Videos from the Aspen Security Forum: If, like me, you were not invited to this year's Aspen Security Forum, you're probably thinking right now, "Gee, I wish someone would post all the videos of the great events I'm not getting to attend." - Sunday August 2nd, 2015 at 2:17 PM
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Videos from the Aspen Security Forum by Benjamin Wittes
If, like me, you were not invited to this year's Aspen Security Forum, you're probably thinking right now, "Gee, I wish someone would post all the videos of the great events I'm not getting to attend."
I live to serve.
Lots of big names this year.
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Saudi-Israeli Diplomacy After the Iran Deal? by Benjamin Bissell
If Twitter is to be believed, the Iranian nuclear deal is already creating waves in the Middle East and upending old regional axes. Earlier today, Jacky Hugi, the Middle East editor for Israel’s Army Radio, posted a picture of a Mercedes with diplomatic license plates driving around Tel Aviv. Unremarkable, until you realize which country the car was supposedly representing: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
היום בצהריים, כיכר השעון ביפו. מרצדס כסופה עם לוחית רישוי סעודית. הסכם הגרעין עם איראן מתחיל להוכיח את עצמו pic.twitter.com/mETViPsglU
— Jacky Hugi (@JackyHugi) July 24, 2015
While the tags appear to be real, we should not be too quick to speculate what this means. Still, the sighting of the car is curious in light of the observed tightening of relations recently between Israel and its erstwhile enemy, Saudi Arabia. While the two countries publicly remain distant, leaders on both sides, but especially in Tel Aviv, have hinted at the unusual and significant confluence of interests between the two in recent months over their shared archenemy: Iran. And it is widely known that both are apprehensive, to say the least, over the recently-inked deal between Tehran and the G5+1.
That said, in recent days, both countries have responded publicly to the deal in very different ways. From Jerusalem, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his deputies have railed against the deal and implored the U.S. Congress to halt it. Saudi officials, by contrast, have been more reticent to comment openly. However, according to US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, who visited the kingdom recently, the Saudi government is beginning to look on the deal more favorably. Additionally, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir stated on July 23 that the deal “generally seems to have achieved” several objectives, including effective inspections and the possibility of resumed sanctions in the case of an Iranian violation.
Whether Israel and Saudi Arabia are as hostile to the deal as some analysts suggest, or whether the two are moving apart on the issue, remains anyone’s guess. In the meantime, only time will tell what exactly that Mercedes, and whoever was in it, was doing in Tel Aviv.
Understanding the Limits of Sanctionsby Peter Feaver, Eric Lorber
Editor’s Note: Sanctions are increasingly America’s foreign policy instrument of first resort, promising success without the bloodshed that comes with military force. Iran’s willingness to cut a deal over its nuclear program is likely to make sanctions proponents even more confident. But Peter Feaver of Duke University and Eric Lorber of Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher argue that the United States risks relying too much on sanctions. They contend sanctions’ effects are difficult to predict and the targeting often goes awry. Sanctions should not be abandoned, but they should be used more carefully and as part of a broader strategy.
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Since 2005, U.S. policymakers have increasingly turned to sophisticated types of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool of first resort. From the development of banking sanctions limiting Iran’s ability to secure financing from Western capital markets to new sanctions targeting Russia’s financial system and the development of its oil resources, U.S. policymakers have touted these innovative tools as extremely powerful while also being tailored and precise. In his 2015 National Security Strategy, President Obama noted that “[t]argeted economic sanctions remain an effective tool for imposing costs on irresponsible actors” and that “[o]ur sanctions will continue to be carefully designed and tailored to achieve clear aims while minimizing any unintended consequences for other economic actors, the global economy, and civilian populations.”
In the case of Iran, the United States used its position as the financial capital of the world—and one of its largest markets—to essentially force foreign companies to abandon their business with the Islamic Republic. The U.S. Treasury Department threatened those companies with a choice: Either they could do business in U.S. financial markets (and have access to U.S. dollars for transactional purposes) or they could do business in Iran, but not both. As a result, a large number of foreign firms shuttered their business operations in Iran, increasing economic pressure on the country. This ability to impose what many countries argued were extraterritorial sanctions helped prevent Iran from easily finding alternative trade and financing partners, and was—at least in part—responsible for bringing the country to the negotiating table to discuss its nuclear program, ultimately leading to a long-term agreement with the P5+1.
Similarly, the United States has imposed sophisticated new sanctions on Russia that move well beyond simple prohibitions on transacting with certain of Vladimir Putin’s cronies. These new tools—which target Russia’s ability to refinance its massive external debt and prevent the country from developing key energy resources over the medium to long term—leverage key advantages enjoyed by the United States: technological superiority and attractive capital markets. A significant component of these sanctions prevents U.S. energy companies from providing cutting-edge technologies to Russian firms that would help those firms develop difficult-to-reach oil resources (such as shale, offshore, and Arctic resources). And like the sanctions aimed at isolating Iran from Western financial markets, U.S. and EU sanctions on Russia prohibit Western financial firms from dealing in new debt or equity with more than a 30-day maturity period, making it exceedingly difficult for Russian companies to secure the necessary financing to service the country’s massive debt.
These new forms of economic statecraft have proven powerful: As a partial result of the sanctions,economists are predicting that the Russian economy will shrink by 3.5 to 4 percent in 2015 and continue contracting in the medium term. Likewise, the Iranian economy suffered from significant inflation, and according to the Treasury Department sanctions on the Iranian petroleum industry cost the country $40 billion in revenue in 2014.
Policymakers, seeing the sophisticated nature and powerful impact of these sanctions, have concluded that these new tools of coercion are different from—and a marked improvement on—prior forms of economic punishment. In a recent speech, former Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen noted:
[W]e have been able to move away from clunky and heavy-handed instruments of economic power. . . . [a]ll of us in this room remember how sanctions used to consist primarily of trade restrictions or wholesale bans on commercial activity. . . . [t]hese embargoes rarely created meaningful pressure. Sanctions that focus on bad actors within the financial sector are far more precise and far more effective than traditional trade sanctions.”
But while these sophisticated sanctions have imposed substantial economic costs on Iran and Russia and do collectively constitute a more capable tool for coercive diplomacy, the developing narrative—likely to be bolstered by what the Obama administration sees as successful coercive diplomacy against Iran—that increasingly sophisticated sanctions provide policymakers with a no-cost silver bullet for addressing intractable national security issues is wrong. These new sanctions can be powerful, but they often cannot be calibrated to the extent policymakers desire—or to the extent necessary to deliver strategic objectives. Indeed, it is more difficult than policymakers think to narrowly tailor these tools to achieve particular strategic objectives for at least two reasons.
First, the economic effects of these sanctions are unpredictable. In the case of Russia, U.S. and EU sanctions—combined with the drop in international oil prices and actions taken by Russian regulators—undercut the country’s economy to a far greater extent than expected or desired: By March 2015, inflation in Russia had risen to 16.9 percent. This followed on the footsteps of a near-run on the country’s currency, which was supposedly triggered by the Russian Central Bank promising to effectively print money to prop up certain companies owned by Putin’s cronies and hurt by Western sanctions. By the spring of 2015, Russia had spent approximately $130 billion of its precious currency reserves in an attempt to defend the value of the ruble and prevent it from sliding even further. In addition, by raising interest rates to 17 percent in an attempt to stabilize the ruble, the central bank has likely stymied consumer spending in the near term.
These new sanctions can be powerful, but they often cannot be calibrated to the extent policymakers desire—or to the extent necessary to deliver strategic objectives.
Although these economic effects are profound, U.S. policymakers did not anticipate them and did not intend to cause them. Collapsing Russia’s economy would cause many more problems in the region than it would solve, and if the Obama administration wanted to seriously undermine the Russian economy, it could have easily done so by designating a number of Russian banks and directly freezing them out of the U.S. and European financial sectors. This action would have been a far simpler and more direct way to cause Russia economic pain and bring it to the negotiating table over the Ukraine issue. These new, sophisticated sanctions were instead designed to hurt a specific subset of Russian companies, namely those that are owned or controlled by Putin’s inner circle or directly run by the Russian government.
Second, the political effects of these sophisticated sanctions are also difficult to predict. In the Russian case, U.S. policymakers developed the sanctions to target Vladimir Putin’s inner circle,believing this would cause them to pressure the Russian president to adopt a different course in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. But although the sanctions have damaged the economic interests of these individuals, the result has been the opposite of what policymakers intended: Instead of pulling out of Crimea and ceasing Russian support for the rebel forces in Ukraine, President Putin requisitioned property of more liberal oligarchs and consolidated the position of hardliners within the political, military, and economic sectors. For example, in October 2014, Russian authorities seized Russian businessman Vladimir Yevtushenkov’s oil company Bashneft and effectively nationalized the company in what was seen as an attempt to secure resources for the Russian government and to reallocate the company to Putin’s allies.
Likewise, Putin has reportedly sidelined even those conservative oligarchs who have supported him thus far during the crisis and has instead relied on the advice of a small group of military and security officials. These officials have further encouraged Russian support of separatists in Eastern Ukraine and a generally confrontational approach to the United States and the European Union. In other words, the sanctions may have actually made it more difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in the conflict.
This is not to say sanctions were not the best tool to employ against Russia. The art of foreign policy decisionmaking often requires leaders to choose between a set of suboptimal alternatives. In this case, the other options may have been far less attractive. For example, simply issuing a sternly worded demarche in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea would have telegraphed irresolution and may have encouraged Russia to engage in more aggressive activity in Eastern Ukraine than it already has. Likewise, threatening to use military force could have lacked credibility or, if believed, escalated the conflict significantly, and providing active military assistance to Ukraine could certainly have escalated the conflict significantly. In comparison, these new sanctions are attractive in large part because they can be imposed unilaterally (or with minimal allied support), quickly, and seem to involve less risk than other forms of coercion such as using military force.
To better understand their strengths and limits, U.S. policymakers should more carefully study the likely impacts of these sophisticated sanctions prior to imposing them. The Obama administration would be well served to create an interagency working group to closely examine the likely economic and political impact of new sanctions before imposing them. Yet we must not kid ourselves about our ability to predict effects with great confidence: These sanctions are more powerful than earlier generations of tailored “smart sanctions” precisely because they have a multiplier effect beyond the direct control, and thus beyond the confident predictions, of policymakers. To be sure, economic sanctions may still often end up being the best alternative to doing nothing or to escalating to military force, but policymakers need to realize that sanctions are not silver bullets, despite their many strengths.
Even if policymakers decide that sanctions are the best tool, they should not rely on them in place ofa strategy, but rather should incorporate them into a broader strategy for safeguarding U.S. strategic interests. Sanctions—even sophisticated ones—are rarely effective alone, and must be used in conjunction with other tools of diplomacy to have much chance of success. Part of the reason that the United States was able to bring Iran to the negotiating table and ultimately strike a deal with the Islamic Republic was that it combined the offer of extensive diplomacy with the threat of force, sanctions, and other forms of coercion over a multi-year period. To be sure, the mix was hardly optimal. The threat of force was stronger at the initial stages of the contest and essentially disappeared during the endgame, and sanctions, or at least the prospect of sustaining sanctions, began to wither in the final months as well. Critics have made a strong argument that a much better deal could have been achieved if the Obama administration had been able to match its negotiations intensity with a sustained credible threat of force and a sustained credible threat of additional sanctions in the absence of a deal. Regardless of where one comes down on whether the Iran deal is good enough, the basic point stands: whatever the economic sanctions were able to accomplish with Iran were accomplished only because they were integrated to a larger strategy, initially laid down by the Bush administration and later expanded by the Obama administration, that combined economic pressure with military, diplomatic, and other forms of pressure.
Even if policymakers decide that sanctions are the best tool, they should not rely on them in place ofa strategy, but rather should incorporate them intoa broader strategy for safeguarding U.S. strategic interests.
By contrast, from the outset of the recent conflict with Russia, the Obama administration relied almost exclusively on sanctions to convince Putin to cease his support of rebels in Eastern Ukraine and pull out of Crimea. This did not prove successful, and while the jury is still out, providing additional economic assistance to Ukraine and bolstering NATO’s ability to respond to Russian aggression throughout Eastern Europe may better convince Russia to cease threatening its neighbors and supporting separatist activity in its near abroad.
The new sanctions provide policymakers with a powerful tool, one that may well seem more efficacious than the other tools available. But well-crafted sanctions are unlikely to salvage a poorly crafted strategy—and a president who resorts to sanctions because he does not know what else to do and is unwilling to pursue a tougher line may not see much benefit, either.
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One aspect of President Obama’s historic visit to Kenya under-reported by the U.S. press and almost entirely ignored by U.S. human rights groups was that the President met with two Kenyan leaders who had been indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in connection with violence after the 2007 elections that killed 1000 Kenyans. Obama had meetings not only with Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta -- who had been charged by the ICC in 2012 with international crimes including murder and rape until charges were dropped last December for lack of evidence -- but also with Deputy President William Ruto, who remains under indictment by the ICC. Many observers have criticized ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda for sloppiness and overreach in charging Kenyatta and Ruto, but human rights groups have insisted that the charges were justified. (At the time the charges against Kenyatta were dropped, Human Rights Watch declared that dropping the case against Kenyatta “sets back efforts to end the country’s entrenched culture of impunity.”) One can only imagine what human rights groups would have said if President Bush had shaken hands and exchanged pleasantries with a foreign government official still under indictment by the ICC. Consistent with other aspects of his Administration’s human rights policy, President Obama’s willingness to meet with both Kenyan leaders while they remain under investigation by the ICC demonstrates that he continues to exercise a much less supportive approach towards the Court than ICC advocates have hoped for.
The Obama Administration was obviously well aware of the ICC cloud hanging over Kenya’s government as the President waited seven years to visit the native country of his father. President Obama has joked that that he did not want to show nepotism towards Kenya, but the dropping of charges against Kenyatta has been widely viewed as removing the principal obstacle to Obama’s visit. Even so, Obama took pains to defend his trip at a time that Deputy President Ruto and other Kenyan government officials remain under ICC investigation. In response to a question from a BBC reporter about the ICC investigations, Obama responded that the Kenyan government “…are not ideal institutions. But what we found is when we combine blunt talk with engagement, it gives us the best opportunity to influence and open up space for civil society and the human rights agenda that we think is so important.” White House officials may also have tried to limit interaction between the President and Ruto, who did not join Kenyatta to welcome Obama at the Nairobi airport on Friday or for the Global Entrepeneurship Forum on Saturday. President Kenyatta, on the other hand, may have insisted that Ruto not be excluded altogether; Kenyatta commented last week that Obama “is coming to meet the government of Kenya and that includes the Deputy President. The last time I checked, the Deputy President was still part of this government.”
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In 1999, the US government approved a change in cryptographic export-control regulations, a change many security types imagined would herald a time of secure communications and secured data. As we all know, that did not come to pass. What did, instead, come to pass, was a long delayed recognition was that data that was not saved was more secure than data that was, that end-to-end encryption had value even when you weren't talking to your bank, and that securing data on yourphone keeps it safe.
The OPM hack, ISIS recruitment via Twitter, and securing an iPhone were not necessarily anticipated by NSA when the agency gave its concurrence, and perhaps even encouragement, to the 2000 export-control changes. But surely situations like that were. So it is not surprising that NSA has not loudly joined the chorus when FBI Director Comey presses for "exceptional access" to encrypted communications.
What the Aspen Security Summit brought this year were strong words by former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and former Director of the National Counterintelligence CenterMichael Leiter about the "Going Dark" problem and proposed solutions.
Secretary Chertoff said,
"First of all, there is when you do require a duplicate key, or some other form of back door, there is an increased risk and increased vulnerability. You can manage that to some extent, but it doesn't prevent you from certain kinds of encryption, so you're basically making things less secure for ordinary people.""The second thing is that the really bad people are going to find apps and tools that are going to allow them to encrypt everything without a back door. And these apps are multiplying all the time. The idea that you're going to build to stop this — particularly given a global environment — I think is a pipe dream. So what will wind up happening is people who are legitimate actors will be taking somewhat less secure communications, and the bad guys will still not be able to be decrypted.""The third thing is what are we going to tell other countries? When other countries say great, we want to have a duplicate key too [say] in Beijing, or Moscow or someplace else. The companies are not going to have a principled basis to refuse to do that. So that's going to be a strategic problem for us.""Finally, I guess I have a couple of overarching comments. One is we do not historically organize our society to make it maximally easy for law enforcement even with court orders to get information. We often make tradeoffs ... I also think that experience shows we're not quite as dark sometimes as we fear we are. In the 90's when encryption first became a big deal, there was a debate about a Clipper Chip, that would be embedded in devices or whatever your communications equipment was to allow court ordered interception. Congress ultimately and the President did not agree to that. And it dawned on the people in the community afterwards, you know what, we collected more than ever."
Former NCIC Director Leiter observed that,
"The place where I come down really is technologically this is a problem. And it's a problem because we are clearly going to a world where end-to-end encryption with temporary keys that disappear immediately after any communication occurs, that is the future. There is no way around that; we are not going to stop that. And, because of that, for the technology issues, I don't think there is a long term way to preserve the US government's ability to intercept or get access to those. And I also do think that societally, we have to accept that the degree to which we undermine our national security by having that back door or front door, depending upon how you define it, is very real. We have seen that because of the cyberthreat. So I tend to think that both technology and the balance of these probably falls on the side of — you can try to design it now, but reality is going to overtake you and it's a funny thing that when technology and law conflict, law's not going to challenge that technology for long, it's going to overtake it. And you have to have a law which addresses reality, and not what you hope reality will be."
Providing security for ordinary people makes law enforcment's job harder, but Secretary Chertoff says that's the right trade-off. Director Leiter says that government has to face reality, and "not what you hope reality will be." But see for yourself; listen to the session. Chertoff's and Leiter's experiences in national security and law enforcement are recent — and deep. They know whereof they speak.
Acknowledgement: I am grateful to Henry Baker for bringing these comments to my attention.
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At the Aspen Security Forum last week, FBI Director James Comey (and others) explicitly talkedabout the "going dark" problem, describing the specific scenario they are concerned about. Maybe others have heard the scenario before, but it was a first for me. It's centers around ISIL operatives abroad and ISIL-inspired terrorists here in the US. The FBI knows who the Americans are, can get a court order to carry out surveillance on their communications, but cannot eavesdrop on the conversations because they are encrypted. They can get the metadata, so they know who is talking to who, but they can't find out what's being said.
“ISIL’s M.O. is to broadcast on Twitter, get people to follow them, then move them to Twitter Direct Messaging” to evaluate if they are a legitimate recruit, he said. “Then they’ll move them to an encrypted mobile-messaging app so they go dark to us.”[...]The FBI can get court-approved access to Twitter exchanges, but not to encrypted communication, Comey said. Even when the FBI demonstrates probable cause and gets a judicial order to intercept that communication, it cannot break the encryption for technological reasons, according to Comey.
If this is what Comey and the FBI is actually concerned about, they're getting bad advice -- because their proposed solution won't solve the problem. Comey wants communications companies to give them the capability to eavesdrop on conversations without the conversants' knowledge or consent; that's the "back door" we're all talking about. But the problem isn't that most encrypted communications platforms are security encrypted, or even that some are -- the problem is that there exists at least one securely encrypted communications platform on the planet that ISIL can use.
Imagine that Comey got what he wanted. Imagine that iMessage and Facebook and Skype and everything else US-made had his back door. The ISIL operative would tell his potential recruit to use something else, something secure and non-US-made. Maybe an encryption program from Finland, or Switzerland, or Brazil. Maybe Mujahedeen Secrets. Maybe anything. (Sure, some of these will have flaws, and they'll be identifiable by their metadata, but the FBI already has the metadata, and the better software will rise to the top.) As long as there is something that the ISIL operative can move them to, some software that the American can download and install on their phone or computer, or hardware that they can buy from abroad, the FBI still won't be able to eavesdrop.
And by pushing these ISIL operatives to non-US platforms, they lose access to the metadata they otherwise have.
Convincing US companies to install back doors isn't enough; in order to solve this going dark problem the FBI has to ensure that an American can only use back-doored software. And the only way to do that is to prohibit the use of non-back-doored software, which is the sort of thing that the UK's David Cameron said he wanted for his country in January:
But the question is are we going to allow a means of communications which it simply isn't possible to read. My answer to that question is: no, we must not.
And that, of course, is impossible. Jonathan Zittrain explained why. And Cory Doctorow outlined what trying would entail:
For David Cameron's proposal to work, he will need to stop Britons from installing software that comes from software creators who are out of his jurisdiction. The very best in secure communications are already free/open source projects, maintained by thousands of independent programmers around the world. They are widely available, and thanks to things like cryptographic signing, it is possible to download these packages from any server in the world (not just big ones like Github) and verify, with a very high degree of confidence, that the software you've downloaded hasn't been tampered with.[...]This, then, is what David Cameron is proposing:* All Britons' communications must be easy for criminals, voyeurs and foreign spies tointercept* Any firms within reach of the UK government must be banned from producing securesoftware* All major code repositories, such as Github and Sourceforge, must be blocked* Search engines must not answer queries about web-pages that carry secure software* Virtually all academic security work in the UK must cease -- security research must only take place in proprietary research environments where there is no onus to publish one's findings, such as industry R&D and the security services* All packets in and out of the country, and within the country, must be subject to Chinese-style deep-packet inspection and any packets that appear to originate from secure software must be dropped* Existing walled gardens (like Ios and games consoles) must be ordered to ban their users from installing secure software* Anyone visiting the country from abroad must have their smartphones held at the border until they leave* Proprietary operating system vendors (Microsoft and Apple) must be ordered to redesign their operating systems as walled gardens that only allow users to run software from an app store, which will not sell or give secure software to Britons* Free/open source operating systems -- that power the energy, banking, ecommerce, and infrastructure sectors -- must be banned outright.
As extreme as it reads, without all of that the ISIL operative will be able to communicate securely with his potential American recruit.
Two days ago, former NSA director Mike McConnell, former DHS secretary Michael Chertoff, and former deputy defense secretary William Lynn published a Washington Post op ed opposing back doors in encryption software. They wrote:
Today, with almost everyone carrying a networked device on his or her person, ubiquitous encryption provides essential security. If law enforcement and intelligence organizations face a future without assured access to encrypted communications, they will develop technologies and techniques to meet their legitimate mission goals.
I believe this is true. Already one is being talked about in the academic literature: lawful hacking.
Perhaps the FBI's reluctance to accept this is based on their belief that all encryption software comes from the US, and therefore is under their influence. Back in the 1990s, during the First Crypto Wars, the US government had a similar belief. In 1999 George Washington University surveyed the cryptography market, and found that there were over 500 companies in 70 countries manufacturing or distributing non-US cryptography products -- back in 1999. Maybe we need a similar study today.
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This week’sLawfare Podcast features interviews from the Aspen Security Forum with—among others—FBI Director James Comey, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, and NSA Director Adm. Michael Rogers.
Ben also posted full interviews from the Aspen event on a range of topics including, but not limited to:
- Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism
- Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Harbinger of Things to Come?
- Cooperation and Conflict in the Relationship between Government and Industry in Cyberspace
- Herding Cats: Synthesizing the Intelligence Community
- Hitting the Security Reset Button: Time to Rethink Our Approach?
- The NSC, DHS, and State: Using All the Instruments of National Power to Combat Threats
- The Mideast Cauldron: Hotter Than Ever Now?
- Law and Order: How will the Lynch Justice Department Confront the Terror Threat?
In what Ben described as the best episode of Rational Security to date, he, Tamara and Shane Harris of the Daily Beast discussed whether it even matters that Taliban leader Mullah Omar is dead, if ISIS has eclipsed Al Qaeda as the most important terrorist threat to America and if FBI Director James Comey's plan for “back doors” in encryption systems was undermined when three former senior security officials cast doubt on the idea.
Susan Landau brought us two different perspectives on “going dark,” also known as end-to-end encryption, that were presented at Aspen. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff maintained that providing security for ordinary people makes law enforcement's job harder, but that it’s the right trade-off. On the other hand, Former Director of the National Counterintelligence Center Michael Leiter says that government has to face reality, and “not what you hope reality will be.”
John Bellinger considered whether President Obama’s Visit to Kenya a Snub to the International Criminal Court. Last week on a trip to Africa, President Obama met with two Kenyan leaders, President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto; the former had been charged for a time with international crimes by the ICC prosecutor, and the latter remains under indictment. John argued that President Obama’s willingness to meet with both Kenyan leaders while they remain under ICC investigation demonstrates a less supportive approach towards the Court than ICC advocates have hoped for.
Ashley Deeks pondered the different legal theories that support U.S. airstrikes against al Shabaab. For one, she says, the United States now might consider al Shabaab have become co-belligerents alongside al Qaeda. Secondly, the United States might be acting on behalf of the Somali government, assisting it in its non-international armed conflict against the group. And lastly, the United States might be acting in a kind of “collective self-defense” of AMISOM, which can take “all necessary measures” to carry out its mandate, including reducing the threat to Somalia posed by al Shabaab.
Bobby followed up with a response to Ashley’s post in which he questions the domestic law basis for U.S. airstrikes supporting AMISOM in Somalia. He claims that the public record suggests that the U.S. government has not yet concluded that al Shabaab as a whole has come within the scope of the 2001 AUMF, notwithstanding its AQ-franchise status. He reminded us how broadly the Obama administration construed its independent Article II authority to direct airstrikes (even if not boots-on-the-ground) in Iraq during the first few months of airstrikes against ISIS. In conclusion, Bobby proposes that similar arguments to those made for ISIS are being mounted in connection with the protection of AMISOM forces.
On Monday, Ben played a game called, "If I were the PLA, I'd Spy With My Little Eye." He tipped us off to other unclassified databases the that the Chinese are probably stealing beyond OPM data, including: FDA Investigative New Drug Applications; Veteran Health Administration information; visa applications; Security and Exchange Commission investigative files; export control applications; and IRS tax returns. Paul Rosenzweig then piled on a few more possible databases the Chinese are eyeing: data related to reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission sensitive information database; the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission filings; drivers' license files in the 50 States; and just for fun, he says, the scientific research at our Universities.
Then came the idea for a Lawfare Contest, in which Paul and Ben invited Lawfare readers to submit their nominations for “most interesting, vulnerable, hackable, unclassified database in the United States government.” Let’s just say that Lawfare readers have proposed some gold mines of information for the PLA’s next target. Through their crowdsourcing experiment, Ben and Paul hoped to illustrate the volume and diversity of information in unclassified government databases that a foreign intelligence adversary might find enticing. They also used as a way of encouraging the database managers to look at their own condition with a more critical eye and potentially to inspire the intelligence community to think about the problem of unclassified material in databases around government.
Bruce Schneier argued that back doors won't solve FBI Director James Comey's “going dark” problem and that the problem is that there exists at least one securely encrypted communications platform on the planet that ISIS can use for communication.
In piece that drew an energetic response, Ben and Zoe Bedell analyzed a new theory of liability under which Apple could be held accountable of supplying material support to a terrorist group: the civil terrorism remedies provision of the Antiterrorism Act. Glenn Greenwald and Christopher Soghoian (along with others) took to Twitter to express their outrage at the argument, but failed to provide any explanation of whether Ben and Zoe describe the law cogently or not.
In a piece for the Intercept---which quoted a response by Edward Snowden---Jenna McLaughlinwrote aboutBen’s and Zoe's liability analysis. Ben and Dan Froomkin of the Interceptthen engaged in a Twitter exchange about the piece's accuracy; Ben subsequently wrote about the back-and-forth, asking whether, during it, the Intercept had admitted to making up facts.
On Tuesday, Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew, and Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz provided testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on the Iran nuclear deal before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Lawfare noted the proceedings. Apropos: Jack detailedfive more weak arguments from David Rivkin and Lee Casey of the Wall Street Journal about the illegality of the Iran deal. He goes on to say that “The President’s Team has (as Presidents’ Teams are wont to do) stitched together his legal authorities in a clever way to empower him to pull off the very consequential Iran Deal. The Deal may well show that Congress has delegated or acquiesced in the expansion of too much presidential power. Perhaps Congress will draw lessons from and act on that realization—but I doubt it.”
The White House responded to a petition to pardon Edward Snowden, filed on June 9th, 2013, that has received 167,954 signatures.
Cody updated us on what will happen when the USA Freedom Act goes into effect on November 29, 2015. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency will no longer access the historical metadata collected under Section 215 after the 180-day transition period authorized under the Act.
The in #77 Episode of Steptoe Cyberlaw Podcast, Stewart Baker and Alan Cohn interviewed Bruce Andrews, the deputy secretary of the Commerce Department. They pepper Bruce with questions about export controls on cybersecurity technology, stopping commercial cyberespionage, the future of the NIST cybersecurity framework, and how one can get on future cybersecurity trade missions, among other things.
In other news, Zoe Bedell reviewed"Guantanamo Diary" by Mohamedou Ould Slahi. Zoe views the detainee's work as a “fascinating, but definitely one-sided, account of American detention and interrogation operations from a particular and very controversial period following 9/11.” Zoe concludes in any case that the narrative is “a side of the story that should be understood and internalized for Americans to begin to understand what the cost of the war on terror really is.”
Wells let us know that the United States was once more seeking en banc rehearing in the Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul vs. United States military commissions case.
Wells also provided an update on the opinion on end-of-war motion in the Al Warafi case. The gist of Judge Royce Lamberth's opinion, he said, is to deny the detainee's motion to grant his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Bobby notified us about yet another arrest of a U.S. Citizen allegedly inspired by ISIS to plot an attack.
Andrew Kent challenged the notion that there has been continuity over time in the legal protections offered to individuals affected by national security and foreign affairs activities of the United States government; he argues, in essence, that there are fewer and fewer "legal black holes."
Yishai and Jen Williams gaveus an update on the Middle East where tensions between Bahrain and Iran continue to rise, Israel is providing limited cooperation to the ICC’s preliminary examination into last summer’s Gaza War, Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed “Cairo declaration” and Kuwaiti authorities broke up an alleged Islamic State terror cell.
Jeremy Shapiro wrote a satirical piece on Ayman al-Zawahiri’s terrible, horrible, no good, very bad day---which had its roots in the death of Mullah Omar.
On that subject, Aaron Zelin provided two translated statements from the Taliban this week. The firstwas an announcement from the Taliban, announcing the death of their “Leader of the Faithful Mullah Omar.” The second was a statement from the group about appointing a new leader. In related news, Aaron posted an emergency episode of the Jihadology Podcast, in which he talked J.M. Berger about the confirmed death of Omar and a variety of related topics, including the event's significance for the broader Islamic State - Al Qaeda war.
Finally, Carrie Cordero offered a peek at summer’s unexpected thrill: NASA’s discoveries in space. Her top three favorites? New Horizon’s exploration of Pluto, Earth's "older cousin," Kepler-452b, and Commander Scott Kelly’s exquisite pictures and pithy observations as he keeps watch over us all while we sleep, which you can follow via the hashtag #year in space.
And that was the week that was.
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· · · · · · · · · · ·
Last week, the podcast featured Aspen Security Forum interviews with a trio of Obama administration national security officials. This week is Part II, wherein we share edited discussions at the Aspen Security Forum from White House Homeland Security Advisor Lisa Monaco, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, and Attorney General Loretta Lynch.
Monaco's conversation with Mike Isikoff of Yahoo News ventures into the Administration's policy on ISIS and what she calls a "generational struggle," the trials of social media as a recruitment vehicle, and most interestingly, whether Obama would act unilaterally to move Guantanamo Bay prisoners to the United States.
Clapper's discussion with Andrea Mitchell of NBC News is most notable for his comments on lone wolf attacks and going dark, a threat about which he shares much of the same concern as FBI Director Comey. Later, Clapper touches on the OPM hack and why the United States is choosing to respond much more forcefully to economic espionage than "traditional" espionage.
Finally, in her own interview with Andrea Mitchell, Loretta Lynch walks us through the challenges of domestic terrorism, the Justice Department's approach to intvestigating and prosecuting home grown ISIS supporters, and the legal protections afforded to Guantanamo Bay detainees should they be moved to the United States.
We've also posted full videos of all events for those who want the unedited versions, complete with audience questions.
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· ·
David Sanger has a very damning story on the USG’s struggles to figure out how to respond to the OPM hack. It has decided it has to do something, Sanger tells us, but it cannot decide what to do, or whether to do it publicly or privately, and it worries about sparking escalation that would worsen the situation. President Obama doesn’t like his options and has asked for more.
Wow. This is not a new problem. The government has been dealing with and complaining about foreign government exploitation of its networks for a very long time, long before the Obama administration. Since 2009 the Obama administration has said it has been putting in place a new cyberseurity strategy to deal with intrusions of its networks. Hundreds and probably thousands of conferences and meetings have been held, inside and outside the government, on how to defend and deter intrusions in USG systems. And yet, just as the USG seemed entirely befuddled about how to respond to the first major attack on private networks, it seems entirely befuddled about what to do about the intrusions into its networks. And to make matters worse, its befuddlement is playing out on the pages of the NYT for the world to see. A nation cannot establish any form of deterrence when the world sees that it is undecided about what to do. Any retaliation now, after all the public uncertainty about how to proceed, will hardly establish a credible deterrence policy; and the fact that the USG is considering "symbolic" responses shows just how unserious it is about deterrence. The failure to have a credible deterrence policy has repercussions far beyond the Chinese to other State and non-State parties.
The government’s inability to mount a credible deterrence strategy in the face of at least fifteen years of growing network intrusions makes pretty clear that deterrence through retaliation in this context cannot work. The problems are well known. Even if the USG can attribute with certainty (and justify the attribution publicly), and even if it can control the consequences of retaliation, how can it justify retaliation against China when it is well known that we penetrate its government networks? Indeed, DNI James Clapper and Former NSA Director Hayden basically admitted that what China to OPM did was fair game. (Clapper said “you have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did” and Hayden said the “records are a legitimate foreign intelligence target” and he would have done the same to China if he could.) And then there is the problem that because of our firms as so dependent on Chinese markets, we have more to lose than gain (or at least a whole lot to lose) from escalation.
These and other considerations make me think that Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn was right when he said in 2010 (after criticizing deterrence through retaliation): “Deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any benefit to attackers than on imposing costs through retaliation,” which means that “challenge is to make the defenses effective enough to deny an adversary the benefit of an attack despite the strength of offensive tools in cyberspace.” And yet as the OPM hack reveals, the USG has not taken serious steps to meet this challenge either.
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· ·
The Limits of Counterterrorism by Daniel Byman
Using counterterrorism as a lens for seeing the Middle East, as the Obama administration so often does, has helped the United States achieve several important successes against the Al Qaeda core and avoided an overreaction to real, but not often existential, dangers to U.S. interests in the region. But this filter has also led the United States to miss threats to broader U.S. interests and underestimate the overall impact of terrorism, and has hindered an adequate response in general.
Building on the post-9/11 efforts of the George W. Bush administration, the Obama administration has constructed an effective machine to identify and disrupt terrorists. Much of the effort is built around an intelligence liaison campaign: partnering with countries around the world to gather information on terrorists and then use it to arrest or otherwise disrupt them. Where the government cannot (or at times will not) arrest the suspected terrorists, the intelligence gathered is used for drone strikes, at times on behalf of a weak allied government and at other times in areas where the government is deemed to have lost its sovereignty.
From the Obama administration’s perspective, perhaps the biggest advantage is what this approach avoids. The Middle East was a mess even before civil wars and chaos consumed it after the 2011 Arab Spring, and there are good reasons not to sink deeper into the region. By limiting the U.S. role, American leaders can concentrate on other critical regions like Asia, avoid costly occupations and wars like Iraq after 2003, and otherwise try to put the Middle East on the back burner. Moreover, bykeeping the U.S. footprint light, Obama administration officials hope terrorist groups might turn their guns on the local regimes they hate and each other, further reducing the danger to the U.S. homeland.
Preventing attacks on the U.S. homeland should remain a priority, and since 9/11 this has been a remarkable, though imperfect, success. But killing terrorists alone will not end terrorism. For much of the Middle East, fighting terrorism requires navigating regional civil wars. Although a look at the U.S. record on civil wars in the Middle East suggests pessimism, this poor record does not extend everywhere: in places as diverse as Columbia, Indonesia, Kenya, the Philippines, and Uganda, the United States has successfully worked on statebuilding with allied regimes, building their capacity and enabling them to improve their performance in civil wars, better negotiate from a position of strength, and, of course, fight terrorism.
Killing terrorists alone will not end terrorism. For much of the Middle East, fighting terrorism requires navigating regional civil wars.
Statebuilding assistance goes beyond working with security forces to improve their technical proficiency. Rather, it requires assistance in reforming and building political institutions on which the security forces should rest. Political systems should help countries moderate predatory elite behavior, bolster legitimacy, and weather shocks that might otherwise produce violence.
Building state capacity is not the same as building a democracy. Indeed, as partial democracies are prone to civil wars and unrest in general, it is dangerous to push democratization when the rule of law and state institutions are not in place or are too weak. However, undemocratic elites may be open to statebuilding in a way they would not be to democratization. They may care little about the general welfare, either political or social, of their citizens, but they will seek economic openings that will bolster the regime’s core supporters and welcome security assistance that will help them suppress or defeat their enemies.
The United States should devote particular attention to defense institution building (DIB). Too often counterterrorism assistance is seen as a technical capacity issue, when poor governance is usually the root of the problem. However, the defense institutions—the military, local forces, intelligence services, and police—at all levels often need reform. Iraq is a painful example where years of massive U.S. assistance went to waste because a politicized political system quickly rotted out the senior military leadership and then spread to the military as a whole.
As partial democracies are prone to civil wars and unrest in general, it is dangerous to push democratization when the rule of law and state institutions are not in place or are too weak.
Often the goal should be conflict resolution, not democracy promotion. The United States and its allies should seek to cut deals between moderate warring parties to isolate radicals and otherwise try to end or at least reduce the violence to subdue the threat of terrorism.
In general DIB, like other programs, should be seen as a long-term enterprise that may take years to have a positive impact. In particular, DIB must be tied to efforts to promote accountability in the security sector and otherwise improve the quality of governance. We should also expect limited progress. The United States is only making a partial commitment to part of the system, and local dynamics will still reign. In addition, the United States will be implicated by association with military coups, abuses, and other problems. All these costs are worthwhile, however, if the United States is able to make states less vulnerable to civil wars and terrorism while improving overall governance.
By focusing too much on counterterrorism the United States neglects its other interests in the Middle East and is unable to wage a more comprehensive fight against terrorist groups. Lasting progress is likely to be in short supply as a result.
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· · · ·
Hey, remember the Khorasan group? Its leader is dead.
Washington Post (blog) “In terms of threat to the homeland, Khorasan may pose as much of a danger as the Islamic State," Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. said in September after the bombings. Exactly what that threat was, or how severe it was, has never ... and more » |
Scott L. Cruse named Special Agent in Charge of FBI's Oklahoma City Division
Government Security News Washington, DC, July 27 – Director James B. Comey has named Scott L. Cruse special agent in charge of the FBI's Oklahoma City Division. He most recently served as legal attaché (legat) in London as part of the FBI's International Operations Division (IOD). |
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Los Angeles Times: Encryption: Government's latest enemy
Lima Ohio To FBI Director James B. Comey, the risk is that encryption will become a standard feature in every device and online app, preventing investigators from identifying and stopping terrorists, child predators, violent criminals and others whom they've ... and more » |
FBI Announces Executive Appointments
Federal Bureau of Investigation (press release) (blog) After three years of dedicated service as the associate deputy director, Kevin Perkins will become the special agent in charge of the Baltimore Division and succeed Stephen Vogt, who is retiring following a 25-year career with the FBI. Mr. Perkins ... and more » |
Weeks after attack revealed, millions of OPM cyber-victims still not protected
Washington Post (blog) The heist was potentially so rich that FBI Director James B. Comey earlier this month called it a “treasure trove of information about everybody who has worked for, tried to work for, or works for the United States government.” To protect the ... and more » |
The Epoch Times |
Warning Signs Are Critical to Violence Prevention
The Epoch Times As a response to another tragedy with warning signs, FBI Director James B. Comey met with reporters at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., regarding the June 17, 2015, killings at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church. Comey honestly ... |
Carl Hiaasen: We sit and wait for the next massacre
St. Augustine Record “We're all sick this happened,” FBI director James B. Comey said. Sick is the word for it. Thousands of ineligible applicants for gun ownership have bought weapons over the counter, thanks to that loophole. Big surprise — some of those weapons were ... |
Reuters |
U.S. House bars funding for 'sanctuary' cities for immigrants | Reuters
Reuters The White House has said President Barack Obama would veto the bill on the grounds that it would support police checking immigration status "from any person at any time for any reason."House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte said the White ... House votes to punish sanctuary cities | TheHillThe Hill (blog) House debates bill to crack down on 'sanctuary cities' - US NewsU.S. News & World Report The Big Problem With The GOP's Crusade Against 'Sanctuary Cities'ThinkProgress Politico -New York Daily News all 799 news articles » |
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How Can Obama Fulfill His Pledges for Sweeping Criminal Justice Reform and ...
Huffington Post As counsel to the House Judiciary Committee from 1980 to 1989, I participated in the comprehensive criminal code revision painstakingly developed in 1979 and 1980 and saw it fail because it was not ready for floor action until September 1980. This fall ... and more » |
ZDNet |
White House will not force FBI to get a warrant for email data
ZDNet Former US attorney general Eric Holder told the House Judiciary Committee in May 2013 that he supported the idea of requiring the government to get a warrant first. At the time, a Justice Dept. spokesperson told The Washington Post: "There is no ... |
Iraqi Army and popular forces battling the ISIL terrorist group have inflicted heavy losses on its members and purged some areas in the country of its presence.
Iran has warned the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the repercussions of disclosing to the US Senate the confidential data on the recently signed roadmap between Tehran and the UN nuclear agency.
Yemeni joint forces took control of a strategic military base in retaliation for the Riyadh government's ongoing aggression against their country's civilian population.
wivb.com |
New York Man Arrested and Charged with Attempting to Provide Support to ISIL
Federal Bureau of Investigation (press release) (blog) Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney William J. Hochul Jr. of the Western District of New York and Special Agent in Charge Brian P. Boetig of the FBI'sBuffalo, New York, Division made the announcement today. Tweets, texts, more helped FBI build case against alleged ISIL terroristwivb.com FBI arrests New York man for providing material support to ISISRT FBI arrests Lackawanna man, accused of trying to recruit for ISISBuffalo News WBFO-Syracuse.com-WRBL all 317 news articles » |
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Appeals Court Upholds Ex-FBI Agent's Murder Conviction
ABC News A divided appeals court on Wednesday upheld the murder conviction of a formerFBI agent in the 1982 slaying of a Florida gambling executive in a case connected to imprisoned New England mob boss James "Whitey" Bulger. The full 3rd District Court of ... and more » |
TIME |
FBI: Child Abuse 'Almost at an Epidemic Level' in US
TIME Despite rescuing 600 children last year, the FBI says child sex abuse is at epidemic levels where tens of thousands of children are believed to be sexually exploited in the country each year. “The level of paedophilia is unprecedented right now ... FBI: 'Epidemic' levels of child sex traffickingWashington Examiner Sex trafficking: Lifelong struggle of exploited childrenBBC News all 7 news articles » |
Business Insider |
FBI understaffed to tackle cyber threats, says watchdog
Reuters Although cyber task forces have been set up at all 56 FBI field offices, five of them did not have a computer scientist assigned to them, the report by the Office of the Inspector General found. Cyber security threats are among the Justice Department's ... The FBI can't hire enough cyber specialists because it doesn't pay enoughBusiness Insider FBI faces several challenges with cybersecurity programWashington Times all 9 news articles » |
PBS NewsHour (blog) |
FBI rescued 600 kids from sexual abuse last year, calls level of trafficking ...
PBS NewsHour (blog) The BBC spoke with several women who are former sex workers. One was 14 years old when “a guy I thought I liked” kidnapped her. She returned two years later. “The level of paedophilia is just unprecedented right now,” the FBI's Joseph Campbell told ... FBI: Child Abuse 'Almost at an Epidemic Level' in USTIME FBI: 'Epidemic' levels of child sex traffickingWashington Examiner all 14 news articles » |
PYMNTS.com |
Why The FBI Can't Keep Up With Cyberattacks
PYMNTS.com Under the DOJ's Next Generation Cyber Initiative, the FBI was authorized to hire 134 computer scientists, but as of January 2015, it had only employed 52, the report stated, highlighting weaknesses within the flagship initiative. The agency's budget ... FBI faces several challenges with cybersecurity programWashington Times The FBI Has a Hiring ProblemNewser The FBI can't hire enough cyber specialists because it doesn't pay enoughBusiness Insider The Fiscal Times -KMBZ all 33 news articles » |
CHS Capitol Hill Seattle |
What happened to Capitol Hill 'conspirators' in the FBI's 2010 Russian spy case
CHS Capitol Hill Seattle In 2010, after the couple had moved to Virginia, they were arrested as part of a major FBIsurveillance investigation into the Russian spy ring. It wasn't until then that the true identities of Mikhail Kutsik and Natalia Pereverzeva were revealed. FBI ... |
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CBS News |
Inside the FBI's Cyber Division headquarters
CBS News The Internet is defining technology of the 21st century, and no one knows it better than cybercriminals. Hackers steal billions of dollars and millions of personal data files each year. The FBI is charged with fighting back, but it is understaffed. A ... and more » |
Tech Times |
FBI Is Understaffed To Handle Cybersecurity Tasks: Because... Protocol
Tech Times In fiscal year 2014, FBI had a budget of $314 million for its cybersecurity program that included about 1,333 full-time employees. However, the cybersecurity department of the FBI remained understaffed. The report discovered that the FBI was authorized ... As Economy Improves, Army has Trouble Meeting Recruiting Goals…and so Does FBIAllGov all 2 news articles » |
Long Island Press |
The FBI Built a Database That Can Catch Rapists—Almost Nobody Uses It
Long Island Press The FBI can parse your emails, cellphone records and airline itineraries. In a world where everything is measured, data is ubiquitous —from the number of pieces of candy that a Marine hands out on patrol in Kandahar, to your heart rate as you walk up ... The FBI Built A Database That Can Catch Rapists (And Nobody Uses It)Gizmodo Australia all 3 news articles » |
CAIRO — Egypt extended Saturday its participation in the Saudi-led Arab coalition carrying out air strikes on Iran-backed Shiite rebels in Yemen for another six months, the presidency said.
The US military has for weeks been training Ukrainian forces in US tactics, but the commander of US Army Europe says Ukrainian forces, who are fighting Russian-backed separatists, have much to teach their US trainers.
August 2, 2015, 8:29 AM (IDT)
In an online statement, the Saudi ambassador to the UK confirmed that members of the late Osama bin Laden were killed Friday when their private jet crashed into a car park in southern England. They were identified as the dead terrorist’s stepmother Rajaa Hashim, his sister, Sana Bin Laden, his brother-in law, Zuhair Hashim and the pilot Mazen Al Doaja. The Beechraft twin-engine aircraft had been flying from Milan, Italy, for one of several recent vacation trips to the UK. Aviation experts are baffled by the pilot’s actions in climbing 500 feet as the plane came into land, then diving at high speed to plummet into a car park, instead of landing on the Backbushe airport tarmac in Hampshire.
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August 2, 2015, 12:42 PM (IDT)
US Secretary of State John Kerry began talks in Cairo Sunday on the resumption of the strategic dialogue that the US suspended in 2009. The Obama administration Friday delivered eight F-16 warplanes to Egypt as part of a military support package for its mounting confrontation with Islamists terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula. From Cairo, Kerry continues his tour with short stopovers in Qatar and Kuwait, which Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif visited last week.
August 2, 2015, 4:06 PM (IDT)
Thirty fire brigades mobilized countrywide and eight aircraft are fighting three fires in and around Jerusalem Sunday amid a sweltering heat wave. The fire from Moshav Even Sapir has not reached Hadassah Medical Center, but the hospital is wreathed in smoke. The moshav had to be evacuated when the flames reached homes, chicken runs and storehouses. Firefighters were unable to access to the conflagration at Beitar Ilit because of an old minefield. A third fire is blazing near Ofer Camp outside Givat Zeev west of Jerusalem. To clear the roads to incoming fire trucks from outside the capital, Routes 386 and 395 are closed to traffic both ways and the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem Highway One shut to trucks from Latrun up to the city. Drivers are advised to use Highway 443 as an alternative route. No serious casualties are reported.
Business Insider |
Western companies are starting to bail on China
Business Insider Double-digit growth rates during the first decade of the millennium lured scores of Western companies to invest heavily in China. But in recent years growth has slowed sharply, hitting demand and raising doubts about the financial health of Chinese ... and more » |
CNN |
Military still dealing with cyberattack 'mess'
CNN The incident, under investigation by U.S. Cyber Command, has been expanded to look at whether the intrusion has also impacted other government networks and servers. Officials emphasize that, so far, no classified systems have been impacted. The ... and more » |
Los Angeles Times |
Pentagon seeks cyber-weapons strong enough to deter attacks
Los Angeles Times The folks who brought the world the mushroom cloud are hard at work at a new project – coming up with cyber-weapons so strong that their very existence would deter foreign governments from attacking U.S. databases and critical computer systems. The ... and more » |
kfor.com |
Police: Man posing as military service member scamming local soldiers out of money
kfor.com They say the man is posing as a military member and pulling rank to get what he wants from trusting military service members, and even uses military 'lingo' to seem more legit. It starts with a seemingly innocent conversation, but soon the man has a ... and more » |
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US Decides to Retaliate Against China's Hacking
New York Times The Obama administration has determined that it must retaliate against China for the theft of thepersonal information of more than 20 million Americans from the databases of the Office of Personnel Management, but it is still struggling to decide what ... and more » |
Shreveport Times |
Four men arrested for cyber crimes
Shreveport Times BATON ROUGE — Attorney General James D. "Buddy" Caldwell announced today that investigators with his Cyber Crime Unit have arrested four men for crimes that victimized children. The four men, all of whom were arrested in separate investigations, are: ... and more » |
Daily Beast |
China Is Tearing Down Crosses
Daily Beast HONG KONG—Christians in China sometimes paint their crosses red to remind them of the blood shed by the faithful when Chairman Mao Zedong's shock troops tried to obliterate their faith almost 50 years ago. Now, many of China's Christians fear that the ... and more » |
Expert: America 'Doing Next To Nothing' About China's Growing Power
Daily Caller In this 29 minute exclusive interview with The Daily Caller, Fisher details troubling trends ofChina using economic clout to build political clout and then seek military advantage. Beyond epic cyber espionage and hacking, he lists specific Chinese ... |
Continuing cuts to the military will soon leave every branch weaker than on 9/11
Buffalo News A “tiger mom” might go ballistic if her child came home with a “needs improvement” on his kindergarten report card. But most adults wouldn't panic. They know there is time to get the kid up to standard before the deadline for that Harvard application ... |
Forbes |
China's Expanding Reach And Growing Influence In Central & Eastern Europe
Forbes For the past couple of years, while everyone has been watching Vladimir Putin's moves in Eastern Europe, China has been making increasing economic inroads on Russia's periphery. Its economic dominance of Moscow's traditional backyard, Central Asia, ... |
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How the American Psychological Assn. lost its way
Los Angeles Times The American Psychological Assn. is in crisis. Last December, a Senate Intelligence Committee report laid bare the extensive involvement of individual psychologists in the CIA's black-site torture program. Then, in early July, a devastating independent ... and more » |
 Daily Beast |
How the CIA Came Out of the Closet
Daily Beast During interviews in recent weeks, current and former CIA officers have given Brennan credit for his commitment to recruiting and retaining more LGBT employees. “It's not lip service,” said an openly gay analyst named Charles, who, owing to the ... |
Analysts worry record low interest rates are fuelling unsustainable housing inflation
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