FBI on a couch: problems and solutions | The American KGB and the Comey's visions: can Hoover's COINTELPRO thugs be transformed into the modern counterintelligence officers? | M.N.: The American KGB wants to take over the US government. Oy, gevalt! Maybe, it is the time to order a ticket to Madagascar.. - Quotes and Comments

FBI as a domestic intelligence service

The American KGB and the Comey's visions: can Hoover's COINTELPRO thugs be transformed into the modern counterintelligence officers? That's the question! 
The issue and the problem, it seems to me, is the "change-resistant" institutional culture. 

M.N.: The American KGB wants to take over the US government. Oy, gevalt! Maybe, it is the time to order a ticket to Madagascar... 

I believe the FBI should be the leadership factory of the United States government [God Forbid! We do not need Mike Grimms running the governmental affairs. - M.N.] and it’s not there yet,” Comey said, speaking Sept. 19 at the Intelligence and National Security Summit in Washington, D.C. "I actually think that we’ve reached an inflection point. We’ve hired a tremendous amount of talented people over the last ten years. And now the question is ‘so where are they going?’"

M.N.: That's exactly where the problem is: they do not know what to do with themselves and with their heavy bag of gold (maybe the ever sympathetic Congress should relieve their burden). In other, higher words, they lack a sense of institutional mission, they stoically suffer from a bad case of identity crisis: "Who are we? The super-cops? The counterintelligence officers? The surveillance specialists? Or we just sit here on a Highway 65, watching everybody and enjoying ourselves?" 

“The best companies in the world obsess about leadership. They treat it as money," said Comey... 

M.N.: Well, FBI is not a commercial organisation as is not the state and its leaders. It is a different set of values, cultures and rules. 

On FBI "Intelligence branch":
“I want it part of criminal, I want it part of cyber, I want it part of everything we do here," Comey said. "And so I took it and created with Congress’ permission an intelligence branch.”

M.N.: Many observers among those listed in the web review references do not believe that this endeavor will be successful and some question the very need for it. It is unlikely that the Pinkertons will become good James Bonds, even if this is all they can dream about. Practice your Cointelpro in the erotic sands of Arabia, that's more in line with your capabilities. 
Besides that, the whole FBI rigid institutional system with its ridiculous hierarchy and cult of "special agents in charge", the Hoover's leftover, does not predispose toward creation of good intelligence agency, if it is to contain at least some intelligence. That is why Mr. Comey pays a particular attention to the selection of new leaders within the Bureau. Hopefully, his choices are the lucky ones. 

"Labels matter," said Comey. "I tend to think of our folks in three buckets..."

M.N.: I liked how you put it, "in buckets"... How do you carry these three buckets with your two hands and a heavy sack of gold on your back? Must be uncomfortable... 

"So how will Comey measure success in his transformation efforts? Before his term is up he wants to have senior intelligence professional talent available to take over the role of EAD for Intelligence.
"Success will be when the EAD for intelligence and all of the leaders down through the intelligence program are people who came up through the intelligence career service," he said. "Because to be truly great we need a symbiotic relationship between those gifted professional agents and those gifted intelligence analysts." 

M.N.: Do you mean that you want to put analysts in charge in about ten years from now? You are the boss, but I don't know... As they say, "time is a terrible thing to waste". And a lot of things might happen during this period of time... 

And the "measurement of success" (especially the institutional success) is a very, very complex and important matter. 

Reinventing the FBI: The Comey vision

The 2001 attacks "stressed the need to share," said Eric Velez-Villar, deputy director of the FBI, adding it has moved from a "culture of need to know" to a "culture of need to share ". "The goal is to find that nirvana between the responsibility to share and the need to protect" information, added the Director of National Intelligence at a conference organized by the CSIS, a think tank.

M.N.: The historical observations and comparisons also stress the importance of cultural and professional factors (rather than "ideological", in our times) in counterintelligence work: 

"Potential targets of FBI counterterrorism investigations probably have more to fear from xenophobic vigilantes than from Bureau superpatriots. 
Undoubtedly FBI agents will make mistakes, especially in the frenzy after a major attack, but the vast majority of its errors seem more likely to result from bureaucratic inertia, institutional culture clashes, outdated technology, and a steep learning curve [the steepness of the curve is always relative and is the subject to the skills of a climber, which points to the quality vs quantity issue in personnel selection - M.N.] than from any ideological fixation." 

Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence But Promoted the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold War Years - Reviewed by David Robarge

M.N.: The references to the "change-resistant" institutional culture are sprinkled throughout the latest  9/11 Review Commission Report, along with the recommendations to strengthen the role and place of intelligence analysts within the Bureau and for their greater integration into the USIC: 

The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century

Report of the Congressionally-directed 9/11 Review Commission


Over the past decade, the Bureau has made measurable progress building a
threat-based, intelligence driven-national security organization. In the same period, however,
global threats to the US Homeland have become more complex, challenging the FBI’s traditional orientation as the primary federal law enforcement organization, its change-resistant culture, and its core capabilities in criminal investigation, counterintelligence, intelligence collection and analysis, and technology.
Recommendation 1: The FBI needs to accelerate the pace of its reforms and
transformation of its culture to counter these dynamic threats and fulfill its expanding global
mission as a fully integrated, intelligence-driven investigative organization under visional
leadership and enabled by state-of-the-art technology. 

Improving Intelligence Analysis and Collection
The Bureau, despite its stated intentions to address the concerns of its intelligence
analysts, still does not sufficiently recognize them as a professionalized workforce with
distinct requirements for investment in training and education... 
The Review Commission views its recommendation to enhance the analyst career service as a top priority among the following other proposals to improve analysis, collection, and training for both analysts and special agents... 
The Review Commission views its recommendation to enhance the analyst career service as a top priority among the following other proposals to improve analysis, collection, and training for both analysts and special agents...
Leadership at all levels of the FBI is not unified or consistent in driving cultural
change. The workforce grasps the FBI’s stated intention to transform itself into an ntelligence driven, threat-based agency, but implementation varies widely...
The FBI today is not sufficiently integrated into the USIC...
The challenges to the Bureau’s core missions—criminal investigation, intelligence, and technology—are already and will be increasingly global...
The Review Commission recommends that the FBI develop a comprehensive strategic vision—and a five-year, implementable, metric-based [!-M.N.] strategic planthat would integrate its expanding national and global missions, as well as its intelligence and law enforcement mandates...
The plan must enable the professionalization of FBI analysis, improvement in the
HUMINT program, long-term strengthening of the LEGAT program, and the acceleration
of S&T initiatives.
Achieving these ambitious goals should not be a zero-sum game between intelligence and law enforcement. It should mean a continued FBI commitment to a growing criminal investigation mission, to a tighter and smoother integration of intelligence analysts and collectors into the USIC, to a more strategic approach to its growing international footprint, and to greater investment in closer collaborative relationships with US and foreign partners.


Report Credits F.B.I. With Progress Since 9/11, but Says More Is Needed - NYT

The 2004 report of the national Sept. 11 Commission and subsequent reviews called for major changes to the F.B.I., but the report released Wednesday was far less critical. Rather than a rebuke, it amounts to a status-check on the F.B.I. transformation that began in 2001.
Today’s bureau bears little resemblance to that organization, and some of the areas cited for improvement are markedly better than they were years ago. For instance, the 2004 report said that two-thirds of the bureau’s analysts were qualified to perform their jobs. The latest report, by contrast, said, “The training and professional status of analysts has improved in recent years.”

And while the report said the F.B.I. needed more translators, it was much less critical of the bureau’s foreign language ability than previous reports were.
The report said that to improve its intelligence gathering and analysis, the F.B.I. needed to have more informants. The panel examined the details of five F.B.I. counterterrorism investigations. In none of those cases did a confidential source “provide actionable intelligence to help prevent or respond to a terrorist operation,” the report said.
Rick Nelson, a former counterterrorism official on the National Security Council, said that reports like the one released Wednesday were highly effective in keeping the pressure on the F.B.I. to continue to evolve.

“The transformation after 9/11 will go on for decades,” Mr. Nelson said. “There are antibodies at the F.B.I., like any agency, that stand in the way of change. These reports keep the pressure on the agency to say, ‘We’re tracking you.’

“It also provides internal support for the agency to say, ‘We have a mandate for change.’ And that helps with getting more money from Congress. The F.B.I. can point to this report and say if you want us to do more human intelligence, we will need the money.”
The panel was particularly critical of how the F.B.I. treats its analysts. It said that “despite its stated intentions to address concerns from its analysts,” the bureau did not regard them as a “professional work force” that needed to be continually trained and educated. It said analysts needed to “be empowered to question special agent’s operational assumptions.”
“Looking ahead, the F.B.I. will be increasingly dependent upon all domestic and foreign partnerships to succeed in its critical and growing national security missions — including against the rapidly evolving cyber and terrorist threats,” the report said.

The report highlighted a simmering issue between the F.B.I. and the Justice Department’s national security division. Many in the F.B.I. believe the national security division “was too slow in reviewing” applications for wiretaps, the report said.


The intelligence community has attempted to refocus to track terrorists that use unconventional means — a more complex task. This complexity is compounded by terrorist disregard for borders, laws, and transnational financing. As a result, the U.S. has attempted to change its concept of domestic intelligence through enactment of legislation and other initiatives. There is uncertainty whether these initiatives have resulted in better intelligence. The challenge for developing domestic intelligence capabilities centers on establishing them within a larger framework, to ensure information sharing and to implement oversight mechanisms to protect civil liberty. Organizational mechanisms, information sharing, and oversight are the critical components. An alternative is to create a domestic intelligence agency. 
While domestic intelligence agencies may not be able to prevent all terrorist attacks, are they more successful in preventing most attacks? Do effective domestic intelligence agencies, solely focused on intelligence gathering and unencumbered by law enforcement responsibilities, possess a better ability to focus and develop precise intelligence?
Additionally, the combination of law enforcement and intelligence functions under the FBI and the Attorney General, acting as the federal government’s chief legal officer, has also led to civil rights abuses.
The critical feasibility issue, however, is whether the United States can translate strategic guidance and direction into meaningful change, reform, and capability that mitigate the domestic intelligence gap...
The 9/11 Commission did not see a need to create a domestic intelligence agency unless their other recommendations were not adopted — to create an effective NCTC and Director of National Intelligence (DNI). 111 The effectiveness of the DNI to implement reform was questionable when 96 percent of the FBI’s intelligence function fell outside of the DNI’s purview. 112 Continued FBI reform attempts, as evidenced by reorganization efforts in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, are indicative of organizational instability or resistance to change.
Like the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and India have been unable to prevent terrorist attacks. In the absence of definitively demonstrating that domestic intelligence agencies are better positioned to prevent most attacks, the single largest obstacle to implementing this organizational construct in the United States is cultural. Given the history and structure of the United States, it is probably still not acceptable to have a domestic intelligence agency.
Merely implementing a U.S. domestic intelligence agency will not prevent further terrorist attacks. 

Only an in-depth appraisal of the DNI and NCTC’s performance, the ability of intelligence and law enforcement organizations to share information, the FBI’s progress at reforming itself, the implementation of the DHS as an organization with a domestic intelligence function, and the ability to provide effective oversight will determine whether the intelligence shortfalls identified in the congressional inquiry into the attacks on 9/11 have been addressed. 118

A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States? A Comparative Analysis of Domestic Intelligence Agencies and Their Implications for Homeland Security | HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS - James Burch


Intelligence Reform

The 9/11 terrorist attacks have been called a major intelligence failure.97 In response to criticisms of its intelligence capabilities, the FBI over the last decade has introduced a series of reforms intended to transform the Bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on criminal investigations into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven98 agency that can prevent acts of terrorism.99

97 There is a large body of literature on the failures associated with the attacks of September 11, 2001, and broader issues associated with the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community in general. According to William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 187, the attacks of 9/11 represent a failure of both intelligence and policy. See also The Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005. (Hereafter cited as WMD Report.) Chapter 10 of this report, “Intelligence at Home: The FBI, Justice, and Homeland Security,” is the most germane with respect to FBI intelligence reform. See also Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 7, 2004. See also the National Academy of Public Administration, Transforming the FBI: Progress and Challenges, January 2005. Chapter 3 on Intelligence is most pertinent to the topic of this CRS report. See also Richard A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11 (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2005); U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks, November 2004, recently released in redacted form.

Others have echoed A Ticking Time Bomb’s bipartisan appraisal. In an April 2011 letter to Attorney General Eric H. Holder and Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Jr.,

the FBI Intelligence Analysts Association (FBI IAA) criticized the efforts the Bureau has made toward becoming “intelligence-driven.”116 The letter stated that the Bureau has not yet fully established intelligence analysis as a core mission of the organization. Rather than being a driver of operational activity, intelligence is still typically seen as an enabler to the law enforcement mission. Intelligence is often viewed as an operational asset, an additional tool that can be used much in the same way that technology can be used to help investigate cases. But to be “intelligence-driven” in the FBI cannot mean intelligence should be a surrogate or a component of the law enforcement mission. America’s security requires that FBI operations be guided by the best possible assessment of the threat. Intelligence must drive operations by identifying threats and vulnerabilities based on our nation’s criminal and national security concerns.117
However, the FBI IAA has stated that analysts at the FBI continue to be relegated to “support” roles120 (i.e., they react to direction from special agents rather than being full partners in an intelligence-driven investigative operation). They argue that intelligence analysts should have professional parity with special agents to rapidly reform the FBI’s institutional culture. The FBI IAA’s indictments of the Bureau’s efforts come from insiders working on intelligence matters within the FBI. However, it must be kept in mind that these same individuals publicly lobby on behalf of FBI intelligence analysts.121 
A Ticking Time Bomb also emphasized that the necessary transformation of the FBI is incomplete, and “we must be impatient for progress.”122 Specifically, the committee cited the Fort Hood shootings as a warning that the FBI’s transformation remains a work in progress and that the FBI must accelerate efforts—especially given the growing complexity and diversity of the homegrown terrorist threat.123 Among its findings, the committee said that the FBI’s Hassan inquiry was impeded by division among the Bureau’s field offices, insufficient use of intelligence analysis, outdated tradecraft, and poor coordination within the JTTFs and between the JTTFs and headquarters.124 As a counterpoint, the HSGAC report cited the case of the terrorist plot by Najibullah Zazi to attack the New York City subway system in September 2009 as an FBI success, noting that the coordination across federal, state, and local departments, led by two JTTFs, was excellent and unprecedented.125 
To counter violent plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described by one scholar as the “Al Capone”131 approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.”132 The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, nonterrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations.133 In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. As the “Al Capone” moniker suggests, historically these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. While these techniques combined with the cultivation of informants as well as surveillance (especially in and around mosques) may be effective in stymieing rapidly developing terrorist plots, their use has fostered concern within U.S. Muslim communities.134


Prior to 1976, national security investigations at the FBI followed no specific guidelines established by either DOJ or Congress. Without oversight, the Bureau developed a covert Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) to target the Communist Party U.S.A.”156 During its lifespan from 1956-1971, the program involved aggressive and illegal tactics to harass, disrupt, discredit, and collect intelligence on the party and its members. COINTELPRO’s purpose was to protect national security, prevent violence, and maintain the social and political order in the United States.157 It was not designed to build traditional cases to be brought to trial. The FBI expanded COINTELPRO to target groups and movements such as the Socialist Workers Party, the Ku Klux, Klan, the New Left, and the Black Panther Party.158 The program was developed partly because the FBI was frustrated with Supreme Court limits on overt investigations of dissident groups.159 With COINTELPRO, the FBI “took the law into its own hands”160 and authorized questionable methods including “use of subterfuge, plant[ing] agents provocateurs, [and] leak[ing] derogatory information to the press.”161 Among specific tactics, the FBI mailed anonymous letters to break up marriages, contacted employers to get people fired from their jobs, and falsely declaimed individuals as government informants to discredit them within their own organizations.162 The Bureau even targeted some nonviolent organizations, such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, because it “believed they represented a ‘potential for violence.’”163 As the FBI itself acknowledges, some COINTELPRO methods were excessive and “went too far for the American people.”164 The public first learned of the program after a 1971 burglary at an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania. Individuals tied to the incident leaked information on COINTELPRO to the press and Congress. In response, the FBI terminated the program.165
In its oversight role, Congress may wish to examine the extent to which intelligence has been integrated into FBI operations to support its counterterrorism mission and the progress the Bureau has made on its intelligence reform initiatives. Congress may also wish to explore the extent to which the FBI has enhanced its collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security, other federal partners, and state and local law enforcement elements. This is not just an issue of information sharing, but of how the Bureau has institutionalized its collaboration in order to tackle complex threats.

Finally, Congress might ask how the FBI uses strategic intelligence to develop a true understanding of security threats and how they are evolving. In other words, has the Bureau developed effective predictive capacity? 

FBI intelligence reforms since 9/11 have met with a mixed response. Among its intelligence initiatives since 9/11, the FBI has increased its intelligence focus by creating a Directorate of Intelligence and hiring thousands of new and better-qualified analysts.
According to the Senate HSGAC report: In the Hasan case, two JTTFs (each located in a different field office) disputed the significance of Hasan’s communications with the Suspected Terrorist and how vigorously he should be investigated. The JTTF that was less concerned about Hasan controlled the inquiry and ended it prematurely after an insufficient examination. Two key headquarters units - the Counterterrorism Division, the “National JTTF” (which was created specifically to be the hub among JTTFs), and the Directorate of Intelligence were not made aware of the dispute. This unresolved conflict raises concerns that, despite the more assertive role that FBI headquarters now plays, especially since 9/11 in what historically has been a decentralized organization, field offices still prize and protect their autonomy from headquarters. FBI headquarters also does not have a written plan that articulates the division of labor and hierarchy of command-and-control authorities among its headquarters units, field offices, and the JTTFs.173
Finally, the FBI has greatly increased its production of intelligence products. As noted earlier, in 2010 the Bureau produced over 25,000 intelligence reports on counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and criminal topics as well as information related to cyber issues and weapons of mass destruction.174 It may be of oversight interest to Congress to examine the value of these reports, their accessibility within the intelligence and law enforcement communities, and the views of various consumers about them.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations .pdf

Jerome P. Bjelopera
Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism
Congressional Research Service
April 24, 2013

Looking Forward 

Can the FBI perform the mission of counterintelligence at the standard of MI5? The answer is that Bureau absolutely has done so in isolated instances and that, if it had not been for political problems, FBI counterintelligence may have started to resemble MI5 counterintelligence in the aftermath of World War II.

Sound counterintelligence practices, however, have never been institutionalized in the Bureau.

The greatest and most concentrated push to do so has been the US post-9/11 FBI counter-terrorism campaign. The question then becomes: can the Bureau morph itself into a successful counterintelligence organization despite its historical preferences? Given that this development is so recent, it is certainly difficult to say. 
Finally, and most crucially, the Bureau must become more preventive and proactive in contrast to its established preference for reactive law enforcement.345 This quality is at the heart of counterintelligence and counter-terrorism and will absolutely be the most difficult change for the Bureau. If the FBI can make this cultural shift, it will be able to prevent and counter intelligence and terrorist threats just as well as any other organization, including MI5.
A final note on intelligence and law enforcement organization is in order. The FBI has always had a more complicated mission than MI5 – it is charged with the sometimes contradictory missions of law enforcement, counterintelligence, and counter-terrorism while MI5 is free to focus on counterintelligence and counter-terrorism.

Counterintelligence in the Kingdom and the States
A Historical Comparison of the FBI and MI5
April 14, 2014

Posner asserts that FBI’s “culture” is unsuitable for an intelligence agency. An agency’s organizational “culture”—namely the accumulated, settled body of beliefs and principles that defines an agency’s mission and that dictates the value system to which an organization demands its employees adhere—shapes and channels how the agency pursues its mission. 

Unlike the CIA, the FBI is predominantly a law enforcement agency and that focus undergirds every step the Bureau takes. The FBI primarily conducts investigations after a crime has occurred rather than pursuing suspects beforehand. Its highest priority is gathering legally admissible and ample proof of a suspect’s commission of a past crime rather than acquiring the fragile and diaphanous bits and pieces of intelligence that could reveal a larger terrorist network or plot in the making. Additionally, the FBI is inclined to view public adversarial criminal prosecutions as the natural culmination of solid investigative work rather than as a harmful and unfortunate occasion for the disclosure of intelligence whose value hinges on its secrecy. In contrast, the CIA would rather watch suspected terrorists in order to collect as much information as possible and pursue various covert actions to disrupt terrorist work (such as bribing or turning a participant) instead of seeking the public condemnation and punishment of a suspect at a criminal trial. For these reasons, Posner contends, the FBI continues to display a law enforcement mindset, despite FBI Director Robert S. Mueller’s efforts to redirect the Bureau toward counter-terrorism work. What the country needs, Posner argues, is to treat terrorist activities uniquely rather than as large-scale crimes and to dedicate one agency to the sole task of sniffing out domestic terrorists. He concludes that the FBI, after seventy-plus years of focusing on catching felons, cannot hope to reinvent itself for that job. 

2008 - Book Review: Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps Richard A. Posner - by Jennifer C. Gross

The rivalries among law enforcement agencies are acute because
of competition for funds, overlapping authority, different cultures,
the FBI’s traditional hauteur 

[is pronounced like "hot air": haughtiness of manner; disdainful pride, or simpler: grandstanding, arrogance - M.N.]
and fear of a rival agency’s “stealing” one’s cases. 
Many local law enforcers feel deserted by
the federal government in general, and the FBI in particular, in
regard to national security intelligence. The Bureau does not treat
them as its partners or even its customers. FBI agents have been
known to brush off attempts by local police, and even by other
federal officers, to obtain the Bureau’s aid in intelligence matters.

Remaking Domestic Intelligence - Richard Posner

Finally, there’s little evidence that the FBI’s intelligence-first approach is effective in preventing terrorism, anyway. The FBI’s most indiscriminate terrorism intelligence tool, the telephone metadata program that sweeps up information about all our calls, has never stopped a terrorist attack. And reviews of its work in failed investigations involving Tamerlan Tsarnaev, David Headley, Carlos Bledsoe, and Nidal Hasan (who all slipped through the cracks and executed deadly plots even after coming under the FBI’s scrutiny) indicate that the relentless workload created by the overwhelming amount of information the FBI collects is part of the problem, not the solution. 

Shielding government agencies from robust public accountability has never been a recipe for effective performance. If the FBI were truly an “intelligence-driven organization,” as Comey likes to say, it would empirically evaluate all the threats we face, and utilize methods scientifically demonstrated to be effective to efficiently address them. 

It is time for Congress to conduct a thorough examination of the FBI’s use of its post-9/11 authorities to end programs that are unnecessary, ineffective, or prone to abuse. Just calling what you’re doing intelligence doesn’t make it intelligent. 

How to Fix the FBI: It Shouldn’t Be an Intelligence Agency - M.German - National Review


Robert G. Wright, Jr. is an FBI agent who has criticized the FBI's counterterrorist activities in the 1990s, when he worked in the Chicago division on terrorists with links to the Middle East... 
Three months before 9/11 he wrote the following:
"Knowing what I know, I can confidently say that until the investigative responsibilities for terrorism are removed from the FBI, I will not feel safe. The FBI has proven for the past decade it cannot identify and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States and it's [sic] citizens at home and abroad. Even worse, there is virtually no effort on the part of the FBI's international terrorism unit to neutralize known and suspected terrorists residing within the United States."[1][3]
After his revelations circa 2002–2003 he was demoted.[1][4]


Links and References - FBI as a domestic intelligence service


Problems with FBI as domestic intelligence agency

FBI reactive law enforcement vs proactive counterintelligence stance in terrorism prevention

FBI intelligence analysis


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