France Says Evidence Suggests Russians Posing as Islamists Hacked Broadcaster | Former US intel chief calls Iran nuclear deal “wishful thinking”
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France Says Evidence Suggests Russians Posing as Islamists Hacked Broadcaster
Former US intel chief calls Iran nuclear deal “wishful thinking”
Chairman Royce’s opening statement
Washington, D.C. – This morning, U.S. Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, will address a Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa hearing that will examine the ballistic missile threat from Iran. The hearing is entitled “Iran's Enduring Ballistic Missile Threat.”
Live webcast and witness testimony will be available HERE. Also see below for detailed hearing information.
Chairman Royce’s opening statement (as prepared for delivery) follows:
In many ways, Iran’s missile program has been a case study in how the Obama Administration has handled its nuclear negotiations with Iran – by backing off key demands. When negotiations kicked-off, the White House was insistent that the Iranians “have to deal with matters related to their ballistic missile program.” After all, U.N. Security Council Resolutions prohibit Iran’s work on ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
But quickly, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei declared this “a stupid, idiotic expectation” and called it the “main duty of all military officials” to “mass produce” ICBMs. Soon, State Department negotiator Wendy Sherman was telling this Committee that U.N. missile sanctions are “not about ballistic missiles per se,” but about nuclear-armed missiles.
The problem is that ballistic missiles are the most reliable way to deliver nuclear warheads. Indeed, as we will hear this morning, ballistic missiles are not a “separate and secondary” issue – but “part and parcel” of Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure. That’s why Congress has targeted Iran’s missile program with sanctions right alongside its nuclear program.
One witness calls the development of a long-range missile program a litmus test for a country’s nuclear intentions – asserting that, “no country that has not aspired to possess nuclear weapons has ever opted to sustain” a lengthy and expensive missile program. Iran is pressing ahead with both. Remember that when Libya and South Africa renounced nuclear weapons, they also gave up the missile programs that went along with them. That’s a long way from the “mass produce” attitude of the Ayatollah.
Recently, this Committee heard about the negotiating gains the Obama Administration will need to make over the next few weeks to get an agreement that has a chance of being meaningfully verified. Given the relative ease in detecting missile programs, missiles restrictions could be a key source of verification in any sort agreement with Iran. As one witness recalls, Reagan’s “trust but verify” didn’t rely on tracking nuclear fuel stockpiles or centrifuges – but instead on counting Soviet delivery systems.
And how close is Iran to achieving a nuclear warhead? Iran continues to stonewall the IAEA on key questions – including missile warhead design – that its inspectors began pressing for over three and a half years ago. We just don’t know.
Unfortunately, in the run-up to the June 30th deadline, the Obama Administration has shown no interest in working to stop Iran’s ICBM program – instead boldly claiming that its agreement will cut off every path to a nuclear weapon. But as one witness asks, “if the agreement effectively blocks Iran’s path to nuclear weapons, why would Tehran continue to work on a costly weapons system that could never be effectively armed?”
And with the vast sanctions relief that is coming Tehran’s way, there will be billions more for Iran to invest in and improve its ICBM program – an increasing threat to U.S. forces and partners in the region, and eventually to our allies in Europe and here at home.
What:
Subcommittee Hearing: Iran's Enduring Ballistic Missile Threat
When:
10 a.m. on Wednesday, June 10
Where:
2172 Rayburn House Office Building
Witnesses:
Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Retired (Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency)
The Honorable Robert Joseph, Ph.D. Senior Scholar National Institute for Public Policy (Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security)
David A. Cooper, Ph.D. James V. Forrestal Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs U.S. Naval War College
Anthony H. Cordesman, Ph.D. Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies
But quickly, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei declared this “a stupid, idiotic expectation” and called it the “main duty of all military officials” to “mass produce” ICBMs. Soon, State Department negotiator Wendy Sherman was telling this Committee that U.N. missile sanctions are “not about ballistic missiles per se,” but about nuclear-armed missiles.
The problem is that ballistic missiles are the most reliable way to deliver nuclear warheads. Indeed, as we will hear this morning, ballistic missiles are not a “separate and secondary” issue – but “part and parcel” of Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure. That’s why Congress has targeted Iran’s missile program with sanctions right alongside its nuclear program.
One witness calls the development of a long-range missile program a litmus test for a country’s nuclear intentions – asserting that, “no country that has not aspired to possess nuclear weapons has ever opted to sustain” a lengthy and expensive missile program. Iran is pressing ahead with both. Remember that when Libya and South Africa renounced nuclear weapons, they also gave up the missile programs that went along with them. That’s a long way from the “mass produce” attitude of the Ayatollah.
Recently, this Committee heard about the negotiating gains the Obama Administration will need to make over the next few weeks to get an agreement that has a chance of being meaningfully verified. Given the relative ease in detecting missile programs, missiles restrictions could be a key source of verification in any sort agreement with Iran. As one witness recalls, Reagan’s “trust but verify” didn’t rely on tracking nuclear fuel stockpiles or centrifuges – but instead on counting Soviet delivery systems.
And how close is Iran to achieving a nuclear warhead? Iran continues to stonewall the IAEA on key questions – including missile warhead design – that its inspectors began pressing for over three and a half years ago. We just don’t know.
Unfortunately, in the run-up to the June 30th deadline, the Obama Administration has shown no interest in working to stop Iran’s ICBM program – instead boldly claiming that its agreement will cut off every path to a nuclear weapon. But as one witness asks, “if the agreement effectively blocks Iran’s path to nuclear weapons, why would Tehran continue to work on a costly weapons system that could never be effectively armed?”
And with the vast sanctions relief that is coming Tehran’s way, there will be billions more for Iran to invest in and improve its ICBM program – an increasing threat to U.S. forces and partners in the region, and eventually to our allies in Europe and here at home.
What:
Subcommittee Hearing: Iran's Enduring Ballistic Missile Threat
When:
10 a.m. on Wednesday, June 10
Where:
2172 Rayburn House Office Building
Witnesses:
Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Retired (Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency)
The Honorable Robert Joseph, Ph.D. Senior Scholar National Institute for Public Policy (Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security)
David A. Cooper, Ph.D. James V. Forrestal Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs U.S. Naval War College
Anthony H. Cordesman, Ph.D. Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies
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· · ·
DALLAS, June 10, 2015 /PRNewswire/ --
According to a new market research report, "Cyber Security Market by Solution (IAM, Encryption, DLP, Risk and Compliance Management, IDS/IPS, UTM, Firewall, Antivirus/Antimalware, SIEM, Disaster Recovery, DDOS Mitigation, Web Filtering, and Security Services) - Global Forecast to 2020", published by MarketsandMarkets, defines and segments global market into cyber security solutions and services.
Browse 74 market data tables and 56 figures spread through 187 pages and in-depth TOC on"Cyber Security Market".
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Nowadays, companies are focusing not only on security solutions but also on security services. Among the services, managed security service is rapidly gaining traction by covering 40% of the security market in 2015. Managed security services help clients to prepare for cyber-attacks by understanding and managing cyber exposure, enabling them to make informed investment decisions and to put necessary, cost-effective protection in place.
Explosive increase in cyber threats is backed by factors such as increasing mobile and web usage and social media, among others. Also, Internet of Things (IoT) is another major factor that has invited various cyber threats at various sensors, terminals, and end devices. Considering this, every sector has a wide scope for cyber security requirement. Organizations are looking for integrated security solutions these days to cater their various security needs through one platform for cost benefits and to reduce complications. The aerospace, defense, and intelligence vertical needs the most advanced cyber security solutions due to increasing security need of the nations. E-governance, increasing concerns regarding territorial security like military, navy, and economic has led the government to think more seriously about cyber threats. Also, increasing demand for cyber security has led the government to make about stringent cyber and IT laws, legal and regulatory compliances, and data security.
Major driving factors for the Cyber Security Market are increasing strictness of government regulations and evolving cyber threats, which are forcing organizations to focus more on cyber security. Also, increasing mobile data usage, cloud usage, and digitization contribute to increasing cyber security awareness. Increasing scope of BOYD at workplace is also said to be driving the market on long-term basis. By utilizing solutions such as data center as a processing and storage powerhouse, data loss protection, data recovery management, leaks and hacking threats can be reduced up to a very large extent. Furthermore, the advancements in virtual machine isolation, client authentication, and secure opportunistic computing are expected to facilitate the adoption of cloud computing, wireless security, and data center, which in turn will boost the demand for advanced security solutions in the coming years. However, lack of talented security professionals in organizations is one of the major problems that have to be tackled.
The major vendors in the Cyber Security Market are IBM corporations, Intel Corporation, Booz Allen Hamilton, CSC, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Sophos, Symantec, and Trend Micro.
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The global cyber security report is segmented on the basis of type, solution, service, vertical, and region. The cyber security types include network security, endpoint security, application security, content security, and wireless security & cloud security. The services are segmented as consulting, design & integration, risk & threat assessment, managed security services, and training & education. The market is segmented into solutions such as identity and access management, risk and compliance management, encryption, data loss prevention, unified threat management, firewall, antivirus and antimalware, Intrusion Detection System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), disaster recovery, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation, and whitelisting. In addition, the report classifies the industry verticals as aerospace, defense, and intelligence; government; Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance (BFSI); telecommunication; healthcare; retail; manufacturing; and others. Also, the regions covered are North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, Middle-East and Africa, and Latin America.
MarketsandMarkets expects the global Cyber Security Market to grow from $106.32 Billion in 2015 to$170.21 Billion by 2020, at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 9.8%. In the current scenario, North America is expected to be the largest market on the basis of spending and adoption of cyber security solutions and services. MarketsandMarkets expects North America to retain its position as the highest revenue generator for the Cyber Security Market during the entire forecast period, while significant revenue growth is expected from Latin American and Asia-Pacific regions.
Browse Related Reports
Intrusion Detection System/Intrusion Prevention System (IDS/IPS) Market (Host Based IDS/IPS, Network Based IDS/IPS, Wireless IDS/IPS, On-premise & Cloud Deployment, Appliances, Software, Professional Services) - Global Advancements Forecasts & Analysis (2014-2019)
Middle East Cyber Security Market by Technologies (IAM, DLP, UTM, IDS/IPS, Firewall, Risk & Compliance Management, Antivirus, SVM/SIEM, Disaster Recovery, DDOS Mitigation, Encryption, Web Filtering) & by Services - Market Forecasts and Analysis (2014-2019)
About MarketsandMarkets
MarketsandMarkets is world's No. 2 firm in terms of annually published premium market research reports. Serving 1700 global fortune enterprises with more than 1200 premium studies in a year, M&M is catering to multitude of clients across 8 different industrial verticals. We specialize in consulting assignments and business research across high growth markets, cutting edge technologies and newer applications. Our 850 fulltime analyst and SMEs at MarketsandMarkets are tracking global high growth markets following the "Growth Engagement Model - GEM". The GEM aims at proactive collaboration with the clients to identify new opportunities, identify most important customers, write "Attack, avoid and defend" strategies, identify sources of incremental revenues for both the company and its competitors.
M&M's flagship competitive intelligence and market research platform, "RT" connects over 200,000 markets and entire value chains for deeper understanding of the unmet insights along with market sizing and forecasts of niche markets. The new included chapters on Methodology and Benchmarking presented with high quality analytical infographics in our reports gives complete visibility of how the numbers have been arrived and defend the accuracy of the numbers.
We at MarketsandMarkets are inspired to help our clients grow by providing apt business insight with our huge market intelligence repository.
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SOURCE MarketsandMarkets
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· · · · ·
It seems porn counts as classified documents.
Shortly after Osama bin Laden was killed four years ago, Seal Team Six reportedly found a “stash of pornography” in his library of “modern” videos that was “fairly extensive.”
But the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which released much of bin Laden’s library files and books on May 20, nixed putting out the porn, our colleague Adam Taylor reported.
“We have no plans to release that at this point in time,” a DNI spokesman said, “Due to the nature of the content, the decision was made not to release it.”
So David Covucci, a blogger for the men’s Web site BroBible, decided to try a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the CIA on May 26 to get the stash. The agency, in a lightning-fast response dated June 4, said:
“With regard to the pornographic material Osama bin Laden had in his possession at the time of his death, responsive records,” — ready? — “should they exist, would be contained in operational files,” which are exempt from the FOIA.
What’s more, CIA information and privacy coordinator Michael Lavergne continued, “To the extent that this material exists, the CIA would be prohibited” by federal law, “from mailing obscene matter.”
Okay. But if, you know, the porn stash exists, the agency wouldn’t have to mail it. What if a group of reporters drove out to the Langley. . .?
Al Kamen, an award-winning columnist on the national staff of The Washington Post, created the “In the Loop” column in 1993.
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· · ·
Federal government spending on cybersecurity has increased substantially over the past several years, but a return on that investment remains elusive.
Breaches such as the one disclosed last week by the Office of Personnel Management and similar ones at the Internal Revenue Service, White House, and State Department in recent months show that federal agencies remain dangerously exposed to cyberattacks despite the billions of dollars poured into securing them.
The fiscal year 2016 federal budget allocates $14 billion on cybersecurity. That figure is a little more than 10 percent higher than the $12.5 billion set aside for 2015 and a massive 35 percent more than what the government spent in fiscal 2014. The cybersecurity budget represents about 16 percent of the total federal information technology budget of $86 billion for 2016, compared to the 4 percent or so that private companies typically allocate for the same purpose.
For 2016, the Department of Homeland Security has twice as much budget – $582 million – for just its EINSTEIN intrusion detection system and its continuous diagnostics and mitigation programs than JPMorgan Chase, the nation’s largest bank spends on its entire cybersecurity program annually.
Yet, the cybersecurity situation for many federal agencies appears to be getting worse instead of better. The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) latest report to Congress on the state of federal information security shows that federal agencies reported nearly 70,000 information security incidents in 2014, up 15 percent from the year before.
To be fair, a vast majority of the incidents involved non-cyber causes, such as a lost or stolen devices containing sensitive data, or pertained to policy violations, suspicious activity and attempted break-ins. At least some of the reported increase in security incidents last year also likely had to do with the fact that agencies are simply getting better at detecting intrusions.
Even so, the numbers are discouraging in the context of the spending on cybersecurity in recent years. In a recent survey conducted by Frost and Sullivan on behalf of security certification organization (ISC)², nearly half of the 1,800 respondents from the federal government sector felt that security has not improved over the past two years. About 17 percent said their agency’s security posture was actually worse because of their inability to keep pace with the changing threat environment and a lack of funds and more than half said their threat response times have not changed.
Multiple factors have contributed to the situation.
Just because the government has increased cybersecurity spending does not mean that all agencies have benefited equally from the largesse. A substantial chunk of the budget has typically gone to the Department of Defense and the DHS. Of the $14 billion set aside for cyber in the 2016 budget, more than $5.5 billion is meant for the DOD.
In 2014, the DOD and the DHS alone accounted for $10.3 billion of the total $12.7 billion in IT security spending reported by federal agencies. The DHS spent some $473 million on preventing malicious cyberactivity across government agencies and another $722 million detecting, analyzing, and mitigating threats on behalf of other agencies. Meanwhile, the OPM spent a relatively paltry $7 million on the same two categories in 2014 even though the agency stores personally identifiable information on 32 million people, more than most other federal agencies.
“The big guys get the big dollars because they have so much to protect,” says Howard Schmidt, former White House cyberecurity coordinatior and special assistant to President Obama. The smaller ones don’t always do as well, he says.
Strong authentication is another major issue, Mr. Schmidt says.
Many federal cybersecurity incidents can be avoided simply by implementing stronger processes for authenticating government workers to systems and networks. Yet, too many agencies and federal workers continue to rely solely on antiquated username and password mechanisms for accessing critical systems and data. The OMB estimates that as of 2014 there were more than 134,280 user accounts that had privileged, or elevated, access to federal systems, but were protected with just a username and password. Many attacks involve hackers stealing such credentials and using them to gain full access to networks and systems.
A 2004 presidential directive signed by then-President George W. Bush requires all federal agencies to issue what are known as personal identification verification (PIV) cards to all employees and contractors. The cards are meant to give agencies a strong secondary way to authenticate users.
Yet, more than 11 years after the directive was passed, PIV card use remains dismally low across the federal government, Schmidt says. Only about 70 percent of federal employees have PIV cards, but it is a number that drops to an even lower 40 percent if the defense department is excluded. A total of 16 federal agencies, including recently breached entities like the OPM and State, allow a majority of users to log into their systems with just a username and password.
Individual agency efforts to bolster cybersecurity are also often hampered by the interconnected nature of federal systems, many of which are often ancient and antiquated, says Jasper Graham, a former technical director at the NSA and currently a senior vice president at security firm Darktrace.
“Even if one agency can upgrade and move right along they still have to maintain interconnectivity,” with other agency systems, Mr. Graham says. Protecting such connections can be a substantial financial and administrative burden for agencies. “Government systems have to deal with a tremendous legacy issue. After a while you end up in a situation where your security is only as strong as your weakest link.”
Cumbersome and bureaucratic procurement practices don’t make the cybersecurity task any easier, he says. Every single item the government wants to buy has to be bid upon and go through an elaborate approval and procurement process that is not just time consuming but expensive as well. Where private companies can quickly acquire what they need to secure their networks, government agencies are bound in red tape.
“Even for things that should not be difficult there’s a process. Nothing is straightforward” says Graham.
According to Alan Paller, research director at the cybersecurity training outfit the SANS Institute, a skills mismatch is another aggravating factor.
Government agencies, he says, spend a lot on security but just not correctly. Many agencies are literally bristling with sophisticated tools for detecting and monitoring intrusions and threats. “But they are mainly watched by contractors who do not know what to do with the data,” generated by these systems, he says. “The tools can find the problem, but it is the high tech people who know where to look that are missing.”
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· · · · ·
Former US intel chief calls Iran nuclear deal “wishful thinking”
DEBKAfile June 10, 2015, 6:44 PM (IDT)
In written testimony to the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, Retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said according to Fox News: "It is clear that the nuclear deal is not a permanent fix but merely a placeholder.” The 10-year timeframe on parts of the deal "only make sense" if the US thinks a "wider reconciliation" with Iran is possible. But, in Gen Flynn’s view, this is "wishful thinking." He added that "regime change" is the best way to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program. Iran has "every intention" of building a nuclear weapon, and their desire to destroy Israel is "very real."
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The ambassador of the U.S. to NATO, Douglas Lute said on Tuesday that Sweden will ensure itself with the support of the U.S. and NATO if it joins the pact, in an interview broadcasted by the Swedish state radio.
The ambassador added that Sweden's NATO membership will be beneficial for both parts.
Swedish state radio EKOT said that the ambassador pointed to the necessity of Sweden's NATO membership by mentioning the ongoing military exercises held conjointly by 13 NATO member countries with 6 thousand soldiers in Baltic states.
"Sweden may not expect any help from the U.S. and NATO should there be any attack against it. If Sweden becomes a NATO member, it will protect itself from any attacks," stated ambassador Lute, in the news piece broadcasted by the Swedish state radio.
Stating that the Swedish army is equipped with modern weaponry, the envoy expressed that Sweden will contribute much to NATO.
He also said that he is conscious of the fact that the Swedish parliament is required to pass a bill to decide to join NATO, and added that the parliament should reach a decision, keeping in mind the benefits to be reaped by both parts.
The military exercises held to increase the defense capacity of NATO started on 1 June in the Baltic states and will continue until 20 June.
The ambassador added that Sweden's NATO membership will be beneficial for both parts.
Swedish state radio EKOT said that the ambassador pointed to the necessity of Sweden's NATO membership by mentioning the ongoing military exercises held conjointly by 13 NATO member countries with 6 thousand soldiers in Baltic states.
"Sweden may not expect any help from the U.S. and NATO should there be any attack against it. If Sweden becomes a NATO member, it will protect itself from any attacks," stated ambassador Lute, in the news piece broadcasted by the Swedish state radio.
Stating that the Swedish army is equipped with modern weaponry, the envoy expressed that Sweden will contribute much to NATO.
He also said that he is conscious of the fact that the Swedish parliament is required to pass a bill to decide to join NATO, and added that the parliament should reach a decision, keeping in mind the benefits to be reaped by both parts.
The military exercises held to increase the defense capacity of NATO started on 1 June in the Baltic states and will continue until 20 June.
Credit: Hospira
NEW YORK — What if the technology meant to save your life could be used to kill you?
Modern hospitals are filled with sophisticated equipment designed to make medical care safer. But new research suggests that some of those machines can be hacked, potentially allowing someone to give you a fatal dosage of medication.
Billy Rios, an independent security researcher, found that drug infusion pumps made by medical device company Hospira can be remotely tampered with. A hacker can tap into the pumps and change the amount of medication they’ve been set to dispense.
As first reported in Wired, the vulnerability affects several different versions of Hospira pumps. The Lake Forest, Illinois, based company says it has sold hundreds of thousands of the infusion pumps to hospitals worldwide.
The pumps are designed to take human error out of the drug dispensing equation. That’s a potentially life-saving task: A Journal of Patient Safety study from 2013 found that medical errors kill between 210,000 and 440,000 patients each year — 35 percent of which are due to incorrect dispensing of medications.
Many Hospira pumps contain barcode readers that prevent hospital staff from dispensing incorrect medication. And they have alarm systems set to notify staff if they set the dosage levels too high.
In May 2014, Rios discovered 100 vulnerabilities in the communications system in the Hospira PCA 3 Lifecare infusion pump software. Among them, a hacker could set the dosage limits on Hospira drug infusion pumps higher. That would prevent the alarms from sounding if a nurse or doctor accidentally gave the patient too high of a dose.
Rios notified Hospira, but the company failed to respond to him. Hospira stayed mum on the issue until April when Jeremy Richards, another researcher, publicly disclosed the vulnerability. In May, the FDA and the Department of Homeland Security’s Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team sent out advisories notifying hospitals of the potential danger of Hospira pumps.
In a statement, Hospira says it is working with the FDA and DHS on a fix for its PCA 3 pump. But Rios says that Hospira has refused to conduct an analysis on its other pumps.
“So I purchased some additional Hospira infusion pumps and did the research myself,” Rios told CNNMoney.
Not only did Rios find that Hospira’s other pumps are vulnerable, he also discovered the potentially much more dangerous vulnerability: A hacker could purposefully give a patient a fatal overdose.
Hospira maintained that none of its devices installed in hospitals have been hacked, and it has worked with its customers about how to address the vulnerabilities. The company noted that hacking a pump would require an attacker to break through the hospital’s own security systems before hacking into the pump.
“We will continue to investigate any feedback we receive on our devices,” said Tareta Adams, a spokeswoman for Hospira. “We will also continue to communicate with customers regarding cybersecurity, and software and infusion pump updates and/or enhancements.”
The company also said its latest Plum 360 and LifeCare PCA 7.0 infusion systems were designed with cybersecurity protections in mind. The LifeCare PCA 7.0 pump is still pending FDA approval, and Rios hasn’t fully tested the Plum 360 yet. But he said the Plum 360 runs the same software that the other affected pumps use.
40.712784 -74.005941
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· · · ·
The Senate Intelligence Committee’s leaders — Sens. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) and Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) — have split over the planned path forward for their stalled cybersecurity bill.
Burr and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) are trying to attach the cyber bill — intended to boost the public-private exchange of hacking information — to the annual defense spending bill under consideration this week.
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It’s an effort to push the cyber bill up in the congressional queue in the wake of the massive data breach at the Office of Personnel Management that exposed 4 million federal workers’ records.
But Feinstein denounced the plan on the Senate floor Wednesday, calling it “a mistake” and saying the tactic would put the bill “in real trouble.”
“Filing the cybersecurity bill as an amendment to the defense authorization bill prompted a lot of legitimate and understandable concern from both sides of the aisle,” said Feinstein. "People want a debate on the legislation and they want an opportunity to offer relevant amendments.”
Critics of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), such as Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), have pledged to offer privacy-enhancing amendments to the bill once it hit the floor.
They’re concerned the measure would simply shuttle more sensitive data to the National Security Agency (NSA) just weeks after Congress voted to rein in the spy agency’s authority.
“A number of my colleagues would like to propose amendments, as is their right,” Feinstein said. “And I expect I would support some of them and would oppose some of them. But the Senate should have an opportunity to fully consider the bill, to receive the input of other committees with jurisdiction in this area.”
CISA does have broad bipartisan backing. Two complementary companion pieces of legislation passed the House in April by wide margins. The White House has cautiously backed those bills and indicated it could support the final product if the Senate passed its version.
Both parties agree that expanding the exchange of cyber threat data between the private sector and government will help the country bolster its cyber defenses.
But the move by leadership to tie the cyber bill to defense spending has threatened that bipartisan comity, Feinstein said.
Unless the Senate considers CISA separately, Feinstein predicted, “we won’t have a bipartisan vote, I believe, because like it or not, no matter how simple — and I’ve been through two bills now — this is not an easy bill to draft because there are conflicts on both sides.”
Feinstein called on McConnell to bring up CISA immediately following the defense bill.
“I very much hope that the Majority Leader will reconsider this path and that once we have finished with the defense authorization bill, the Senate can take up, consider and hopefully approve the cybersecurity legislation,” she said.
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· ·
By Stephen Losey, Staff writer 1:08 p.m. EDT June 10, 2015
Air Force Personnel Center(Photo: Air Force)
The Air Force has selected 18 officers for promotion to colonel, 1,499 to be promoted to lieutenant colonel, and 57 for promotion to major.
According to statistics provided Wednesday by the Air Force Personnel Center, 54 newly selected majors were in the promotion zone, and the remaining three were above-the-zone. There were 65 officers considered for promotion to major, resulting in an 88 percent selection rate. All newly promoted majors are judge advocate generals.
Of the lieutenant colonel selectees, 48 are JAGs, and the remaining 1,451 are line of the Air Force officers. There were 1,288 in-the-zone selectees, 65 above-the-zone selectees, and 146 below-the-zone selectees. With 6,440 officers considered for promotion to O-5, that resulted in an overall selection rate of 23 percent and an the in-the-zone selection rate was 72 percent.
All of the newly selected colonels are JAGs. There were 14 in-the-zone selectees -- with a 50 percent selection rate -- three above-the-zone selectees and one below-the-zone selectee. The overall selection rate for the 127 officers considered for promotion was 14 percent.
The list of officers selected for promotion is as follows:
Major
Adams, Brian H
Adams, Ronald Scott
Carlson, Bradly Adam
Carns, Marc G
Carroll Tipton, Andrea R
Coon, Mark E
Corrothers, Heather Noelle
Coulter, Terry Lee
Devito, Allison Anne
Dubose, Hugh Hammond Iii
Dykstra, Christopher M
Ervie, Phillip Lee
Ford, Benjamin D
Frenck, Eric Howard
Frommelt, Nicholas C
Gotfredson, Kevin Wayne
Halldin, Andrew G
Haney, Aimee Rochelle
Hannon, Jeffrey J
Harley, Jason Michael
Hilton, Theresa Lynn
Horton, Noel E
Jones, Christie A
Kershner, Kelby Daniel
Kirk, Aaron Douglas
Korsak, Dean W
Kress, Sarah Loretta
Langlois, Malcolm Lafrance
Lorek, Jeffrey Joseph
Lowry, Alexander Leonardo
Mabis, Kurt Alan
Mallone, Megan Cramer
Marshall, Jacob Robert
Mcmillan, Micah
Newsome, Ted Adam
Obrien, Michael Edward
Phillips, Stella Jean
Rahn, Brianne Elizabeth
Ramagewhite, Matthew Wallac
Ramer, Jacob Allen
Ream, Matthew Gaylord
Sanders, Christopher Lane
Schrama, Michael Alan
Schrider, Richard Joseph
Schwartz, Michael Aaron
Shure, Laurenann L
Snyder, Jeremy Nathaniel
Steelman, James Ronald Iii
Stuard, Jarrod H
Switzer, Jessica L
Thompson, Robert Mathews
Van Maasdam, Rachel Lynne
Vanmaasdam, Matthew D
Vaughn, Melvin Arthur Ii
Vogel, Karl Jeffrey
Walker, David Lee
Wood, Mary Jean
Lieutenant colonel, JAG
Ahmed, Afsana
Artz, Kenneth A
Barker, Andrew R
Bartoe, Chelsea L
Beaudette, Peter Thomas Jr
Dennis, Naomi Porterfiel
Didomenico, Lauren N
Durkes, Paul E
Elameto, Sean M
Fanniff, Todd J
Felsen, Michael J
Gabriele, Thomas A
Gagne, Brian R
Gartland, Charles J
Gentry, James G
Hendricks, Ryan A
Hill, Matthew Edward
Hodges, Scott A
Hopkins, Michael Todd
Jones, Christopher David
Jones, Jack M Jr
Keen, Jason F
Kindness, Tyson D
King, Michael G
Lund, Matthew T
Mahmud, Amer
Mccall, Kristin K
Mccall, Matthew N
Mccue, Nicholas William
Mountin, Sarah M
Page, John Merritt
Park, Tracy A
Richard, Lisa M
Schichtle, David R
Schubbe, Christopher Joseph
Schwomeyer, Patrick M
Silverman, Justin A
Smart, Maxwell S
Stingl, Jacqueline M
Sutanto, Felix I
Swart, Sara A
Teter, Brian D
Thompson, Gregory J
Van Schoyck, Scott A
Vorhees, Robert Eugene Ii
Warren, Charles G
Watson, Daniel J
Yager, Reggie D
Lieutenant colonel, LAF
Abel, Brandon R
Abrams, Alicia D
Adames, Luis J
Adams, George E
Adams, Isaac E
Adams, John F Jr
Adcock, Brian S
Agnew, John T
Aikman, Robert A Ii
Akeredolu, Daniel O
Akers, Adam T
Akers, James D Ii
Albers, Michael S
Alblinger, Melissa M
Alderman, John E
Aldrich, James D
Aldridge, Stephen C
Alexander, David S
Alexander, Garry J
Alexander, Kerri V
Alexander, Perry D
Alford, Daniel M
Alfred, Perry G
Allen, Billy S
Allen, Christopher B
Allen, Christopher Ian
Allen, Christopher W
Allen, Kyle S
Allman, Jearl C
Allred, Lance P
Altman, Bradley D
Amendt, Mark A
Amig, Matthew B
Anders, Craig A
Anderson, Kelly S
Anderson, Matthew E
Anderson, Ryan J
Anderson, Stephen G
Andrewsen, Todd R
Anglin, Christopher J
Antwine, Cassandra P
Arbore, Jayvin L
Arnott, Stephen P
Asay, Seth W
Ashby, Albert J
Ashby, Geoffrey Michael
Aston, Samuel L
Aul, Michael L
Aupke, Jennifer M
Austin, James H
Avilesfigueroa, Nelson
Avilla, Gabriel C
Ayres, Gerred J
Azaravich, Frank A
Babiarz, Paul T
Baca, Marcos Manuel
Baccheschi, Nancy L
Badger, Eric D
Badgett, James A
Badgett, Nancy E
Baggett, Jason F
Baker, John M
Baker, Judd W
Baker, Michael B
Ballak, Michael
Ballard, William H
Ballinger, Justin D
Banister, Rickie A
Banks, Aaron B
Barbour, Benjamin P
Barker, Jeffrey L
Barnard, Joseph F
Barrett, Nathan E
Barrett, Tracie A
Barroqueiro, Suzanne M
Barta, Jason R
Bartels, Jason R
Bartley, Carolyn R
Bartley, David R Iii
Bartoe, Zachary D
Barton, Charles J
Bartran, James R Ii
Bass, Patrick J
Batchelor, Michael T Jr
Bayne, Clifford M
Baysinger, Richard A
Beach, Jonathan R
Beal, Joseph Delane
Beal, Robert J
Bean, Thomas M
Beattie, Christopher J
Beatty, John Donald
Beauter, William M
Beaver, Christopher D
Beck, Peter L
Beecher, Brian D
Beers, Brandon C
Beg, Meredith S
Bennett, Johnathan E
Benson, John D
Berg, Ashley J
Berisha, Met M
Berrios, David
Berven, Andrew P
Beskar, Shawn P
Biagini, Mircea M
Bice, Ernest T
Bichler, Stephen F
Biedermann, Joshua M
Biggs, Timothy S
Bilbo, Garret J
Birge, Ronnie H Jr
Bishop, Gary L Ii
Bishop, Kevin J
Black, Scott P
Blanchet, Edmund J
Blauser, Michael J
Blech, James J
Blom, Zak S
Boardman, Nathan D
Bobnock, Paul A
Bode, Todd F
Bodge, Ryan A
Boe, Michael Daren
Boehm, James T
Bofferding, Steven M
Boisvert, Jason M
Booker, Joseph S Jr
Bosque, Jeffrey K
Boswell, Jason M
Boswell, Michael L
Bottolfson, Carl B
Bounds, Jordan T
Bowden, Jason T
Bowen, Arnold H
Bowman, Geoffrey G
Boyd, James D
Boyd, Ronald G
Bozarth, Joe T Iv
Bradford, Wesley P
Bradley, Kenneth C
Brandenburg, Jeffery R
Brander, Brooke K
Brandimore, Scott D
Branick, Anthony
Brannon, Michael J
Brasse, Geoffrey R
Brazel, Sean C
Breed, Mark W
Bregand, David K
Brice, Matthew A
Bristow, David S
Brittingham, Jacob A C
Brockhaus, Matthew F
Bronder, Timothy J
Brooks, Bentley A
Brooks, Frank
Broshear, Nathan D
Broussard, Steven M
Brow, Mark Edward
Brown, Aaron B
Brown, Gabriel C
Brown, Kevin L
Brown, Leroy Jr
Brown, Rhett W
Browning, James R
Broyles, Philip N
Bruno, Matthew P
Bryant, Christopher L
Bryant, Philip A
Bubar, Matthew J
Buchholz, Douglas C
Buckner, Bobby D Jr
Buckreis, John T
Buckwalter, Hans Nicholas
Buehn, Cheryl N
Buie, Jonathan J
Bunko, Tracy A
Burke, Donald S
Burks, Bryon J
Bury, Matthew M
Bush, Kevin R
Butler, Tommy R
Butson, Brian E
Byrum, Steven S
Cabatu, Emersonn C
Cadice, Joshua A
Caffey, Jared R
Cain, Patrick D
Calhoun, Paul J
Callahan, Sean M
Callahan, Sean M
Camel, Ricardo La
Camilli, Louis M
Campbell, Kevin F
Cannon, Christopher C
Canopy, Peggy L
Cantu, Kathryn Rhonda
Canupp, Ellen T
Capper, Justin Richard
Carden, Chris E
Carle, Jonathan J H
Carlson, Randall E
Carlton, Marissa Anne
Carmichael, Kenneth R
Carns, Jennifer A Branigan
Carr, Andrew D
Carrillo, Rene N
Carrizales, Micheal
Carroll, Benjamin L
Carroll, Patrick G
Carson, Thomas M
Carter, John D
Carville, Ryan D
Caspers, Matthew S
Caswell, David J
Cato, Jonathan B
Cavallaro, Kristen L
Cecil, Dawn Renee
Chamberlin, John M V
Chang, Mark D
Chapa, Mark A
Chapman, George L
Charleston, Michelle M
Chase, Christopher M
Chavez, Annalaura
Chenelle, Stephen J
Chiaramonte, Michael V
Childs, Loyd G
Chism, Jason C
Chivis, Myron Lee
Chock, Kelii H
Choi, Paul J
Christensen, Lisa H
Christensen, Michael Wayne
Christensen, Scott D
Christensen, Travis E
Christian, Ty
Christianson, John A
Christy, Alexander C
Cirino, Donovan
Clagett, Cory L
Clapper, Michael D
Clark, Nathan D
Clark, Thomas B
Clausen, Matthew R
Clayton, William J Iii
Clendenin, Jason D
Cline, Michael R
Cline, Scott D
Clough, Ronald V
Cluche, Jason E
Cochran, Brett W
Codrington, Kevin W
Coffee, Steven L
Coil, Daniel J
Colella, Anthony C
Collazo, Hector L
Colletti, Stephen F
Collier, John M
Collins, Jordan S
Collins, Matthew L
Collins, Raymond S
Colvin, Jeremy W
Congdon, Andrew B
Conlan, Michael A
Conn, Kit R
Connelly, William G Jr
Cook, Timothy J
Cook, Todd M
Cooper, James A
Cope, Christopher J
Copper, Brian L Jr
Copper, Paul E
Corea, Jessica C
Cornett, John W
Cosme, Jesus M
Coulter, Loren M
Covacci, Claudio G
Crabtree, Andrew P
Craig, Daniel A
Croker, Barry A
Crooks, Brian O
Crosby, Barry D
Crotts, Ray E Ii
Crum, James S
Crum, Kaveri T
Csoma, Ernest
Cuadra, Pedro Iii
Cuenca, Russell B
Cullen, Andrew J
Cummings, Devin J
Cummins, Shannon Christophe
Cunningham, Christopher K
Cunningham, James A
Cureton, Robert M
Curran, Douglas M
Curran, Robert D
Curtis, Brent W
Curtis, Katrina L
Czesak, David M
Dahman, Justin T
Dailey, Kenny W
Dalby, Timothy D
Dammeier, David C
Damron, John J
Daniel, Tracy A
Danielsen, Eric C
Danner Jones, Mary B
Dasilva, September Shannon
Davis, Kevin J
Davis, Linda L
Davis, Mark E
Davis, Matthew T
Davis, Robert D
Davisson, Jerry Alvin
Davitch, Mindy Ap
Day, Jeffery H
Day, Timothy J
Dechellis, Kenneth A
Decker, Daniel Devon
Dehaas, Stephan R
Delacruz, Delfinariel C
Delavega, Ciro E Iii
Deleon, Armando Jr
Delosrios, Nora E
Dennis, Jeffrey R
Denny, Scott E
Deppensmith, Randall D
Derenzy, Scott William
Desantis, Andrew C Jr
Devonshire, Nathan K
Dewever, Kevin G
Dexter, Heidi L
Dexter, William T
Diaz, Ricardo M
Diaz, Robert L
Dicapua, Nicholas K
Dickenson, Jack T
Diehl, Justin L
Diehl, Virginia Marie
Diers, Beau Eugene
Diesselhorst, Hollie N
Digsby, Jeffrey T
Dipietro, Maxwell D
Dirkes, Wayne K
Distelzweig, Kurt J
Do, James J
Doby, Leroy J
Dollarhide, Gene
Donaldson, Brandon L
Donnelly, Peter J
Dorhosti, Abion C
Dotson, Trace E
Doty, Joshua R
Dougherty, Curtis W
Douglas, Kyle W
Douglas, Nathaniel J
Dow, Brandon K
Drass, David J
Drossner, Matthew S
Dubose, Ephane B
Dugan, Patrick O
Dunlap, John E
Duran, Stephen R
Dutkiewicz, Erik L
Echard, Bret
Eck, John F Jr
Edgar, Daniel A
Edmonds, Corey K
Edwards, Alex C
Edwards, Nicholas S
Edwards, Shay L
Ehrler, Anamaria Ortega
Eide, Stephen T
Ekundayo, Adeleke O
Ellis, Brian
Ellis, Ellen M
Ellis, Michael P
Elmerick, Brian A
Emminger, Wendy A
Engemann, Jonathon C
Entwistle, Rockwell T
Epper, Michael J
Ernest, Matthew D
Ernest, Richard D
Erpelding, David R
Evans, Joshua M
Evans, Sean M
Eveland, Keith W
Fadul, Jose E
Fallon, Charles A
Faminu, Oluyomi T
Fann, Kenneth C
Fann, Scott S
Farrow, James R
Fast, Timothy W
Fay, John J Jr
Ferguson, Stacey L
Fetters, Kenneth H
Feuring, Jason A
Feuring, Jeffrey C
Fiechtner, Robb B
Fielder, Clarence Jr
Fields, Jason N
Fields, Michael E
Figueroa, Jesus R
Figueroa, Shana S
Finke, Aaron W
Finkler, Andrew J
Finnicum, Shawn R
Fish, Brett W
Fisher, Andrew T
Fisher, Duane L
Fisher, Garrett C
Florko, John J
Foley, Bryan R
Folker, Robert D Jr
Fontana, Christopher J
Fontejon, John V
Fontinel, Mathew L
Forbes, Timothy J
Fore, Robert B
Formell, Jennifer L
Foster, Timothy P
Fowler, Grant M
Fowler, John D
Fox, Kimberly A
Foy, John D
Frakes, Joshua T
Franck, Derrick R
Franklin, Jerry L Jr
Frantz, Paul A
Fredin, Paul W
Fredrickson, Nathan P
Freeman, James A
Freestrom, Rachel G
Frey, Andrew M Jr
Friedman, Francis D
Friend, Samuel A
Fritz, Timothy J
Fry, Brian J
Fryman, Ian
Fuller, Christian M
Gaetke, Kathryn K
Gafford, Jarrett R
Gallagher, David E
Gallagher, Jeffrey E
Gallant, Brent K
Gallegos, Fredrick
Gallucci, Michael L
Gamauf, Eric C
Gaona, Joseph M
Garcia, Andrew M
Gardner, Evan H
Garner, Jeffrey A
Garza, Vidal S
Gaustad, Jonathan J
Gebhardt, Leslie K M
Geffert, Thomas J
Geisel, Christopher D
Gentry, Megan L
George, Blake H
Gerard, Jason Robert
Germany, Michael P
Gibbs, Christopher G
Gilbert, Andrew P
Gilbert, Jonathan M
Gilbreth, Justin M
Gillespie, Kendall D
Gillette, Patrick D
Ginez, Jason F
Gingras, James M
Giovannetti, Robert G
Gipson, Jeffrey A
Glass, Andrew J
Godwin, Archie E
Godwin, Spencer E
Goldsworthy, Joe E
Gombar, Michelle L
Gonzalez, Thomas E
Goode, Sean C
Goodpasture, Adam E
Goossen, Paul A
Goulding, Earthan J
Graff, Michael E
Graham, Annie Jenkins
Graham, Nicholas C
Graham, Paul R
Graham, Sharonda L
Gramling, Monica Dziubinski
Gray, Aaron T
Gray, Andrew J
Gray, Mark C
Gray, Stephen E
Green, Brian M
Green, Jason H
Green, Johnnie C
Green, Joseph
Greenwood, Matthew B
Greenwood, Roger T
Gregg, Scott A
Grider, Casey M
Grimm, Christian L
Grimm, Jonathan P
Gritter, Jeffrey T
Groff, John A
Growden, Michael A
Gugas, Chad M
Gustafson, Erik R
Haas, Erica Marie L
Haase, Curt A
Hagemeyer, Christopher
Hager, Aaron S
Hale, Carmen Jaime
Hale, Douglas R
Hall, Amy N
Hall, David Michael
Hall, Jennifer H
Hall, Levi B
Hall, Timothy S
Hall, Zachary G
Hallagin, James D
Hamlett, Kenny W
Hampel, John S
Hancock, Erin L
Hannan, Lance C
Hanson, Christopher M
Hanson, Mark A
Hanson, Matthew E
Hanson, Michael O Ii
Hargis, Matthew D
Hargrove, William R
Harley, Thomas P
Harney, Kenneth M
Harris, Jared R
Harris, Nathan S
Harrison, Carina R
Harrison, Melissa A
Hartsel, Jamey L
Hatton, David W
Haufschild, Jason A
Haugland, Jessica M
Hawkins, Joshua B
Haws, Brian D
Hayden, Casey P
Hebert, Robert W
Hedgpeth, Jeffrey L
Heil, Daniel H
Helms, Christian P
Helton, Freddie L
Helton, Jason W
Hemmingsen, Martin D
Henderson, Richard W
Hendrix, Constance D
Henry, Carman E
Heren, Henry G Iv
Hermann, Scott J
Hernandez, Carlos A
Herron, Taylor O
Hethcock, Michael P
Heusser, Randall J
Hickie, Elia B
Hickie, Mark M
Higgins, Nathan A
Hignite, Greg A
Hildebrand, Gene H
Hinson, Neal H
Hipps, Kristin B
Hobbs, Brian G
Hobbs, Shawn
Hobbs, Stephen A
Hobgood, Harold E
Hobgood, Kelly K
Hogan, Garrett K
Hoger, Jeffrey N
Hoglund, Mcarthur
Hoisington, Andrew J
Holland, Courtney R
Hollis, Trevor C
Holmes, Joshua M
Holmes, Kenneth W
Holtzclaw, Damion L
Hook, Patrick J
Horn, Robert E
Horst, Eric M
Hosler, Daniel C
House, Douglas H
Howell, Brad N
Howell, Gary L Ii
Howell, Lisa M
Hudson, James W
Huebinger, Brad S
Hughes, James D
Hughes, Jason G
Hughes, Ryan J
Hughes, Scott T
Huhmann, Gregory P
Huibregtse, Matthew J
Hulun, Richard J
Humphreys, Clay J
Hunt, Stephen M
Hunter, Andrew P
Hurt, Ronald D
Husmann, Amy S
Huso, James M
Husted, Allen D
Huston, David D
Hyatt, Andrew W
Hyde, Milo W Iv
Idleman, Jason W
Ihrig, Robert D
Ingle, Ryan C
Ingram, Michael A
Inscoe, Matthew L
Isacco, John J
Isokane, Ryan W
Iverson, Tracey L
Iwanenko, Derrick J
Izdepski, Gregory L
Jackson, Dean R
Jackson, Janelle T H
Jackson, Joshua A
Jackson, Marcus J Iv
Jacobsen, Mark D
James, Hayley S
Jansheski, John W
Jennrich, Rodger A
Jensen, Benjamin Denmark
Jensen, James C
Jensen, Matthew V
Jewell, Corey A
Jewell, Michael J
Jimenez, William D
Johncour, Peter F
Johnsen, Benjamin A
Johnson, Benji L
Johnson, Charles C
Johnson, Creg A
Johnson, Leonard W Jr
Johnson, Nicholas J
Johnson, Scott C
Johnson, William R
Johnston, Jeremy A
Johnston, Robert L
Jones, Christopher
Jones, David Nathaniel
Jones, Henry L Jr
Jones, Nevah M
Jones, Seana Arnette
Jordan, Mickey
Joyner, Thomas A
Jungquist, Michael J
Kallemyn, Benjamin S
Kaminsky, Benjamin A
Kampa, Dina L
Kapadia, Ashok N
Kapp, Christopher S
Karamarinov, Miroslav P
Karas, Andrew S
Karrs, Nathanael L
Kastner, William R
Kaya, David M
Kearney, Michael A
Keethler, Nathan T
Keithley, Lance M
Keller, Elizabeth Gayle
Keller, Gregory G
Kelley, Matthew D
Kelly, Brooke C
Kelly, Michael S
Kelly, Paula A
Kendall, Deborah A
Kennedy, Rome E
Kenney, Andrew J
Kent, Phyllis H
Kenyon, Joshua J
Keown, Christopher G
Ketterer, Christopher D
Kettles, Thomas R Jr
Khan, Umar M
Kiefer, Kory S
Kilgore, Terrence R
Kilian, Nathaniel D
Kilker, Johnpaul
Kilker, Kathryn M
Killeen, Christopher J
Kimball, Mark E
Kimberlin, Kyle F
Kimbrough, Jennifer L
Kind, Richard K
King, Barbara A
King, Norbert A Ii
King, Teresa A
Kinsel, Wayne C
Kisby, Douglas
Kistler, Charles E
Klohr, John M
Knechtel, Julie A
Knerl, Daniel J
Knerr, Scott F
Kneuer, Jason D
Knight, David M
Knight, Dennis W
Knight, Emily A
Koch, Janelle L
Kolesiak, Patrick J
Komensky, Joseph J Jr
Koonce, Brandon D
Kosobud, John K
Koutsoheras, Alexander J
Kovaskitz, Seth M
Kozak, Matthew C
Kraus, Sheri L
Krebs, Andrew B
Krol, Chauncy V
Kubacz, Joshua L
Kulchar, Jason E
Kulpa, Paul B
Kuster, Aaron S
Kuykendall, Mehtap
Lacouture, Eric J
Laird, Christopher R
Laird, Zachary M
Lambert, Daniel S
Lammert, Rodney W
Lamontagne, Robert E
Lamothe, Kristina L
Landale, Karen Annefisher
Landez, Mark M
Landreth, James E
Landwehr, Christopher M
Lane, Aaron M
Lane, Eric S
Langborgh, Adam V
Laribee, Trevor J
Larson, Craig D
Larson, Reid Allen
Lassere, Chad J
Lasso, Jose L
Lauderdale, Craig P Jr
Laughlin, Clayton R
Lawson, Jonathan M
Laye, Darryl M
Lazar, Andrew T
Le, Dung T
Leach, Jeremy D
Leachman, John R
Leaman, Sean A
Leatherwood, Jonathan A
Lee, Adam T
Lee, Andy C
Lee, Jonathan C
Lee, Robert A Jr
Leggio, Derek Antonio
Lehto, Christopher N
Leifer, Brandon R
Leigh, Elliott J
Leija, Pete A
Lensgraf, Shane
Less, Seanna M
Lewis, Angela M
Lewis, Scott S
Lewis, Sean R
Lewis, Susannah B
Ley, Ryan B
Lieber, Matthew J
Ligon, Derek L
Lingle, Brandon J
Linton, David M
Linton, Richard C
Littig, Justin D
Little, Gibb P
Little, Joseph O
Little, Nekitha M
Little, Wardrias D
Lohse, Morgan Park
Lomedico, Anthony B
Long, James Edwin Iii
Long, Jeffrey D
Lopez, Andres I
Lord, Erick Dean
Loveland, Susan M
Loveless, Brian S
Lovett, Steven R
Lowe, Patrick R
Lowery, Craig A
Lowery, Karalyne Suzanne
Lucero, Ryan E
Lugo, Alfredo
Lundeby, Joshua D
Lundin, Douglas C
Lutmer, William D
Lutter, Charles W Iii
Lynn, Michael D
Lyon, Stephen G
Lyons, Audra
Lyons, Francis R Iv
Macgarvey, Mason E
Mack, Jeffrey M
Mackenzie, Adam S
Maddocks, Sally C
Magee, Robert P
Magruder, Daniel L
Mai, Max T
Maldonado, Valentin Iii
Mandes, Lisa W
Manning, Matthew R
Manning, Michael J
Mansfield, Brian J
Marce, David W
Marchand, Shane C
Maresh, Nathan P
Marino, Francis R
Markel, Adam T
Marlatt, Michael A
Marler, Jeffery S
Marshall, Kenneth
Marshall, Tommy V Ii
Martin, Leo A Jr
Martin, Melvin A
Martin, Scott C
Martin, Tracie L
Martini, Dimitri C
Masterson, John P
Mather, Benjamin D
Mathis, Robert G
Matlock, Damon C
Mauze, Charles W
Maymi, Carl William
Mays, David A
Mazzei, Christopher M
Mcafee, John S
Mcalear, Christopher R
Mccane, Joseph D
Mccarthy, Bethany Joy
Mccartney, Michael A
Mcclintock, Patrick K
Mcclune, Sean R
Mcconnell, Robert C
Mcculloch, Jesse S
Mcdowell, Craig A
Mcfarland, Robert J
Mcfeeters, Michael P
Mcgee, Jennifer A
Mcgill, Joseph A
Mcglone, Kevin T
Mcgough, Ryan S
Mcgraw, David J
Mcguinness, Matthew S
Mcguire, Bryan T
Mcguire, Daniel J
Mcham, Douglas P
Mckiernan, Jeffrey A
Mckinsey, Samuel L
Mckissick, Zachariah D
Mclaughlin, William J Iii
Mclean, Douglas R
Mcleese, Keagan L
Mcleod, Michael L
Mcmahon, Kevin A
Mcmenamy, Brian R
Mcmullen, Charles L
Mcwilliam, Peter R
Meadows, Clifford Alan
Medlicott, William P
Medykowski, Stanley
Meerstein, Timothy J
Meihls, Marie L
Meister, Stephen L
Menath, Ryan T
Menschner, Andrew S
Merkle, Lacresha A
Merrell, Trevor T
Meshanko, Matthew D
Messing, Angela M
Michaelson, Clint A
Mickelson, Kent T
Mignery, Alex D
Mikes, James A
Milarch, Benjamin A
Miller, Carl F
Miller, Christopher J
Miller, Michael A
Miller, Nathaniel J
Miller, Paul A
Miller, Robert D
Mink, Samuel R
Minnich, Adam L
Mintz, Clinton P
Miscisin, Andrew C
Mitchell, Melody H
Mitchell, Robert B
Mittelmark, Cary D
Mobley, Merrell D
Moe, Kyle A
Moeller, Christopher L
Monaco, Joseph E
Montano, Vincent J Jr
Montier, Kelly M
Montminy, David P
Moon, Kelli R
Mooney, Brad W
Moore Urrutia, Cristina M
Moore, Christopher M
Moore, Gary J
Moore, Nicholas J
Moore, Robert L
Moore, Thomas R
Moran, James E
Morash, Craig L
Morello, Matthew R
Morgan, Bryan K
Morgan, Nathan L
Morin, Todd J
Morrell, Bradley J
Morris, Michael R
Morris, Paul J
Morrise, Wyatt E
Morrison, Jamie R
Morse, Arthur L Iii
Mountcastle, Matthew R
Mulder, Christopher P
Muller, Eric C
Muller, Paul L
Mullins, Creighton A
Munn, Zensaku M
Murphy, Dennis P Ii
Murphy, Jonathan D
Murphy, Paul B
Murray, Nathan M
Musa, Jamil I
Music, Eric M
Musil, Sean S
Myrick, David W
Nash, Michelle I
Naylor, Jeffery A
Nelson, Angelique
Nelson, Thomas A
Neris, Jennifer R
Netchaeff, Paul N
Neylon, Sean D
Nicholas, Joseph Emron
Niebuhr, Tyler A
Niendorf, Matthew J
Nigro, Ronald F
Nilsen, James K
Nodine, William H Jr
Noe, Meera Anne Daroy
Noel, Daniel J
Noel, Randall B
Noke, Scott E
Nolan, Trevor C
Nolte, Ronald E
Novchich, Brian M
Nuno, George B
Nussbaum, Matthew E
Nyberg, Mark D
Obenchain, Matthew B
Occhiuzzo, Christopher
Ohara, Thomas P
Ohlmeyer, Steven K
Oiland, Andrew D
Okeson, Amanda L
Okeson, Kendall W
Okumura, Jason K
Oldham, Jeremy V
Oleary, Stephen T
Oliver, Jamal
Olson, Douglas J
Olson, Dustin E
Olson, Matthew T
Olvis, Robert Bryan
Opielowski, Tara L
Ord, James R
Oreilly, Wilfred G
Ortega, Hector M
Ortego, Michael L
Orzechowski, Richard C
Osborne, Nathaniel S
Otool, Corey C
Ott, William F Jr
Ottinger, Jerry
Owen, Nathan L
Owen, Ryan K
Owens, Jeremy J
Paap, Grant M
Pacheco, Erick
Padilla, Michael S
Palacios, Christopher M
Palagi, Douglas J
Palagi, Lauren W
Palmer, Clinton N
Palmer, Maxx E Ii
Pang, Sila
Pankoski, Jeremy
Pantages, John J
Papineau, Scott R
Pargas, Jorge A
Park, Sean
Parker, Jason H
Parker, Steven J
Parkinson, Anthony J
Parks, Stephen R
Parry, Melissa M
Parsons, Joseph J
Partridge, Alan J
Parvin, Jeremiah W
Pasquino, James M
Pastuzyn, Michael
Pate, James A
Patel, Aanan N
Paul, Jason Victor
Paulus, Michael W
Pawluk, Paul R
Pearsall, William P
Pecarina, John M
Pelbath, Alexander J
Pendleton, Randal W
Pennington, David
Penuela, David
Perez, Wilhem A
Perry, Paul A
Peters, Sabine U
Peterson, Andrew S
Peterson, Gina A
Petren, Nicholas J
Petrucci, David J
Petrucci, Nicole M
Pflug, Jason F
Phelan, Nicole L
Phelps, Robert A
Phillips, William W
Pickett, Bryan Michael
Pickett, Michael V
Picklesimer, John W
Pierce, April D
Pierce, Troy B
Pietz, Jesse A
Pifer, Nathan J
Pine, Louis S
Pinkerton, Jason T
Piper, Ralph E Ii
Pippel, Stephen G
Pires, Eduardo H
Pitts, Carl B
Pitts, Jon A
Place, Thomas B
Pochet, Michael C
Poe, Brady J
Pogue, William J
Polsinelli, Angela M
Pommer, Matthew L
Pontius, Michael S
Poplin, Jeffrey Michael
Poppe, Neil B
Porath, Jon W
Porter, Alec E
Posada, Anthony J
Pouliot, Randall R
Pouska, David A
Povilus, Michael William
Prater, Travis Richard
Preston, Justin K
Presuto, Melanie M
Provins, Michael D
Prue, Andrew Graham
Pruitt, Kristopher A
Psilos, Matthew A
Pudlo, Tomasz A
Quan, Landon E
Quick, Jeffrey J
Quick, Keith E
Quick, Wendy L
Quidley, Eric B
Quinn, Joseph A
Rabadi, Qais
Rabe, Matthew R
Raczkowski, John R
Randall, Trigg E
Rasinski, Michael F
Ray, Timothy Daniel
Ready, Steven W
Reagan, Patrick M
Ream, Johanna Kathryn
Rebik, Emil Lawrence
Recksiek, Karl H
Reed, Richard J
Register, Carrie E
Regni, Jessica L
Rehm, Christopher R
Reich, Jeremy R
Rein, Scott J
Rellick, Michael S
Rembold, Stacie A
Reynolds, Karin E
Reynolds, Matthew E
Rhylander, Erik Paul
Rhymer, Preston L
Richardson, Duane E
Richardson, Lloyd S Iv
Riddle, Jamison L
Rienzi, Patrick D
Riester, John J
Rigsbee, Daniel C
Rivera, Edward T
Rivera, Joel
Rivero, Eric J
Rivers, Jeffrey J
Rivers, Teresa D
Roach, Neal R
Robarge, Tyler W
Roberts, Brian V
Roberts, Michael L
Rockwood, Gregory C
Roeckers, Breanne C
Rogers, Shane D
Rohrer, Alan T
Roman, Mark C
Rooks, Jason B
Root, Derek A
Roper, Darnell
Rosales, Alfred J
Ross, Dominic A
Rossi, Jason F
Rotermund, Carl B
Rountree, Stewart L
Rovello, Frank W
Rudolphi, Adam C
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Ruiz, Wilfredo
Ruona, Aaron L
Rupp, Karen P
Rush, Angelinda D
Rusling, Con A
Russell, Jeremy J
Russo, Nicholas J
Ruth, Kylene L
Rutherford, Jeffrey L
Rutkowski, Andrew R
Ruttenber, Jessica N
Ryan, Timothy M
Ryder, Christopher J
Ryder, Robert W Jr
Ryerson, William R
Sadler, Rebecca
Saechao, Troy R
Salvatore, Don R
Sanders, Dale S
Sanders, Jeremiah B
Sandusky, Lee T
Sanford, Ryan A
Sarmiento, Traci A
Sartori, Jacqueline A
Sasnett, Martha J
Sauter, Luke M
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Schaefer, Jessi R
Schantz, John R
Schecht, Josh C
Scheutzow, Benjamin
Schieser, James E
Schindler, Nicholas S
Schmidt, Tracy A
Schmitt, Ernest R
Schoeneberg, Robert N
Schofield, Andrew
Schroeder, Matthew Kenneth
Schroeder, Scott J
Schulke, Gregory N
Schultz, Paul D
Schutt, Avery D
Schwenn, Karl R
Sconyers, George W Iii
Scoughton, Amanda K
Scruggs, Clifford N
Seal, Jonathon S
Seaman, Christopher G
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Seki, Anthony Edward K
Semrau, Leslie L
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Serbia, Carlos A
Serrill, Ryan D
Servant, Brian R
Shannon, Brendan M
Sharpe, Richard R
Shaw, Robert R Jr
Shelton, Adam W
Shelton, Nathan G
Shepherd, Franklyn K Jr
Sherinian, John C Ii
Shields, Michael J
Shif, Boris
Shinohara, Dan J
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Shrull, Matthew R
Shulman, Jeffrey D
Shupert, Joseph H
Sides, Wesley R
Siegler, Paul D
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Simmons, Christopher E
Simmons, Jeffrey D
Simms, Ryan S
Simonich, Michael Andrew
Simons, Michael J
Simpson, Bryan P
Sitzmann, Chad S
Skalko, Mark D
Skiles, Jack Iii
Skopeck, Robert J Jr
Skow, Christopher A
Slaton, James
Slovinsky, Martin J
Smith, Jonathan R
Smith, Peter M
Smith, Rachel K
Smith, Reginald L
Smith, Robert Shelby
Smith, Rochelle D
Smith, Scott E
Smith, William Charles
Snedeker, Sol R
Snider, Ryan E
Snoddy, Samuel M
Snodgrass, David N
Snyder, Matthew P
Somers, Jason G
Somers, Paul N
Sonne, Thomas E
Sortor, Paul Russell
Sorvillo, Lewis G
Soto, William G
Soukup, Joel R
Spencer, Boone C
Spencer, Kendall W
Spohr, Raymond H K
Sporysz, Brian J
Sposito Salceies, Julie
Sproles, Zan A
Sprute, Bernard R
St Louis, Jeremy E
Stallworth, Cheo F
Standridge, Dawn
Stanley, Matthew F
Stanton, Stuart A
Stapanon, Edward J Iii
Starrett, Broc L
Staufer, Bruce A
Stauter, Troy T
Steel, Chad J
Steele, Eric D
Stefanovic, Michael D
Stephens, Travis H
Stevens, Karen L
Stevens, Robert D
Stewart, Helen
Stewart, Zachary Roy
Stock, Michael J
Stockham, Erik Steven
Stone, James L
Stone, Scott J
Storms, Randon L
Strange, Jeffrey P
Strickland, Brian K
Stringer, Richard R
Strohmeyer, Matthew D
Strom, Paul B
Stroup, Christopher S
Stucki, Paul D
Sukhlall, Jacqueline M
Sulhoff, David A
Sullivan, Joey P
Sullivan, Mark A
Sullivan, Michael J
Surita, Jose R Jr
Sutton, Timothy P
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Sward, Michael David
Sweet, Layla M
Swengros, Richard W
Swiechowicz, Jennie A Y
Szatkowski, Mark T
Szczepanik, Edward V
Taitano, Yuri P
Talafuse, John A
Tanner, Katherine A
Tate, Darin R
Tauer, Thomas M
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Tellez, Brandon J
Temple, Brian S
Thierauf, Linda J
Thiry, Jason T
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Thomas, James J
Thomas, Jeremey T
Thomas, William D
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Thompson, Shaundal T
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Thomson, Lee C
Thornhill, Scot A
Thornton, Paul B
Thorpe, Dylan G
Timberlake, Joseph W
Tipton, David W
Tobin, Joseph C
Tolliver, Justin C
Torrijos, Phoenix L
Totten, Lindsay M
Travis, Kelly R
Treat, Kevin M
Trebold, Brian J
Trest, Robert J
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Tull, Joshua W
Turner, Thomas A
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Waters, Angela Marie
Waters, Richard H
Watson, Joseph P
Watson, Justin T
Weatherly, Erin Owens
Weaver, Barry S
Webb, Jeffrey S
Webb, Timothy R
Wedington, Jessica A
Weger, Mark A
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Wehunt, Shane A
Weidman, Hayes J
Wein, Josef R
Weisler, Jeffrey E
Welch, Christopher M
Wennrich, Joshua N
Wentzel, Carrie E
Werner, Daniel C
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Wester, Daniel L
Westphall, Ingemar S
Whelan, Glendon C
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Whitehead, Tandy R
Whitford, Jason A
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Williams, Ryan R
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Willis, Shawn M
Willis, William S
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Winslow, Travis M
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Wolff, Jason B
Wong, Bryan K
Wong, Ryan M
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Woodruff, Michael R
Woodworth, Marc A
Wooten, William D
Worden, Bradley R
Wray, David A
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Wyffels, Rebecca A
Wyrick, David J
Yamzon, Michael L
Yates, Robert J Iii
Yates, Rowdy E
Yonce, Edward F
Youngmeyer, Matthew J
Zapata, Fernando L
Zelinski, Gregory M
Zemler, Jason M
Zervos, Nicholas G
Ziemann, Matthew J
Zingarelli, John C
Ziska, Barbara L
Zourdos, Carolos J
Zuercher, Brandon A
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Boomer, Jane E
Deam, Seth R
Dene, Joseph F
Hall, Robert S
Hume, Robert S
Huygen, Julie J R
Imburgia, Joseph S
Jarreau, Matthew T
Johnson, John C
Ladue, Richard H Jr
Letendre, Linell A
Luker, Debra A
Mulbarger, Matthew J
Ohman, Mynda L G
Schools, Shelly W
Seuell, Suzette D
Sherwin, Shannon L
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Sophisticated spyware widely believed linked to Israel infected computers at luxury hotels used as venues for nuclear negotiations with Iran, a Russian cybersecurity firm said Wednesday, but the extent of any possible data breach was not immediately known.
Moscow-based Kaspersky Lab did not specifically identify Israel as the mastermind behind the complex — almost undetectable — virus it stumbled across in early spring during a routine test.
But Eugene Kaspersky, chairman of the company, told a news conference in Moscow that it was most likely “state-sponsored malware” whose stealth and date-grabbing technology he described in Hollywood movie terms: “Kind of a mix of ‘Alien,’ ‘Terminator’ and ‘Predator.’”
The apparent attempt at cyberspying on the high-level talks marks another escalation in the widening world of Internet espionage that has governments and militaries spending huge amounts on spyware and countermeasures.
Kaspersky said it bore all the markings of an improved version of the Duqu malware, which was first identified in 2011 and is believed to be related to the Stuxnet computer worm. In 2010, Stuxnet infiltrated the systems at Iran’s uranium-enrichment sites and caused significant setbacks.
At the time, Iran blamed Israel — and, by extension, its ally the United States — for the Stuxnet virus. While no definitive origins have been established, many Internet security experts in the past have said Duqu and Stuxnet appear developed and deployed by Israel.
“Most probably, it was used by the same people, or they shared the source code with other people, maybe nations,” said Kaspersky.
He estimated the spyware’s development cost at $10 million or more, effectively ruling out an amateur hacker.
Duqu is a remote-access Trojan virus that collects information, which could be used for intelligence or to probe further weaknesses in computer defenses. It’s unclear, however, what data — if any — was obtained by the spyware.
“We don’t know if the attackers were successful,” said Kaspersky principal security researcher Kurt Baumgartner in an e-mail response to The Washington Post. “What we know is that they have successfully deployed their platform there and were able to attack.”
There was no immediate comment on the report from U.S. officials or other nations involved in the nuclear talks. There also was no reaction from Israel, which has never confirmed or denied the suspected links to Stuxnet and other malware.
The company said some of the virus infections it found were in venues where the United States and five other world powers have been negotiating with Iran to curb its nuclear program in exchange for easing sanctions. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has lobbied hard against the potential deal, which is running up against a June 30 deadline.
The latest nuclear negotiations have been held in a string of five-star hotels in Switzerland, Vienna and Oman. Kaspersky did not identify the hotels that were hacked, nor the extent of the possible security breaches.
Earlier this year, U.S. officials said Israel appeared to be spying on the nuclear talks and using the intelligence it gathered to undermine the negotiations. Though Israel denied spying on the talks, the suspicion caused the State Department to publicly acknowledge it was not sharing all the details of the closed-door talks with its close ally.
The report issued Wednesday said Kaspersky Lab also found the malware used in an attack connected to events in January to mark the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp.
Kaspersky said the people behind the malware did not appear to be interested in corporate or financial data. Instead, he said, they probed new security software for detecting viruses.
“Maybe it’s a kind of sport interest,” he said. “They wanted to prove to themselves they were cool, so they were able to infiltrate a leading Internet security company.”
Though the virus went undetected for months before it was found, Kaspersky was scornful of the hackers — who also tried to penetrate the Kaspersky network using the same virus.
“It’s stupid to attack an Internet security company,” he said. “Sooner or later, we find it, anyway.”
But he declined to discuss news reports pointing to Israel because it is believed to have developed Duqu.
“As a news reader, I will say, ‘Hmm, interesting,’” he said. “As CEO of the company, we don’t have any proof to confirm this.”
But tracks such as the computer code of the attack and the address of servers used suggests that “it’s related most probably to the same people, or in cooperation with the people who made Duqu back in 2011,” he added.
Carol Morello is the diplomatic correspondent for The Washington Post, covering the State Department.
Brian Murphy joined the Post after more than 20 years as a foreign correspondent and bureau chief for the Associated Press in Europe and the Middle East. He has reported from more than 50 countries and has written three books.
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A computer virus was used to hack into computers in European hotels that were hosting talks last year on Iran's nuclear program, according to a report released Wednesday from Kaspersky Lab ZAO.
The Moscow-based cybersecurity firm identified the offending malware as "Duqu 2.0" and described it as the "step-brother of Stuxnet" — a virus that was used to sabotage Iranian nuclear centrifuges in 2009. According to classified documents leaked by Edward Snowden, Stuxnet was developed by the United States and Israel. Duqu 2.0 is a more advanced version of a virus called Duqu discovered in 2011, the Kaspersky report said.
Program Aims to Mold Next Generation of Hacker Warriors 1:49
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Kaspersky discovered Duqu 2.0 on its own internal systems last year. It determined that the virus was used to target three European hotels that were hosting diplomatic efforts between the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany, otherwise known as P5+1, and Iran over the latter's nuclear program.
"Most of the final targets appear to be similar to their 2011 goals — which is to spy on Iran's nuclear program," the report said.
The Wall Street Journal, which originally reported the story, cited "current and former U.S. officials and many cybersecurity experts" as saying they believed Duqu "was designed to carry out Israel's most sensitive intelligence-collection operations." Kaspersky did not name Israel as the nation behind Duqu 2.0.
"This is definitely not the work of some amateurs," Vikram Thakur, senior manager at Symantec Security Response, told NBC News.
"We do believe that this is the handiwork of some nation-state," he said. "Whether it's country A or B, that's not something that we can comment on, because honestly we don't know."
What seems clear, Thakur said, is that Duqu 2.0 is very advanced and was written by the same people who created the first Duqu.
Adam Segal, cybersecurity expert for the Council on Foreign Relations, was not surprised by the report.
"We have seen malware targeting every large international forum," Segal told NBC News. "I think it's already common and will continue to be common."
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WASHINGTON—
A study released Wednesday suggests that despite the growing time and resources companies spend on cybersecurity, they’re at best keeping even with the hackers, and may in fact be losing ground.
The study, conducted by the RAND Corporation, was based on extensive interviews with 18 chief information security officers or CISO’s – traditionally the top cybersecurity position in corporate organizations – as well as a review of current cybersecurity products on the market.
Titled “The Defender’s Dilemma: Charting a Course Toward Cybersecurity,” the report authors conclude that worldwide corporate spending on cybersecurity now nears $70 billion annually and is on track to grow at a rate of 10 percent or more each year.
Despite that investment, report authors say the CISOs are relatively pessimistic about their battle against cyberattacks and believe that hackers may in fact gain the upper hand in a matter of a few years.
That last finding was among several that report authors suspected even before the study was conducted. Other initial preconceptions that were confirmed was that larger businesses often had more options for strengthening cybersecurity than smaller ones, and that walling off specific parts or computer systems of the corporation from the Internet can help guard against attack.
Reputation
Among the more surprising findings for the report authors was that CISOs often view the greatest damage caused by cyberattacks to be on a corporation’s reputation, rather than the actual stolen data or intellectual property.
Among the more surprising findings for the report authors was that CISOs often view the greatest damage caused by cyberattacks to be on a corporation’s reputation, rather than the actual stolen data or intellectual property.
“The bedrock of cybersecurity is good system software,” the authors wrote. “Companies often find themselves having to invest in defensive measures because foundational systems and software are unsecure. The security and solidness of the actual software helps to prevent attackers from gaining a foothold on a network.”
The report said that recent high-profile data breaches at Sony Pictures Entertainment, Anthem Insurance and many other private firms has paradoxically strengthened the corporation’s cybersecurity posture, because corporate boards are taking the issue much more seriously.
“Core software is improving, and cybersecurity products are burgeoning,” the authors write. “The combination is likely to make the attacker’s task more difficult and more expensive—which will not solve the problem, but will make it more manageable.”
Several recent studies have shown that many companies are more worried about the damage to their reputations than the actual loss of intellectual property or other valuable information.
A previous study by the Ponemon Institute says the most costly cyber crimes include attacks by malicious insiders and "denial of service" attacks that overwhelm a firm's computer systems. The Ponemon study also says the longer such attacks continue, the more costly they become, with business disruption the largest expense.
A separate report Tuesday from the Standard & Poor’s rating agency says global business losses may run as high as $400 billion per year.
S&P says it evaluates how management handles all risks, including this complex and growing one, as it determines credit ratings. The rating agency says some insurance companies offer protection for financial losses due to cyber-attacks, but that the field is so "fluid" and unpredictable that insurers are having difficulty judging how to evaluate risk and price their products.
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CNN's On the Road series brings you a greater insight into countries around the world. This time we travel to Azerbaijan in the lead up to the European Games to explore the culture of sports in the country sitting on the Caspian Sea.
(CNN)It's the Azerbaijani national sport, recognized for its rich cultural significance and inextricably linked with the country's favorite animal -- but playing it is not for the faint-hearted.
Welcome to Chovgan, a forerunner of polo. Its roots can be traced back to the middle of the first millennium, and it doesn't have any frills.
Although the basic rules are pretty much the same as those of polo, there are no helmets or safety gear for players. Chovgan is a game of skill but, more than anything else, it is one of courage.
Karabakh stallions
Players ride Karabakh stallions -- mountain steppe racing and riding horses noted for their speed and stamina and unique to Azerbaijan -- often without saddles.
Pickup games between village teams remain common, with working farm horses taking a break from their labors to do a little sporting duty.
But the key trait of Chovgan, those who know and play it say, is the sort of attitude and bravery that are needed to shine.
"People who are a little bit afraid of some action in life cannot do this," Bahruz Nabiyev, the head of Azerbaijan's Equestrian Federation, says.
A long history
Nabiyev explains just how deeply the sport is embedded in the life of the country. "This is part of the history of Azerbaijan," he adds. "Every Azerbaijani person has a kind of love for the horses because of the history.
"It was a hobby for the people -- actually, shepherds were playing this game many years ago -- and then they started to make it as a game in Azerbaijan, and make a championship of it."
Both Chovgan and the Karabakh horse are officially recognized by world heritage body UNESCO, and Nabiyev and his colleagues hope the expertise of the country's best players can enable them to make a mark on international polo.
A protected species
It also appears that the battle to safeguard the future of the Karabakh horse is being won after years in which growing alarm was voiced about dwindling numbers.
Yashar Guluzade, who has been breeding the animals in the forested foothills of Sheki, a small city 300km (187 miles) from the capital, Baku, explains that conflict and a difficult economic situation led to a decline.
"At the beginning of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict [in the late 1980s] the horses were continually transferred from one place to another, and this was one of the reasons for the sharp reduction of stock as the movement of pregnant mares led to miscarriages," he told CNN.
The government has stepped in to try and protect the breed, with the Ministry of Agriculture drawing up a number of horse breeding programs and introducing a law prohibiting the export of Karabakh horses for sale.
Estimates of the number of Karabakh horses -- named after the mountain region where they were originally developed through cross-breeding -- vary. According to the Karabakh Foundation, there were fewer than 1,000 in 2011.
The foundation's co-founder Dr. Adil Baguirov, originally from the Karabakh region, says the horse has always been important to Azerbaijanis.
As Khandan Rajabli, the head of the Agriculture Ministry's breeding division, puts it: "The Karabakh horses are a symbol of national heritage and pride. It's an ancient, national breed that is inseparable from our national identity."
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ROME — Barely two days after Europe’s most powerful leaders presented a common front on Russian sanctions, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia swept into Italy on Wednesday, a pointed reminder that European unity against him is fragile and that efforts to isolate him have brought only mixed success.
Mr. Putin has always found a comfort zone in Italy, which has important trade and energy ties to Russia. He began his day in Milan, where he toured Russia’s exhibition at Expo Milano 2015, the world’s fair, and also met with Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. He flew to Rome and was scheduled to meet Pope Francis at the Vatican, his second audience with him in the past 18 months.
At a news conference in Milan, Mr. Putin criticized European sanctions, saying that Italian companies had unfairly suffered, with defense contracts worth 1 billion euros now frozen. He also contested European claims that Russia has deliberately violated the Minsk peace agreements for eastern Ukraine, instead blaming the Ukrainian government for not upholding the deal.
“Unfortunately, the Minsk agreements are not being implemented fully, only selectively,” Mr. Putin said.
At the Vatican, Mr. Putin and Francis were expected to focus on the persecution of Christians in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, an issue of mutual concern. Earlier in the day, the top American diplomat to the Vatican urged Francis to raise concerns about Russia’s role in the fighting in eastern Ukraine.
“Perhaps the Holy Father can raise this concern privately,” said Kenneth Hackett, the United States ambassador to the Holy See. “It does seem that Russia is supporting the insurgents, and that there are Russian troops inside the Ukraine. This is a very serious situation.”
The European Union instituted economic sanctions against Russia last summer, as a response to its annexation of Crimea several months earlier. Sanctions have expanded as European and American officials have blamed Mr. Putin for deliberately stoking instability by sending Russian troops into eastern Ukraine.
At a two-day summit in Germany that ended Monday, leaders of the Group of 7 industrialized nations reaffirmed their support for sanctions, as President Obama praised European resolve and called for even tougher measures if Mr. Putin did not abide by terms of the cease-fire. European leaders are expected to formally renew sanctions at a meeting later this month.
But support for sanctions has weakened in many European countries, including Italy, and Mr. Putin has sought to exploit the political divisions and nurture bilateral alliances, especially with countries on Europe’s periphery. He is talking with Greece about a partnership on a gas pipeline running through Turkey, while he exerts influence in countries such as Hungary, where he has been linked to far-right political parties.
“The G-7 shows he is more and more isolated from the big member states of the European Union,” said Stefan Meister, an analyst at the European Council of Foreign Relations in Berlin. “He is trying to engage with the weaker parts of the European Union, like Greece or Hungary. Maybe he is also trying to engage with Italy.”
In Italy, Mr. Renzi has pursued a balancing act. Italy’s economy, already struggling, has suffered from reciprocal sanctions invoked by Russia against Europe. One study estimated that Italy would lose 3.7 billion euros in exports to Russia from 2014 to this year. In March, Mr. Renzi made an official visit to Moscow, the first major European leader to do so since the Crimea annexation, though Mr. Renzi also visited Kiev on the same trip and met with President Petro O. Poroshenko of Ukraine.
Yet Mr. Renzi is also seeking a bigger role in European affairs and has endorsed European sanctions, while also attending the Group of 7 summit in Germany.
“Italy has no intention of overriding any European decision, nor can it,” said Paola Mariani, associate professor of international and European law at Bocconi University in Milan. “But it can’t hurt to create a solid relationship with Russia, with hopes of returning to being a privileged economic partner one day.”
In Milan, Mr. Renzi described Russia as an important player in the fight against global terrorism and called for strict adherence to the Minsk agreements on Ukraine. At the welcoming ceremony, Mr. Renzi also alluded to the European standoff with Russia, citing the “difficult international situation, not just on account of issues that do not unite us but also for issues that should see us ever more on the same side in a very complicated international scenario, starting with the global threat of terrorism.”
Marco Di Liddo, a senior analyst with the Center for International Studies, an Italian research institute, said merely holding the meeting with the popular pontiff was a boon for the Russian leader, as a demonstration that international relations are not made only in “exclusive clubs named G-7 or G-20.”
“He wants to show that he is not isolated,” Mr. Di Liddo said.
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An ambulance rushes by congested traffic on the New Jersey side of the Lincoln Tunnel in Weehawken, N.J., Wednesday, June 10, 2015. A New Jersey transit bus rear-ended a private bus injuring at least 18 people at around 9:30 a.m. in the center tube on the New York side of the tunnel connecting it with New Jersey, according to a spokesman for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey police. (Joe Epstein/Associated Press)
By Jennifer Peltz and Shawn Marsh | AP June 10 at 12:25 PM
NEW YORK — A New Jersey Transit bus rear-ended a private bus carrying Canadian schoolchildren inside the Lincoln Tunnel on Wednesday, injuring more than 30 people and slowing traffic on one of the busiest routes for commuters entering and leaving New York City, authorities said.
The crash happened at around 9:30 a.m. in the center tube on the New York side of the tunnel connecting it with New Jersey, said Joe Pentangelo, spokesman for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey police, which operates the tunnel.
None of the 26 students and two adults from the Toronto school was hurt, according to Anna Caputo, spokeswoman for the Toronto District School Board. The group was heading to New York for a graduation trip, she said.
As for the transit bus, Pentangelo said 35 to 40 people were hurt, and the four most severely injured had neck and back injuries. The Fire Department of New York said 31 people were taken to hospitals with injuries that weren’t considered life-threatening.
A 32-year-old woman also went into labor while stuck in the tunnel. She was taken to a hospital.
There were approximately 60 riders on the NJ Transit bus heading from Cresskill, New Jersey, to the Port Authority Bus Terminal, the transit agency said. At least two people were taken out of the tunnel on stretchers and two others walked out with the help of emergency personnel. People with bloody noses were being treated at a triage station set up outside the tunnel.
Jaehoon Chung, a carpenter who was going to work on the NJ Transit bus, said the impact of the crash felt like a minor collision.
He said the passengers were stuck on the bus for 10 to 20 minutes because the door was damaged.
“We couldn’t get out. The door was bent,” he said. “Everyone was calm. We all waited until a cop came.”
There are delays of up to one hour heading into New York. The two lanes of the center tube in the tunnel reopened before noon.
The Port Authority says 42 million vehicles a year travel through the tunnel. The tunnel is comprised of three tubes built beneath the Hudson River.
___
Marsh reported from Trenton, New Jersey.
Copyright 2015 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
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Earlier this year, investigators for Silicon Valley security company FireEye Inc. FEYE 1.45 % visited a U.S. firm to determine who, and what, sneaked into the firm’s network harboring military secrets.
There they found what they call a sophisticated cyberweapon, able to evade detection and hop between computers walled off from the Internet. The spy tool was programmed on Russian-language machines and built during working hours in Moscow. FireEye’s conclusion, in a report to be released Tuesday: The cyberspying has a “government sponsor—specifically, a government based in Moscow.”
ENLARGE
China, the object of recent U.S. allegations of cyberspying, may hack more often, U.S. officials and researchers say. But Russia hacks better. ‘I worry a lot more about the Russians’ than China, America’s top spy, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said, speaking of cyberattacks.Pablo Martinez Monsivais
The report is one of four recent assessments by cybersecurity companies, buttressed by reports from Google Inc. GOOG 1.84 % and U.S. intelligence agencies, pointing to Russian sponsorship of a skilled hacking campaign dating back to 2007. Targets included NATO, governments of Russia’s neighbors, and U.S. defense contractors Science Applications International Corp. SAIC 0.69 % and Academi LLC, the U.S. security firm previously known as Blackwater.
Collectively, the new research offers evidence supporting a view long expressed privately by U.S. officials and American security researchers: Moscow commands the A-team of Internet adversaries.
China, the object of recent U.S. allegations of cyberspying, may hack more often, U.S. officials and researchers say. But Russia hacks better.
“I worry a lot more about the Russians” than China, America’s top spy, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, said at a University of Texas forum this month, speaking of cyberattacks.
A U.S. official said differentiating between Russian criminal hackers and government hackers is difficult because the government uses cybersurveillance tools created by criminal groups and criminals use tools developed by the government.
For example, U.S. officials still haven’t determined whether the high-profile infiltration of a classified military system in 2008 was carried out by criminals or government hackers because the same surveillance tool was used by both, the U.S. official said.
More recently, the infiltration of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. has also been difficult to pin down.
“It looks to be criminal and of Russian origin,” the U.S. official said. But when it comes to gauging whether that criminal element is working with the government, “you’re back into that gray area. You really can’t tell.”
People with direct knowledge of the investigation said there is no evidence implicating the Russian government in the J.P. Morgan breach.
The Russian embassy didn’t respond to a request for comment.
American complaints about Moscow’s espionage skills come as U.S.-Kremlin relations have hit a post-Cold War low following Russia’s incursion into Ukraine. Although some security firms said they are seeing more activity from Russia-linked attacks these days, U.S. officials say it’s difficult to establish a baseline for Russian-based cyberspying and that finding such attacks is “serendipitous.”
FireEye shared its findings earlier this month with The Wall Street Journal, which then found that other security firms and the U.S. government had reached similar conclusions. FireEye also has shared its findings with the government. “Who else benefits from this?” asked Laura Galante, a FireEye manager and former Russia analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense. “It just looks so much like something that comes from Russia that we can’t avoid the conclusion.”
FireEye’s Mandiant unit made a name for itself in 2013 when it revealed a Chinese-military hacking group working from an office building in Shanghai. The Justice Department confirmed many of Mandiant’s findings, even naming one of the same hackers, in May when it charged five People’s Liberation Army officers with stealing U.S. trade secrets. FireEye acquired Mandiant for $1 billion in January.
In the case of the Russian-language hackers, researchers inside and outside the government compared notes and believe they are tracking the same group. They dubbed the spy tool described by FireEye “Sofacy.”
The company’s investigators said they were caught off guard when they responded to the U.S. firm that had been hacked earlier this year and which held military secrets. The company, which they decline to name, had lost sensitive data, but there were none of the digital fingerprints that Chinese hackers often leave behind, investigators said. Rather, the malware, or malicious code, was littered with spycraft.
The malware program also deployed countermeasures to deter investigators from determining how it worked. It encrypted stolen data and exported it in a way to resemble that victim’s email traffic to better conceal it. FireEye analysts determined the group has been active since at least 2007 and has steadily updated its hacking tools.The malware’s authors also designed it, if needed, to harvest data from machines not connected to the Internet by jumping onto USB thumb drives.
Governments often disconnect computers with highly sensitive information to guard against cyberspies. But government spies in the U.S. and elsewhere have used USB drives to overcome this defense in the past. The Russian hackers used this technique in the 2008 Defense Department intrusion, U.S. officials have said. “These are state-grade weapons,” Ms. Galante said.
Sofacy’s authors consistently logged changes to the code between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. local time in Moscow and St. Petersburg—like an analyst working at a desk, Ms. Galante said. Most of their computers were configured to use Russian, researchers at FireEye and Google found.
Perhaps most telling, researchers say, the hackers deployed the malware almost exclusively in targets of interest to Russia—government networks in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, U.S. defense contractors and NATO. FireEye found a well-crafted phishing email aimed at a Georgian journalist, purporting to come from an editor at libertarian magazine Reason.
In another phishing attack, the security firm Trend Micro Inc. TMICY 2.06 % found the group created fake websites designed to trick employees at Academi into handing over their work email credentials, Tom Kellermann, chief cybersecurity officer said. One of these sites, the slightly misspelled <a href="http://academl.com" rel="nofollow">academl.com</a>, was created just weeks after the Russian government accused a firm with links to Academi of sending freelance troops to Ukraine to support the government, according to Internet registration records.
Academi has denied any involvement in Ukraine. A spokeswoman declined to comment.
Trend Micro said the hacking group aimed similar techniques at Science Applications International. A SAIC spokeswoman said the company appeared to have been targeted by hackers creating fake company websites, but blocked the efforts.
Two other computer-security firms with close ties to federal law enforcement, Crowdstrike Inc. and iSight Partners Inc., dubbed the hackers behind the Sofacy malware “Fancy Bear” and “Tsar Team,” respectively. Executives at both companies acknowledge the names are references to Russia.
The Google researchers don’t name Russia explicitly in its researchers’ previously unreported memo submitted last month to the Department of Homeland Security and other security professionals. Rather, the 41-page white paper, viewed by the Journal, referred to the hackers as a “sophisticated state-sponsored group” and noted the computers used to craft the cyberweapons were set to work with the Russian language. A Google spokesman confirmed the report’s existence and contents.
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PARIS—French investigators suspect that a well-known group of Russian hackers posing as Islamic State militants were behind an April attack that crippled a French-language TV broadcaster, raising new questions about the motives for an intrusion that had initially appeared aimed at spreading terrorist propaganda.
A group calling itself “CyberCaliphate” took control of computer systems at the Paris headquarters of TV5Monde on April 8, posting messages in support of Islamic State to the broadcaster’s social media accounts, and blacking out the company’s global TV channels for several hours, in what some analysts had said could be a dangerous new display of the militant group’s cyberattack prowess.
Investigators now think the true hackers were just misdirecting.
Evidence uncovered in the two months since the attack points to the Russian hacker group dubbed APT28, or Pawn Storm, a spokeswoman for the Paris prosecutor’s office said Wednesday. While the investigation is ongoing, IP addresses used to host a CyberCaliphate website linked to the attack, and other techniques used by the hackers match those deployed in the Russian group’s previous attacks, she said.
“We’re focusing on the Russian angle,” the spokeswoman said, adding that there is currently “no evidence for the theory” of a connection to Islamic State.
French investigators’ turn toward Russia comes amid a broader wave of sophisticated attacks against government and security targets that some experts say appear to be backed by the Russian government.
While the Russian government denies involvement in hacking, reports from U.S. cybersecurity firms allege circumstantial evidence of government sponsorship of hacker groups—including the group French investigators are now probing in the TV5Monde attack.
“All of our attribution tends to suggest this is an organization that is focused on furthering the objectives or gathering intelligence that is of use to the Russian government,” said Richard Turner, the president for Europe, Middle East and Africa at FireEye Inc., FEYE 1.27 % which says it has independently verified that the attackers made use of infrastructure linked to APT28, and had seen signs the group was looking at TV5Monde as early as February. “The evidence points to a nation-state,” Mr. Turner said.
Russian officials weren’t immediately available for comment on Wednesday.
During April’s attack against TV5Monde, hackers posted messages making threats against French military personnel and indicating that they were retaliating against French attacks on Islamic State. But it remains unclear why Russian hackers would target TV5Monde.
Indirectly owned by the governments of France and other French-speaking countries, the company broadcasts original news programming as well as shows from the French-speaking world. While the company’s channels are available in 200 countries, including Russia, the company in 2013 reported a razor-thin profit of just €23,000 on revenue of €28.6 million.
“We’re asking ourselves why the Russians would attack us,” said Yves Bigot, the chief executive of TV5Monde, who said he has been briefed by officials on the investigation. “We don’t have the slightest idea.”
In the past, APT28 has targeted organizations like the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, government officials and agencies in Eastern Europe, as well as security companies and journalists for intelligence, security firms say. But the group has not previously been known to mount attacks that impersonate hacktivist or terrorist groups, nor inflict damage on targets.
While the attack caused damage valued at more than €5 million to TV5Monde, according to Mr. Bigot, it is unclear why sophisticated hackers did not go further. Mr. Bigot says the investigation has revealed that the hackers did not appear to have tried to broadcast over the company’s TV channels, nor did they appear to have stolen information.
FireEye’s Mr. Turner says that the TV5Monde attack could have helped the hackers test their capabilities to penetrate TV stations. “If part of the objective is to demonstrate capability, it is just like parading tanks though Red Square.”
Write to Sam Schechner at sam.schechner@wsj.com
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