader re-entered the FSB's sites is a key development. It is possible that Putin wanted to make sure the FSB knows that Kadyrov is a loyalist and cannot be removed from his position in Chechnya for fear is destabilization. And it is possible that during their meeting, Patrushev wanted to ensure that Kadyrov knows his place.
Adding to the confusion is Putin's disappearance from the public eye for days and his cancellation of many meetings. In addition, Kadyrov's only other ally in the Kremlin, Putin's advisor Vladislav Surkov, left Russia for a sudden vacation with his family in Hong Kong on the very day the media noticed Putin's disappearance. Putin reappeared in public March 16 for a meeting with Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev in St. Petersburg. Putin's public absence led to a flurry of media speculation that he was ill, dead or missing — or that a coup was under way behind the scenes.
During Putin's absence from the public, Kadyrov continued his unwavering support for the Russian leader, releasing a long diatribe on Instagram stating his full commitment to Putin and his readiness to fight Russia's enemies. He added that he owes his life to Putin and is "committed to him as a man," whatever his political position. Thus, wherever Putin was or whoever was in charge during his disappearance, Kadyrov was tying himself to Putin on a personal level.
The possibility that Russia's premier security agency, the FSB, and one of Russia's most powerful and unwieldy figures, Kadyrov, are sparring would be a matter for Putin to resolve. Whether or not Putin's absence was related to this confrontation, the inconsistencies in the Kremlin's explanations of Putin's absence seems to indicate that the FSB was a factor somehow.
M.N.: I have my doubts that Surkov went anywhere, especially to Hong Kong. He probably is hiding somewhere inside Russia, to avoid the attention and journalists' questions, borrowing the Putin's tactics in hope to wait it all over until the things come down. If he went abroad (and it might be a question where) he risks to be arrested and extradited to Ukraine for his role in the Ukrainian events.
This Master Manipulator Is Russia’s Frank Underwood
For presidential puppet-master Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin is a House of Cards
Earlier this month, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko accused a Kremlin aide named Vladislav Surkov of directing the “foreign sniper groups” who shot and killed over 100 protesters at the Maidan protest camp in February 2014.
Beyond a relatively small circle of Russia watchers, few Westerners would have recognized the name. But while he has always been careful to remain low-profile, Surkov, a chain-smoking writer with a fondness for gangsta rap, is one of the most influential behind-the-scenes figures in Vladimir Putin’s Russia: the Kremlin’s Karl Rove. He is also a chief architect of Russia’s rejection of Western-style democracy.
If Poroshenko is to be believed, Surkov has been tasked with enforcing Putin’s will in Ukraine. The shadowy ideologue was spotted at recent talks in Minsk between Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France, where he was working on behalf of separatist leaders in east Ukraine.
So who exactly is Mr. Surkov?
Born in the provinces in 1964 to a Russian mother and Chechen father, Surkov followed the well-beaten path taken by talented youth to Moscow. He studied theater for a while and read widely; one of his favorite authors was the American Beat poet Allen Ginsberg.
Like Putin, Surkov also trained in the martial arts. In the late 1980s, he was briefly a bodyguard to tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who quickly realized that there was more to his new employee than mere muscle and promoted him to head his bank’s advertising and public relations department. Surkov soon gained a reputation as one of the most skillful PR people in the country.
But Khodorkovsky would prove unwilling to satisfy Surkov’s growing ambitions; the two reportedly fell out after the businessman refused to make his PR manager a full partner. “I wanted to be like the hero in the movie Pretty Woman,” Surkov later recalled. “I wanted to be a big businessman who’s sitting in a big hotel, supervising big events.”
In 1999, after highly paid jobs in TV and banking, Surkov joined Boris Yeltsin’s presidential staff. From that perch, he helped launch Putin to the top job in the country. Regularly identified by analysts as one of the two or three most powerful men in Russian politics throughout the 2000s, the obsessively secretive Surkov has never been a household name. Most ordinary Russians, it is fair to say, have never even heard of him. And Surkov does everything he can to bolster his mysterious image, rarely making public appearances, and once declaring that Putin was “sent to Russia by the Lord”. (“Yeah, as the angel of the apocalypse,” they joked in opposition circles.) Believed to have written a satirical novel, Almost Zero, under a pseudonym, Surkov also penned lyrics for the Russian rock group Agata Kristi. If the Kremlin’s chief ideologue likes to think of himself as an artist, then his canvas is Russia.
Surkov, who has a piercing gaze, has been invested with almost supernatural powers by the anti-Putin movement. “He’s like the gang member who actually enjoys torturing victims,” a protest figure once colorfully described him to me, on condition of anonymity. “He is the lord of darkness,” said opposition politician Vladimir Ryzhkov, without irony. “He has been complicit in all the vileness of the Putin era.”
It was Surkov who, in 2004, announced that Putin’s rule was based on the concept of “sovereign democracy.” The malleable term drew heavily on the works of one of Putin’s favorite philosophers, Ivan Ilyin (1883– 1954), an intellectual exiled by Lenin, who believed that Western-style democracy was not only unsuitable for Russia but also harmful. Instead, Russia, Ilyin believed, required a “united and strong state power, dictatorial in the scope of its powers.” Sovereign democracy essentially meant that the state should exert robust controls over a nominally democratic political system, one that was free of any foreign influences whatsoever. Not everyone was convinced, however, by Surkov’s new addition to the political lexicon. “Sovereign democracy,”, ran the joke, was to “genuine democracy” what “electric chair” was to “chair.”
Widely viewed as the heir to Mikhail Suslov, the little-known Russian politburo member who was Soviet Union’s puppetmaster during the Cold War, Surkov’s genuine role was for many years masked by his official anodyne job title of deputy chief of staff of the presidential administration. But Surkov was–and perhaps remains–Putin’s grey cardinal, responsible for the transformation of state-controlled media into slavishly pro-Kremlin platforms, and the creation of a docile parliamentary opposition to provide the masses with the illusion of a functioning democracy. In the wake of Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, Surkov also created Nashi, a pro-Kremlin youth movement, to provide the authorities with street muscle in the case of a similar revolt in Russia.
Never one to conform to expectations, when anti-Putin demonstrations broke out for real in Moscow in 2011 and 2012, Surkov praised the protesters as the “best part” of society. The statement appeared to cost him his job – within a month he had been shifted from his post in the presidential administration and shunted to a minor ministerial portfolio. Surkov’s response? “Stabilization devours its own children,” he declared. “I am too odious for this brave new world.”
Within a year, however, Surkov had been handed responsibility for religious affairs. It was fortuitous timing for the Kremlin: The public disinformation campaign that demonized Pussy Riot and by association discredited the anti-Putin opposition was child’s play for him.
So could Surkov have ordered the killings on Maidan last year? He hasn’t commented, and the Kremlin has dismissed Ukraine’s allegation as “nonsense.” The head of the opposition-friendly radio station, Echo of Moscow, Alexei Venidiktov, has also expressed doubts that Surkov would be capable of directing such an operation.
But other Russian opposition figures are far more willing to believe the accusations. “He would have done this with great pleasure,” said opposition-friendly analyst Andrei Piontkovsky. “He is willing to carry out any task for the party and the government.”
Either way, Surkov may just relish the accusations. As pointed out by Oleg Kashin, a high-profile opposition journalist who once accused Surkov of ordering an attempt on his life, Surkov has “spent many years creating an image of a person who resolves political tasks via the most Satanic methods.” Allegations of involvement in the bloodletting at Maidan only serve to bolster that image.
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surkov - GS
Владислав Юрьевич Сурков - GS
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United Arab Emirates. Their role in war against Islam
Publication time: 15 July 2013, 01:30
Some facts about the United Arab Emirates.
- The Emirates helped the Mubarak regime in Egypt every year in the amount of $ 12 billion, mainly with oil products. After the revolution and the overthrow of Mubarak, the UAE completely stopped helping Egypt. After the military coup the aid resumed.
The Emirates helped to get the US out of the economic crisis in 2010, signing a deal to buy weapons for $ 200 billion.
The Emirates helped Arizona (USA) after the famous hurricane in 2008 in the amount of 10 billion dollars, rebuilding all the schools of the state.
The Emirates expelled the majority of Syrians working in the country since the beginning of the revolution in Syria against Bashar al-Assad. In the UAE, the Syrians are not allowed to transfer money anywhere.
The Emirates helped the French in their crusade in Mali in the amount of $ 7 billion - to help the French to prevent establishing the Sharia law by Muslims in the country.
The Emirates spent on the celebration of a so-called New Year nearly $ 2 billion.
The Emirates is a haven for all those who are hiding from law such as Ahmad Shafiq and war criminals, such as Dahlan, and the family of Bashar al-Assad.
The Emirates is the nest of American and European intelligence services in the region. After the overthrow of Mubarak, all intelligence agencies moved from Egypt to the UAE.
The Emirates is a world center of money laundering and arms sales, as well as prostitution. A single trip to Dubai will be enough to confirm all this.
The Emirates gave credit to a well-known Serbian war criminal, accused of genocide of Muslims in the amount of $ 400 million with a very sympathetic repayment scheme.
The Emirates deprived of citizenship many Islamic scholars and preachers, such as Ibrahim al-Marzouqi, Hussain Al-Jaber, and the others were expelled from the Emirates, and many of those who observed diligence in prayer and observance of Islam, as well as proper care for the Ummah.
On the request of Putin, the Emirates welcomes and befriends Kadyrov and Chechen apostates, helping them with money, false "sheikhs" and fake "relics" of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).
UAE Emir Mohammed bin Zayed vowed to overthrow Ikhwans (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, even if it would cost him the entire budget of Abu Dhabi. And he fulfilled his promise.
The Emirates is a fully fledged sponsor of the French campaign against Muslims in Mali, as well as a safe haven for the entire American terrorist organization Blackwater in Baghdad.
In the Emirates, the Americans found friendly hospitality (CIA base in Jebel Ali) for interrogating and torturing all the prisoners: the Mujahideen or all those "suspected" of involvement in Jihad, or just Muslims, "blacklisted" by the CIA.
All Masonic meetings of Rotary clubs and Lions are being held in the UAE.
In the Emirates, they build churches and Buddhist temples, although the Prophet (pbuh) bequeathed to this world, as one of the last instructions by him, an order to expel all polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula.
Question: Which religion and Community does the UAE belong to?
By Salman al Bulgari
Department of Monitoring
Kavkaz Center
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