Marine Selected to Head Joint Chiefs - NYT | New Way the U.S. Projects Power Around the Globe: Commandos - WSJ
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» U.S. Military: Put in Harm's Way for Global Empire
04/05/15 20:54 from Mike Nova's Shared Newslinks
mikenova shared this story from rss. The the U.S. military is deployed in over 80 countries around the world. But why? And should they be there?
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Selected Comments:
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[M.N.: Shall we call it "the bandaids and beans" strategy? What are the results of its application in practice so far?]
Meanwhile, as America's most experienced, trained and capable troops are sent into the African bush to handout bandaids and beans to fractious tribesmen of limited strategic value, America's military is being dismantled from within by the Obama Dictatorship to a level not seen in modern history at a time when our enemies are on the march across the world, and even within America's border's. America's elite warrior's should be training for the coming showdown with those who want to overthrow the global order and to either prevent or mitigate nuclear armed fanatical states like Iran or North Korea from instigating catastrophic regional conflict, and defeating the Global Jihad, as the world marches toward global conflagration reminiscent of the 1930s.
The Navy has as many ships as it had during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. A primary component of force projection, and therefore global stability- the Amphibious Readiness Group, has been cut to 33 ships, the bare minimum requirement to respond to the contingencies of a more stable global security situation of five years ago is 38, as determined by the overly optimistic Quadrennial Defense Review. We have less combat power in regards to troops, ships, combat aircraft, and overall logistical and technological investment than at anytime since World War II.
Since Barack Obama has taken office, America has retreated from its role as moral guarantor of global stability; look how that is working out. Seventy year's after World War II, and less than 25 after the end of the Cold War, American's obsessed with the trivial and capricious nature of their decaying popular culture, have ignored the lesson's of the last Century, while the world careens toward a global conflagration with nuclear armed belligerents.
Most of this is the result of an Obama Dictatorship which sees as its duty the weakening of the United States from within economically, politically, culturally, and militarily. Now, more than ever, we need voices speaking the the necessity of mobilizing national will toward safeguarding America's survival against the threats to it, both internal and external, and we should be preparing our military for the type of operations necessary to succeed in the coming catastrophe, not internal defense for illiterate tribesmen.
Why do I think the Chadian trainees are just doing it for a paycheck but when the shooting starts they will vanish if not join the other side.
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[M.N.: Just as it happened in Afghanistan, unfortunately:]
And when they decide our interests aren't their interests we have a well trained rebel insurgency to help kill us. Not sure about this strategy.
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New Way the U.S. Projects Power Around the Globe: Commandos
Over the past year, special-operations forces have landed in 81 countries, mostly to train local troops to fight so Americans don’t have to
MAO, Chad—“Is this good?” yelled the U.S. Special Forces sergeant. “No!”
He waved a paper target showing the dismal marksmanship of the Chadian commandos he was here to teach. Dozens of bullet holes intended for the silhouette’s vital organs were instead scattered in an array of flesh wounds and outright misses.
The Chadians, with a reputation as fierce desert fighters, were contrite. They dropped to the fine Saharan sand and pounded out 20 push-ups. “Next time, we’re going to shoot all of the bullets here,” one Chadian soldier said, gesturing toward the target’s solar plexus.
Such scenes play out around the world, evidence of how the U.S. has come to rely on elite military units to maintain its global dominance.
These days, the sun never sets on America’s special-operations forces. Over the past year, they have landed in 81 countries, most of them training local commandos to fight so American troops don’t have to. From Honduras to Mongolia, Estonia to Djibouti, U.S. special operators teach local soldiers diplomatic skills to shield their countries against extremist ideologies, as well as combat skills to fight militants who break through.
President Barack Obama, as part of his plan to shrink U.S. reliance on traditional warfare, has promised to piece together a web of such alliances from South Asia to the Sahel. Faced with mobile enemies working independently of foreign governments, the U.S. military has scattered small, nimble teams in many places, rather than just maintaining large forces in a few.
The budget for Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., which dispatches elite troops around the world, jumped to $10 billion in the fiscal year that ended on Sept. 30, from $2.2 billion in 2001. Congress has doubled the command to nearly 70,000 people this year, from 33,000 in fiscal 2001. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force provide further funding.
Navy SEALs and Army Green Berets, for example, are stationed in the Baltics, training elite troops from Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia for the type of proxy warfare Russia has conducted in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
U.S. forces are also winding down what they consider a successful campaign, begun soon after the Sept. 11 hijackings, to help Filipino forces stymie the al Qaeda-aligned Abu Sayyaf Group. And commanders believe U.S. training of Colombian troops helped turn the tide against rebels and drug traffickers.
At times, U.S. special-operations troops take action themselves, as in the Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden in his Pakistani hideout in 2011, or the rescue of freighter Capt. Richard Phillips from Somali pirates in 2009.
U.S. special operators roam the forests of the Central African Republic, alongside Ugandan troops, hunting the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Joseph Kony . The rebel group, considered a terrorist organization by the U.S., has forcibly recruited children into its ranks.
But the vast majority of special-operations missions involve coaxing and coaching foreign forces to combat extremists the U.S. considers threats.
Driving the idea are 14 years of fighting in Afghanistan, and the on-again-off-again battle in Iraq, expensive land wars that have sapped the political support of many Americans. At the same time, the U.S. faces threats from such free-range terror networks as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali; al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen; Islamic State in Syria and Iraq; al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Most of these militants have no borders, instead concealing themselves among civilians disaffected with their own corrupt or inept rulers.
The special-operations strategy has a mixed record. The U.S. tried it in Vietnam, only to watch an advisory mission metastasize into a costly, full-scale war. The U.S. put years of training into Mali’s military, which crumbled before the swift advance of al Qaeda and its allies in 2012.
The partnership between U.S. and Yemeni special operators to battle al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was disrupted earlier this year when an anti-American rebel group ousted the U.S.-aligned president.
One skeptic, James Carafano, vice president for defense and foreign policy at the conservative Heritage Foundation, said relying on special-operations forces was akin to saying, “I’m not going to do brain surgery because I’m going to give you an aspirin. The world doesn’t work that way.”
Commandos can hunt down enemy leaders or train small indigenous units, Mr. Carafano said, but they alone can’t build a capable national army.
The strategy isn’t always flexible enough to meet immediate threats. American efforts to enlist, train and arm moderate Syrian rebels have moved so slowly that some potential allies have given up on Washington. Many have been overrun by the same extremist groups the U.S. sought to defeat.
The three-week military exercises in Chad, which ended last month, are a microcosm of the U.S. strategy. The annual event started small a decade ago, and has grown to include 1,300 troops, with special-operations contingents from 18 Western nations coaching commandos from 10 African countries.
“We have a common threat in the form of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram and other extremist organizations that threaten our way of life,” said Maj. Gen. Jim Linder, the outgoing commander of Special Operations Command-Africa.
The allied nations included the U.K., Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Denmark and others that over the past decade have forged a global special-operations network, primarily by training local forces together in Afghanistan. Lithuania and Latvia sent observers to Chad this year, raising the possibility the nations will join next year’s exercises in Senegal.
Several African countries face extremists of one stripe or another. Mauritanian paratroopers have fought al Qaeda and its allies in Mali. German special forces mentored Tunisians, whose country borders the chaos of Libya.
A Spanish special-forces soldier watches a truckload of Chadians roll by during multicountry military exercises in Chad in February. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Niger and Cameroon defend their territory against Boko Haram, a group infamous for kidnapping hundreds of young people and slaughtering thousands in rampages through northeastern Nigeria.
Scores of Nigerian Special Boat Service commandos, who have trained with U.S. Navy SEALs, were in Chad to receive tactical advice from British instructors: How to set up an ambush, how to drag a wounded comrade out of danger and how to move through the sparse Sahelian forests.
At many points over the past six years, the U.S., Chad, Niger and others have criticized Nigeria for using brutal tactics against civilians who might otherwise help them flush out militants.
The Nigerian response to Boko Haram didn’t work effectively and “actually in some places made it worse,” Gen. David Rodriguez, commander of Africa Command, told an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., in January. The U.S. and its allies hope the latest training will help the Nigerians turn the tide.
American training has helped Chadian troops block the militants’ advance. But Chad is unlikely to be able to reverse Boko Haram’s gains unless Nigeria, which has the region’s biggest economy and largest army, steps up its own campaign, according to commanders.
“We can’t declare victory and be triumphalist yet,” said Chadian Brig. Gen. Zakaria Ngobongue.
The training exercises, dubbed Flintlock, were held in Chad, but U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa took the leading role and spent between $6 million and $7 million, the lion’s share of the cost, the military said. The West Virginia Air National Guard, and the Canadian and Spanish air forces provided cargo planes to ferry troops and supplies.
Though it has a population of just 12 million, landlocked Chad covers an area three times as large as California, much of it in the Sahara. It borders an array of hot spots, including Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic and, across Lake Chad, Nigeria.
Smugglers dealing in arms, drugs and humans cross Chad and neighboring Niger, many heading to or from Libya to the north. “There’s vast, empty territory with porous borders, and it contains a huge terrorist threat,” said Chadian army Col. Khassim Moussa.
Chadians have long fought America’s enemies, from the Nazis to the late Libyan leader, Col. Moammar Gadhafi. In the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, the U.S. urged Chad to set up a commando unit to counter regional threats. In 2010, Chad launched its Special Anti-Terrorist Group, with the understanding that American special operators would be the trainers.
The U.S. has provided the unit with more than 50 vehicles over the past year, along with uniforms, spare parts, radios, generators and ambulances, said Col. Khassim, its chief of staff. American special operators train Chadians three or four times a year, the colonel said.
The commandos cut a striking image, roaming battlefields in Toyota Land Cruiser pickup trucks armed with heavy antiaircraft guns, their heads wrapped in checked scarves and sunglasses. They are the first to fight when Chad goes to war, which is often.
Chadian troops fought in Mali in 2013, for example, joining French forces to push back al Qaeda. The antiterrorist unit recently ventured into Nigeria, a mission the soldiers training with U.S. Special Forces last month expected to undertake, as well.
An American Special Forces medic checks the blood pressure of a patient at a military-run medical clinic in Mao, Chad. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The special-operations approach can run up against laws barring American troops from working with foreign military units known to have violated human rights, which include some Nigerian units. The Chadians also faced such allegations. Chadians served as peacekeepers during sectarian strife in Central African Republic, but they withdrew last year following accusations they took sides and fired on civilians.
Chadian officials said their troops have at times run roughshod over the people they were supposed to protect. Col. Khassim said American training has helped. “Soldiers aren’t behaving the way they were before,” he told residents of Mao, a desert town and training site, in February. “You civilians don’t have to fear the military.”
U.S. special operators are encouraged to learn local culture, language and politics as they report on a country’s vulnerability to extremists. “This isn’t spying—this is armed anthropology,” said David Maxwell, a former Special Forces colonel now at Georgetown University.
The work draws soldiers with more than a hint of Peace Corps aspirations. The leader of one Special Forces team in Chad grew up in neighboring Cameroon, the son of missionaries. He speaks both French, the colonial language of Chad, and West African pidgin English, a skill that surprised Nigerian commandos at his camp. He rarely starts a conversation with African counterparts without first politely asking whether they’ve had a good night’s sleep, an approach that signals respect in the region.
Anti-extremist campaigns often push U.S. special operators into spheres once strictly the realm of civilians, combining tactical training with social and economic outreach.
American psychological-operations soldiers helped build a jungle radio network in Uganda, South Sudan and Central African Republic to encourage defections among Lord’s Resistance Army fighters. Special-operations civil-affairs teams, based in American embassies in three-dozen countries, work with U.S. diplomats and development experts to improve such public services as water supply to stoke the popularity of governments friendly to U.S. interests.
In Mao, special operators paused the ambush training and mock patrols to hold a free medical clinic. While American, Danish, Italian and German medical personnel pulled rotten teeth, felt babies’ foreheads and dispensed anti-parasite drugs, Chadian commandos handed out pesticide-laced bed netting and Prudence-brand condoms.
“The thought is that if the Chadian people see they have a legitimate and capable defense force, they’ll feel more secure,” said one special-operations doctor. “A secure and stable Chad is one far less susceptible to Boko Haram and other insurgent influences.”
“We’re drawing a line in the sand literally here,” the doctor said.
Write to Michael M. Phillips at michael.phillips@wsj.com
