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Far West LLC A company behind many black operations. Some names and information for further research

Poroshenko says evidence shows Kremlin aide Surkov directed snipers in Kiev

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KIEV (Reuters) - Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said on Friday police evidence showed that a top Kremlin aide, Vladislav Surkov, had directed "foreign sniper groups" who shot and killed protesters in Kiev a year ago.
A Russian foreign ministry spokesman dismissed the claims as "nonsense", Russia's Interfax news agency reported.
Poroshenko made his comments at a meeting with relatives of some of the 100 or so people who were shot dead over a three-day period a year ago during protests on Kiev's Independence Square (Maidan) against the Moscow-backed president, Viktor Yanukovich. Yanukovich subsequently fled to Russia.
"Just a few days ago, the head of state security told me that, in questioning, special forces operatives gave evidence that the Russian presidential aide Vladislav Surkov led the organisation of groups of foreign snipers on the Maidan," Poroshenko said, according to his website.
He also said that phone records showed there was evidence of regular conversations between Yanukovich and Russia's security services which revealed a "clear Russian link" to the shootings.
"They prepared for the shooting together in advance," he was quoted as saying.
Surkov is a senior aide of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and is often described as a 'grey eminence' in the Kremlin.
He was part of the Russian delegation in peace negotiations involving Putin, Poroshenko and the leaders of Germany and France in Minsk, Belarus, last week and was responsible for liaising with separatist leaders.
Ukrainians will commemorate the anniversary of the climax of the protests this weekend amid disillusionment at the pace of reforms and resentment that no-one yet has been put on trial for the killings.
The global police organisation Interpol has put Yanukovich on its international wanted list at the behest of Ukraine on charges of embezzlement and financial wrongdoing.
(Reporting by Natalia Zinets; Writing by Alessandra Prentice and Richard Balmforth; Editing by Crispian Balmer)
  • Politics & Government
  • Government
  • Vladislav Surkov
  • Viktor Yanukovich
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Идеолог Новороссии и правая рука Путина сбежал в Гонконг - СМИ | Политические новости Украины

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Как стало известно, на днях советник Путина Владислав Сурков срочно выехал в Гонконг вместе с семьей. По словам источника в Кремле поездка оказалась настолько срочной, что о ней не знало даже ближайшее окружение, а также администрация президента. Об этом сообщает
Владислав Юрьевич Сурков (имя при рождении — Асланбек Андарбекович Дудаев, родился 21 сентября 1964, Дуба-Юрт, Чечено-Ингушская АССР СССР) — российский государственный деятель, автор концепции «суверенной демократии». Помощник президента Российской Федерации (с 20 сентября 2013 года). Ранее заместитель председателя Правительства Российской Федерации — руководитель аппарата Правительства Российской Федерации. Считается, что Сурков принимал непосредственное участие в создании проекта “Новороссия” и аннексии Крыма.

Treasury Designates Brothers' Circle Members

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Action Further Targets Major Transnational Criminal Organization
WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated five key members and associates of the Eurasian crime syndicate, the Brothers' Circle. These designations were made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581, which targets entities or individuals determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be significant transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) or to have provided material support for, or to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted for or on behalf of, such organizations. Today’s designations included Brothers' Circle leader Temuri Mirzoyev as well as Brothers' Circle members Lasha Shushanashvili, Vladimir Vagin, and Koba Shemazashvili, each of whom is designated for acting on behalf of, or providing support to, the Brothers’ Circle or its members. In addition, Kakhaber Shushanashvili is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13581 for acting for or on behalf of, or providing support to, Lasha Shushanashvili.
President Obama identified the Brothers' Circle as a significant TCO in the Annex to E.O. 13581 (Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations) on July 24, 2011. Since then, the Treasury Department has targeted the Brother’s Circle by designating seven members and associates of the TCO.
“This action marks the next step in Treasury’s ongoing efforts to target major transnational criminal organizations. Today’s designations expose links among these criminals and serve to protect the United States financial system from their illicit activity,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.
Today, the Treasury Department is continuing to target this criminal group by identifying additional key members and associates, freezing any assets the designated persons may have within the jurisdiction of the United States and prohibiting any transactions with them by U.S. persons. These efforts are designed to protect the U.S. financial system from the malign influence of transnational criminal organizations and expose the individuals who are supporting or acting on behalf of the Brothers’ Circle organization.
The Brothers' Circle is a multi-ethnic criminal group composed of leaders and senior members of several Eurasian criminal groups largely based in countries of the former Soviet Union but operating in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The Brothers' Circle serves as a coordinating body for several criminal networks, mediating disputes between the individual criminal networks and directing member criminal activity globally.
Brothers' Circle leader Temuri Mirzoyev has been identified as a crime boss in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), Russia. In September 2006, he was arrested along with another criminal figure during a gathering at a casino in Sochi, Russia.
Brothers' Circle member Vladimir Vagin has seven criminal convictions and has been wanted by Russian law enforcement since March 2009 on charges of attempted murder. He fled to the United Arab Emirates but escaped from their custody in March 2010 and disappeared.
Brothers' Circle member Lasha Shushanashvili was in overall charge of a criminal organization; his subordinates included his brother, Kakhaber Shushanashvili, and Koba Shemazashvili. Lasha Shushanashvili avoided being detained during a March 2010 Europe-wide law enforcement operation that resulted in the capture of Kakhaber Shushanashvili, but later was arrested in Greece in January 2012. Lasha Shushanashvili is wanted in Spain on several charges and in Georgia for extortion and acting as a criminal boss. In addition, he sent two assassins to meet his brother in Spain as part of an effort to murder a criminal rival.
Brothers' Circle member Koba Shemazashvili was Lasha Shushanashvili's subordinate in his organized crime network and has been described as his "right-hand man.” Separately, he along with Kakhaber Shushanashvili assaulted two criminal rivals in the Netherlands. He was wanted by Spain on a variety of criminal charges, and in July 2011 he was arrested in Ukraine; he entered a Spanish prison in February 2012.
Kakhaber Shushanashvili operates for or on behalf of Brothers' Circle member Lasha Shushanashvili by serving as his subordinate in his criminal network. In March 2010, he was arrested in Spain as part of a Europe-wide law enforcement operation targeting a Georgian criminal organization. He oversaw funds that were collected, including through credit card fraud, from other Europe-based members of the network.
Identifying Information:
MIRZOYEV , Temuri Suleimanovich (a.k.a. MIRZOEV, Temuri; a.k.a. "TIMUR SVERDLOVSKIY"; a.k.a. "TIMUR TBILISI"; a.k.a. "TIMUR TBILISSKIY")
DOB 7 May 1957
POB Tbilisi, Georgia
SHEMAZASHVILI, Koba Shalvovich (a.k.a. SHERMAZASHVILI, Koba; a.k.a.
DOB 1974
POB Rustavi, Georgia
SHUSHANASHVILI, Lasha Pavlovich (a.k.a. MALGASOV, Ymar; a.k.a. SHUSHANASHVILI, Lasha (Iasha) Pavlovich; a.k.a. "LASHA RUSTAVSKI"; a.k.a. "LASHA RUSTAVSKY"; a.k.a. "LASHA TOLSTY")
DOB 25 July 1961
POB Rustavi, Georgia
SHUSHANASHVILI, Kakhaber Pavlovich (a.k.a. KOSTOV, Nikolay Lyudmilo; a.k.a. ROSTOV, Nicholas; a.k.a. SEPIASHVILI, Moshe Israel; a.k.a. SHUSHANASHVILI, Kajaver; a.k.a. SHUSHANASHVILI, Kakha; a.k.a. "Kakha RUSTAVSKIY");
8 Rukavishnikov Street, Mariinskiy Posad, Chuvash Republic, Russia
DOB 8 February1972
POB Rustavi, Georgia; alt. POB Kutaisi, Georgia
VAGIN, Vladimir Viktorovich (a.k.a. "VAGON")
Sadaf 2 Sector, Tower C06-T06, Apartment 603, Dubai 32900, United Arab Emirates
DOB 3 February 1966
POB Raditshevo, Russia
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Treasury Designates Associates of Key Brothers' Circle Members

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WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated six individuals and four entities linked to the Brothers’ Circle, a Eurasian crime syndicate, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581, which targets significant transnational criminal organizations (TCOs).  Today’s actions are focused on the criminal networks of two key members of the Brothers Circle, Vladislav Leontyev and Gafur Rakhimov, both of whom were designated by the Treasury Department for acting on behalf of the Brothers’ Circle in February 2012.  Today’s designations include individuals and businesses in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East working on behalf of Leontyev and Rakhimov and support Treasury’s efforts to disrupt the illicit financial networks that provide revenue and support for their global criminal activities. 
“The key to targeting transnational criminal organizations, such as the Brothers’ Circle, is exposing the network behind the group’s leaders, which we have done today.  We remain determined to continue our systematic effort to disrupt these networks in order to protect the U.S. financial system from abuse by these criminals,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. 
The Brothers’ Circle is one of five TCOs sanctioned under E.O. 13581, along with the Camorra, the Yakuza, Los Zetas, and MS-13.  Today’s action brings to 28 the total number of individuals and entities designated by the Treasury Department for acting for or on behalf of the Brothers’ Circle.
The Brothers’ Circle is a criminal group composed of leaders and senior members of several Eurasian criminal groups that are largely based in the countries of the former Soviet Union, but which also operate in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The Brothers’ Circle serves as a coordinating body for several criminal networks, mediates disputes between individual criminal networks, and directs member criminal activity globally.
Today’s action generally prohibits U.S. persons from conducting financial or commercial transactions with these entities and individuals, and freezes any assets they may have under U.S. jurisdiction.
Targets Linked to Vladislav Leontyev
Vladislav Leontyev was designated by the Treasury Department under E.O. 13581 on February 23, 2012, for acting for or on behalf of the Brothers’ Circle.  Vladislav Leontyev is a key member of the Brothers’ Circle and has been involved in various criminal activities, including narcotics trafficking.  He was also involved in a shooting between regional factions within Russian organized criminal networks over an attempt to seize control of a local precious metals enterprise.  The following individuals were designated today, along with entities they own or control, because they act for or on behalf of Vladislav Leontyev:
Vadim Lyalin serves as a conduit for passing messages on behalf of Vladislav Leontyev;
Grigory Lepsveridze couriers money on behalf of Vladislav Leontyev;
Igor Shlykov has worked to get identification documents and to develop business opportunities in Africa on Vladislav Leontyev’s behalf.  Igor Shlykov also owns or controls M S Group Invest OOO and Meridian Jet Management GmbH based in Russia and Austria respectively.  He is the director-general of M S Group Invest OOO and owns 60 percent of Meridian Jet Management GmbH;
Gurgen House FZCO is owned or controlled by Lazar Shaybazian who was designated in February 2012, for acting for or on behalf of Vladislav Leontyev.  Gurgen House FZCO has offices in the U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Russia. Lazar Shaybazian uses Gurgen House FZCO to move money.
Targets Linked to Gafur Rakhimov
In February 2012, Gafur Rakhimov was designated by the Treasury Department pursuant to E.O. 13581 for acting on behalf of the Brothers’ Circle.  Gafur Rakhimov is a key member of the Brothers’ Circle and one of the leaders of Uzbek organized crime with a specialty in the organized production of drugs in Central Asia.  He has operated major international drug syndicates involving the trafficking of heroin.  Sergey Moskalenko and Yakov Rybalskiy were designated today by the Treasury Department because they act for or on behalf of Gafur Rakhimov.
Artur Badalyan
Artur Badalyan and his company Fasten Tourism LLC were designed today pursuant to E.O. 13581 because they are used by key members of the Brothers’ Circle to courier money and make travel arrangements.  Artur Badalyan is the owner and CEO of Fasten Tourism LLC.
For a chart detailing Treasury actions against the Brothers’ Circle click here.
Identifying Information:
Name: Artur Badalyan
a.k.a.:   Arthur Badalyan
DOB: 09 Sep 1963
Name: Fasten Tourism LLC
a.k.a.:   Fasten Tours LLC
a.k.a.:   Fasten Tourism Dubai
Address: P.O. Box 19583, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
alt. Address: 171 Omar Ibn Al Khattab Road, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
National Identification No.: 223263 (United Arab Emirates)
Name: Vadim Mikhaylovich Lyalin
Address: Oceana Residences, Unit Aegean/8/803, The Palm, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
alt. Address: 1102 Al Fattan Marine Tower, P.O. Box 1102, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
DOB: 30 Sep 1973
Passport: 4510935440 (Russia)
Name: Grigory Victorovich Lepsveridze
a.k.a.: Grigory Leps
a.k.a.: Grigoriy Leps
a.k.a.: “GRISHA”
Address: Phuket, Thailand
DOB: 16 Jul 1962
POB: Sochi, Russia
Name: Igor Leonidovich Shlykov
a.k.a.: “SHLYK”
DOB: 02 Nov 1967
Passport: 530134972 (Russia)
Name: M S Group Invest OOO
Address: 9 Prospekt Universitetski, Moscow 119296, Russia
National Identification No.: 5107746076994 (Russia)
alt. National Identification No.: 69686198 (Russia)
alt. National Identification No.: 7736626537 (Russia)
Name: Meridian Jet Management GmbH
f.k.a.: Sun Handels Und Beteiligungs GmbH
Address: Tegetthoffstrasse 7, Vienna 1010, Austria
National Identification No.: FN 204685 h (Austria)
Name: Gurgen House FZCO
a.k.a.:   Gurgen House CO LTD
a.k.a.:   Gurgen House LLC
a.k.a.:   Gurgen House OOO
a.k.a.:   Gurgen House TOO
a.k.a.:   Gourgen House LTD
Address: 130 A, Ulitsa Klara Tsetkina, Shymkent 160000, Kazakhstan
alt. Address: Ulitsa Angarskaya, 22.1, Moscow 125635, Russia
alt. Address: Ulitsa General Dorokhova, A 6 A, Moscow 121357, Russia
alt. Address: Ulitsa Letnikovskaya, 13 A, Office 1, Moscow 115114, Russia
alt. Address: Al Quds Street, Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai, United  Arab Emirates
alt. Address: Office 210, Building 3E, Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 293751, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
alt. Address: P.O. Box 777, Jumeirah, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
alt. Address: Ulitsa Jami, 5, Tashkent 100057, Uzbekistan
National Identification No.: 40788618 (Kazakhstan)
alt. National Identification No.: 582100259386 (Kazakhstan)
Company No.: 86483143 (Russia)
Public Registration No.: 1087746669845 (Russia)
Tax Identification No.: 7743693291 (Russia)
Name: Sergey Yevgeniyevich Moskalenko
a.k.a.:   Sergei Yevgeniyevich Moskalenko
Address: Haldenstrasse 26, Lucerne, Switzerland
DOB: 08 Nov 1951
alt. DOB: 08 Nov 1961
POB: Surkhandaria Region, Uzbekistan
Citizen: Uzbekistan
Passport: CA1702697 (Uzbekistan)
alt. Passport: CA1938292 (Uzbekistan)
Name: Yakov Rybalskiy
a.k.a.:   Yaakov Rybalsky
a.k.a.:   Yakov Ribalsky
a.k.a.:   Yaakov Ribalsky
a.k.a.:   Yaakov Ribalski
a.k.a.:   Jacob Rabalsky
Address: Rashi 9/3, Sharon, Israel
DOB: 08 Aug 1954
alt. DOB: 08 Aug 1950
Citizen: Israel
Passport: 7959978 (Israel)
alt. Passport: 9001681 (Israel)
alt. Passport: R5408081 (Israel)
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Page 5

Where Terrorism Research Goes Wrong

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TERRORISM is increasing. According to the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland, groups connected with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State committed close to 200 attacks per year between 2007 and 2010, a number that grew by more than 200 percent, to about 600 attacks, in 2013.
Since 9/11, the study of terrorism has also increased. Now, you might think that more study would lead to more effective antiterrorism policies and thus to less terrorism. But on the face of it, this does not seem to be happening. What has gone wrong?
The answer is that we have not been conducting the right kind of studies. According to a 2008 review of terrorism literature in the journal Psicothema, only 3 percent of articles from peer-reviewed sources appeared to be rooted in empirical analysis, and in general there was an “almost complete absence of evaluation research” concerning antiterrorism strategies.
The situation cries out for the techniques of prevention science. For a given problem (like terrorism), prevention science identifies key risk factors (like alienation), develops interventions to modify those risk factors (like programs to promote positive relations with the dominant culture) and tests those interventions through randomized trials. Using this methodology, scientists have identified interventions that effectively prevent problems as diverse as antisocial behavior, depression, schizophrenia, cigarette smoking, alcohol and drug abuse, academic failure, teenage pregnancy, marital discord and poverty.
Jon Baron, who leads the Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy, which advocates for the use of randomized trials to evaluate government programs, reports that his organization has been able to identify only two experimental evaluations of antiterrorism strategies. One of them, a field experiment reported in a paper from a World Bank office in 2012, randomly assigned 500 Afghan villages to receive a development aid program either in 2007 or after 2011. The aid program had significant positive effects on economic outcomes, villagers’ attitudes toward the government and villagers’ perceptions of security. The aid program also reduced the number of security incidents, though that effect was not maintained after the program ended and was observed only in villages that were relatively secure before the program began.
Thus the study found an unequivocal but limited benefit of an aid program in reducing insurgent violence. I say “unequivocal” because randomizing villages to receive or not receive the aid made it extremely unlikely that differences in attitudes and security resulted from anything other than the aid program itself.
The second study was published last year in The Economic Journal. The researchers randomly assigned neighborhoods and villages in Nigeria to have, or not have, a campaign to reduce pre-election violence. The campaign made use of town meetings, theater and house-to-house distribution of material. The study found that the campaign increased empowerment to counteract violence and voter turnout, and reduced both perceptions of violence and the intensity of violence.
Imagine how much more we would know about the prevention of terrorism if even a small proportion of the hundreds of antiterrorism efforts implemented worldwide in the past 15 years had been properly evaluated. As it is, we can say almost nothing about their efficacy. Do we know whether drones are increasing or decreasing the rate of terrorists’ attacks? Whether our current surveillance activities are thwarting more terrorists than they are radicalizing young people?
In 2012, the National Institute of Justice (the research arm of the Department of Justice) began a program to study domestic radicalization. Over the first three years it has funded nearly $9 million in research. While the studies underway will undoubtedly contribute to our understanding of the risk factors that contribute to radicalization, none of the projects funded thus far are adequately evaluating a strategy to prevent radicalization.
One of the projects, for example, is an effort to increase awareness of risk factors for radicalization as well as civic-minded responses to them among members of the Muslim community. The program’s impact will be assessed by comparing outcomes for those who never participate, those who participate once and those who participate multiple times. If the project finds that those who participated multiple times were less radicalized than those who never participated, you might be inclined to conclude that the program is working. But experience from evaluation research over many years has taught us that such a difference could just as likely be because those who were less inclined to become radical were more likely to participate.
The only way to really be confident that it is the program that is making the difference is to randomly assign some people to get it and others not. That way any differences are very unlikely to be caused by pre-existing differences between the two groups.
Estimates of the cost of the war on terror have varied between one and five trillion dollars. Surely we can invest a tiny fraction of that in improving our antiterrorism strategies through rigorous experimental evaluations.
Correction: March 15, 2015
The Gray Matter feature last Sunday misstated an estimate for the growth in the annual number of attacks by groups connected with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. It was more than 200 percent, not more than 300 percent.
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How empirical studies of political violence (can) help policymakers

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By Eli Berman, Joseph Felter, Ethan B. Kapstein and Jake Shapiro March 16 at 10:34 AM
In a recent New York Times opinion piece, “Where Terrorism Research Goes Wrong,” social psychologist Anthony Biglan argues that, given the importance of antiterrorism programs and the huge resources devoted to them, far too few are subjected to randomized controlled trials (RCTs) evaluating their efficacy. To his knowledge only two such studies have been undertaken: one evaluating the effects of aid in Afghanistan, the other evaluating the effects of an anti-violence campaign preceding a Nigerian election. While we heartily agree with his appeal for more RCTs, his evaluation of the state of the field is inaccurate, and it’s worth discussing why.
As members of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC), a research collective dedicated to the study of violence and what can be done to reduce it, we agree with Biglan’s central thesis. If a larger portion of antiterrorism budgets were devoted to evaluation, we would have better information to guide policymakers and a better chance at decreasing violence. Also, since rigorous evaluations can identify cheaper interventions that outperform more expensive ones, funding more of them might save money in the long run – and hopefully save lives, as well.
But as an overview of the field, Biglan’s count of RCTs is simply off the mark. First and foremost, breaking off “terrorism research” as a field distinct from broader research into political violence is like studying diabetes without thinking about peoples’ eating habits. Most terrorism happens within the context of broader conflicts and is often fed by them. The complex web of interconnections between the Afghan civil wars, terrorism in Pakistan, and the threat of transnational terrorism being organized in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is but one example of these links.
And once we widen our scope beyond the strict boundaries of terrorism studies, then, as readers of the Monkey Cage well know, there is more RCT-based work. Chris Blattman has used randomized trials in such countries as Liberia to study policies intended to keep former combatants from returning to crime and violence. Michael Callen and James Long successfully used one to demonstrate how to reduce corruption in Afghan elections, and in a recent follow-up (with Eli Berman and Clark Gibson) showed how that intervention improved attitudes toward the government. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra and Jake Shapiro have worked with coauthors to conduct surveys and experiments in Pakistan, which address the complexity of local attitudes towards militancy, as have Jason Lyall and colleagues in Afghanistan.
These results should be celebrated rather than overlooked, given the logistic and bureaucratic difficulties in implementing RCTs and primary data collection conflict-affected environments. Implementers and funders often resist evaluation and the provision of data to academic researchers – typically citing security concerns when they do so. Government agencies also regularly argue that research could endanger human subjects and staff, or that uncertainty about the security environment could shut down studies before they are completed and thus resist starting them.
To be sure, sometimes implementer resistance is well founded. Ethical guidelines of RCTs can be hard to meet when assessing programs intended to combat terrorism. Still, these challenges can and should be overcome by incorporating good research design into costly programming. At one point Biglan asks, “Do we know whether drones are increasing or decreasing the rate of terrorists’ attacks?” To use a randomized trial to find out would be impossible for scientific and ethical reasons. Scientifically, the drone program is designed to impact a small number of outcomes: attacks by al-Qaeda and the small number of other targeted groups. In medical terms the number of doses is large, but it all goes to a few patients, thus we have an insufficient sample to establish the treatment contrast.
Ethically, the proposal to use RCTs here is even more dubious. In medical trials, it is considered unethical to withhold a drug from the control group not receiving it once one believes the treatment would work. The U.S. government is not capacity constrained for drone strikes, at least not once the target is under sufficient surveillance to decide a strike is worthwhile, and officials do not order strikes unless they strongly believe the target is valuable. Withholding them for research purposes necessarily fails a basic ethical test. But as Patrick Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi show, there are quasi-experimental routes to better understanding how drone strikes work.
More broadly, while we can celebrate of the quality of evidence randomized trials have been producing in the field of economic development, they are by no means giving a comprehensive picture of how development works. Several years ago we conducted a survey of all the randomized trials of social programs conducted outside the US and either published in top journals or still underway. The 640 we came up with can be considered a representative undercount. Strikingly, 30 percent took place in only three countries (India, Kenya and Mexico) suggesting how scholarship gravitates toward poor but research-friendly nations. Only 20 percent of studies took place in autocracies, although 35 percent of the world’s population lives in such countries.
This is not surprising; people in power in autocracies and conflict-ridden countries make it difficult to conduct studies and produce reliable results. To begin with, they tend to be resistant to share data. Their budgets for evaluation and after-the-fact learning are tiny. And these are precisely the leaders and countries we would need to work with to conduct randomized controlled trials of antiterrorism programs.
There are serious questions about how much randomized trials of social programs tell us about how a program that tests successful will work on a bigger group (say, if it is rolled out nationwide) or a different group (say, if it is exported to a different country). Trials conducted in collaboration with researchers, as they usually are, often work much differently when taken over by government ministries. In counterterrorism extrapolation is even more suspect, since organizations are both heterogeneous and strategic: when air travel was secured after a wave of hostage taking in the 1970s, they switched to other kinds of attacks; as profiling of terrorists improves at our borders they switch to recruiting within our borders.
Luckily, strict randomization is not the only way to establish causal links. “Natural experiments” are created when an outside force creates assignment into treatment and control groups that is independent of programs’ expected impacts. For example, Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian published a study last year where they used random fluctuations in US wheat production to show that, broadly speaking, food aid can stoke violence in conflict-ridden countries. David Yanagizawa-Drott used the distribution of preexisting geographical features that blocked radio transmissions to quantify how hate-mongering broadcasts fueled the Rwandan Genocide.
In the Philippines, our group exploited the government’s arbitrary poverty threshold that determined communities’ eligibility for a community-based aid program. Aside from being just-eligible or just-ineligible, the villages we examined showed no major differences. This, along with detailed conflict data from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, allowed us to show how the influx of targeted development projects into communities affected violence in several dimensions – against whom and at whose hands.
If you widen the horizon beyond randomized or quasi-randomized trials, you’ll find even more interesting research that exposes causal relationships behind insurgent violence and the programs which could combat it. Reed Wood in Africa, Oeindrila Dube and Juan Vargas in Columbia and Oliver Vanden Eynde in India have shown how economic fluctuations affect conflict. Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi and Esteban Klor have shown how punitive home demolition affects suicide bombings in Palestine and which kinds of terrorist get sent against which targets. Melissa Dell has shown how changes in government policy affect gang violence in Mexico. Jeff Clemens has illuminated the role of opium eradication policies in stoking the Afghan insurgency, and Jason Lyall has demonstrated how indiscriminate violence by government forces can sometimes quell violence in some places even as it stokes civilian sympathy with insurgents in others.
Perhaps most of these studies go beyond Biglan’s strict requirement of randomized evaluations as the evidentiary standard, but they all meet high standards for program evaluation. Until governments and aid organizations make the right move and attach evaluation budgets to more programs and provide the quality of data necessary for this research, an ad hoc scholarly effort may have to do. And while it is a second-best to what could be done with systematic support from implementing agencies, this body of work should be recognized.
As in other fields of research, RCTs alone cannot address our crucial questions. If we want to know “what works” in terms of violence reduction in fragile and conflict affected states we need to thoughtfully triage between experimental and observational work.
Eli Berman is a professor in the department of economics at the University of California at San Diego.Joseph Felter is a senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Ethan B. Kapstein is the Arizona Centennial professor at Arizona State University and senior research fellow at the University of Oxford and the UK Department of International Development. Jake Shapiro is associate professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. The authors direct the Empirical Studies of Conflict program, a research initiative based at Princeton, UCSD and Stanford funded by grants from a range of organizations including the U.S. Department of Defense through the Minerva Research Initiative.
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Far West, LLC, also known as Far West Ltd., Far West LLTS, and Far West DDS, is alleged to be a spy network responsible for numerous acts of smuggling, espionage, drug dealing, assassinations, and starting wars.
Leonid Leonidovich Kosyakov, b. 1955, Ukrainian citizen. Until 2005 resided in Dubai and Switzerland. ’83-’85 – in command of a special GRU group in Shindand, West. Afghanistan, assigned to intercept caravans with drugs. In different times under his command served Filin, Lunev, Likhvintsev, Surikov, Saidov, and Petrov. Ret. in ’93. Owns big travel company in Dubai. In the spring of 2005 was appointed to general’s position in Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) and stepped down as the official president of Far West Ltd.
Vladimir “Ilyich” Filin, b. 1960, Kiev, Ukraine. Ukrainian. Doctor of sciences (1982). In ’83-84 served in a special unit of GRU in Western Afghanistan, assigned to intercept caravans with drugs. In 1993 retired from GRU in the rank of Lt.-Colonel. A British citizen since 2000. In 2004 Filin was listed as political scientist and expert on “revolutionary and guerilla movements in the developing world” at IPROG, the Moscow Institute for Globalization Studies.
Anatoly Baranov. Journalist. Under Masliukov-Primakov cabinet served as public relations executive director, Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG. In 2002 bought Owner of Pravda-info. 2003 – Press secretary to the deputy prime minister Alyoshin (military-industrial complex). “Coordinator of media projects” at IPROG.
Audrius Butkevicius
Audrius Butkevicius, Lithuanian. Presently resides in Georgia. Former Lithuanian minister of defense. Sentenced for bribery. Has close ties with Albert Einstein Institution. Member of Far West Ltd. board of directors and the editorial board of ’94 – visiting scholar at Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London (together with Anton Surikov and Igor Sutyagin, now in prison for espionage).
Alfonso Davidovich Ochoa (b. 1948), Venezuelan, resides in Munich, Germany. Has German and Venezuelan citizenship. In the 1970s went through special training in the USSR and East Germany. Was close to the Cuban General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez. In the past used passports in the names of Jose Rodriguez, Captain of the Cuban Army, and Jose Alva, Colombian citizen. Responsible for FWL office in Bogotá.
Alexei Likhvintsev (“Abdulla,” “Pribalt”), b. 1959, Lviv, Ukraine. Ukrainian. British citizen (2000), resides in Britain (Scotland?). ’84-85 special GRU unit based in Shindand, West. Afghanistan). Nov ’87-Jan ’89 – military advisor in Angola. 90′-’93 – together with Filin on assignment to sell the property of the Soviet Army in East Germany, did business with Kosovo Albanian companies. ’93.
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Valery Nikolaevich Lunev (b. 1960, Belorussia). Belorussian. ’83-84 – special GRU unit based in Shindand, West. Afghanistan. Married to Dzhokhar Dudaev’s relative Fatima (b. 1970). Retired from the military in March of 1995. Lunev is responsible for security and “strong arm operations”. For his operations he hires the former and active duty officers of Russian secret services, including spetsnaz. Resides in the Netherlands, has Dutch citizenship. In 1990-91 Lunev took part in overthrowing the regime of Zviad Gamsahurdia in Georgia. Has extensive contacts in Tajikistan.
Ruslan Shamilievich Saidov (b. 1960, city of Khasavyurt, Dagestan). Avar Chechen-Spanish. Has Turkish passport in the name of Hungar (?) Mehmet and passport of Arab Emirates. ’83-84 – special GRU unit based in Shindand, West. Afghanistan. Later, assignments in Lebanon and Syria. Ret. Major of GRU ’93. Resides in Turkey since ’95 and in Dubai. Advisor to Necmettin Erbakan – ’96. Business partner of the Islamic Bank of Dubai and Habib Bank. Since mid-90s Saidov formed stable relations with the Saudi businessman Adnan Hashoggi, Prince Turki al-Faisal and Prince Na’f. Close to Basaev and Khattab.
Anton Victorovich Surikov , “Mansur” (Ancestral name: Mansur Ali-Hadzhi Natkhoev), b. 1961, Sukhimi, Georgia, USSR. Ethnic Adygei. Son of a leading figure in the Soviet military-industrial establishment. Resides in Moscow. Has Turkish and, possibly, US citizenship. Doctor of sciences. ’84-served in a special GRU unit, based in Shindand, West. Afghanistan). ’90-96 – Institute of USA and Canada. ’92 – 93 – deputy of the Abkhazian minister of defense, makes friends with Shamil Basaev, commander of the special battalion trained by GRU. ’94 – visiting scholar at the Center for Defense Studies, King’s College London. ’96 – ret. Colonel. Also on IPROG staff.
Yakov Abramovich Kosman (b. 1946), resides in Nice, France. Has German and, possibly, Israeli citizenship. Involved in real estate operations and banking. Has contacts with Kosovo Albanian criminal societies in European countries. In 1997-2000 he served as financial consultant to Hashim Thaçi, the chief commander of KLA. The new president of Far West, Ltd.
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Nachrichten Heute

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Saidov, Surikov, Muslim Insurrectionism, and Drug Trafficking / Part VIII

ukPeter Dale Scott
 - Another example of Dunlop’s curtailment of Yasenev is his abridged description of “Mekhmet,” another attendee at the Beaulieu meeting, as a “certain Turk, in the past an advisor to the Islamicist premier of Turkey, [Necmettin] Erbakan.” (1) In the same year 1999, Erbakan reportedly arranged for both cash and arms to be sent to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a drug-trafficking group whose heroin reached Europe through Chechnya. (2) The IMU was backed not only by Turks but also by Pakistan’s ISI, who had also trained Shamil Basayev for the Chechnyan insurgency. For strategic reasons, ISI oversaw the spread of mujahedin and their narcotics from Afghanistan to Chechnya, a spread which as we have seen continued on into Kosovo.

In addition Yasenev links Mekhmet (“whose real name is Ruslan Saidov”) not only to Erbakan but also to the CIA, to Saudi intelligence, and to al-Qaeda:

In 2003 the Turkish citizen Mehmet whose real name is Ruslan Saidov, persuaded the President of the Chechen Republic, Ahmed Kadyrov, that he could be of use with Kadyrov’s policy of “national reconciliation.” Saidov took part in organizing Kadyrov’s visit to Saudi Arabia. There Kadyrov made an agreement with the head of Saudi intelligence, Prince Naif Ibn Abdel-Aziz, that the Arab militants under the Lieutenant Colonel Aziz ben Said ben Ali al Hamdi (alias Abu al Walid al-Hamadi), Prince Naif’s subordinate, would be removed from Chechnya by May 2004. The agreement stipulated that Kadyrov guaranteed safe passage to Abu al-Walid. Playing a double game and intending to set up both parties, Saidov (probably together with Abu al-Walid himself) gave this information to the CIA. Apparently the CIA was concerned that having left Chechnya the Arab militants would resurface in Iraq and join the terrorist group of the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that belongs to the al-Qaida network.
Trying to prevent this, and besides, wanting to discredit Kadyrov in the eyes of Prince Naif, the CIA gave Saidov an “assignment”. On April 13 in the Nozhai-Yurt district of Chechnya, Russian troops killed Abu al-Walid (or alleged having done so). Saidov paid $300,000 to those who carried out this operation. Their bosses in Moscow received $500,000. How much the CIA paid Saidov is unknown….

Yasenev describes Saidov as both a drug trafficker and an arms trafficker, involved with the supply of Russian arms to Yemen. He adds that, since the mid-1990s, “Saidov formed stable relations with the Saudi businessman Adnan Khashoggi, Prince Turki al-Faisal [then head of Saudi intelligence, now Saudi Ambassador in Washington] and Prince Naif [Saudi Interior Minister].”


In the spring of 1995 Saidov began to cooperate with the organized society, led by Vladimir Filin and Alexei Likhvintsev in handling [narcotics] traffic through the port of Novorossiysk.
Saidov is described by Yasenev as having good relations not only with the CIA and Saudi intelligence, but also with both Turkish Islamists and even with Ayman al-Zawahiri, the man often described as both the “mastermind” behind 9/11 and the senior partner in al Qaeda active in the Balkans. (3)

In addition Yasenev described Saidov as not pro-Putin, but a Muslim activist who was passionately anti-Putin and indeed anti-Russian:

In September 2003, Saidov participated in the congress of the extremist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami in Jordan. At this congress he announced that Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami was an organization effectively acting in the underground throughout Russia, Central Asia and the Crimea…. (4)
On December 8, 2004 Saidov addressed Muslim youth in Moscow. In his words, “following Ukraine, the Orange Revolution is coming to Russia.” “Our liberals say that in 2008 the situation in Moscow will be like the one in Kiev.” However, everything will be different, and not in 2008, but earlier.” “Amirs and mudjahideen will soon make the Kremlin shudder with horror.” In 2005, “they will throw into hell the servant of Satan,” i.e., President Putin, who is allegedly “wanted by the International Tribunal at The Hague.” (5)

The same goal of Muslim liberation was attributed by Yasenev to the organizer of the Beaulieu meeting, Anton Surikov:

On December 13 2004, in Adygeia, Surikov had a meeting with a group of Sufi believers and said this: “In the past we were against ahl-ad-dalala (those who gone astray) with their Arab money. We used to say that one should not separate from Russia. But now “Russia is on the brink of collapse and chaos.” So “we’ll be separating [from Russia] with all Muslims of the Caucasus.” A new state will be created on our historical lands from Psou and the Black Sea to Laba and Kuban.” (6)
The portraits of Saidov’s and Surikov’s connections with al-Zawahiri, Erbakan, and Hizb ut-Tahrir reinforce the thesis that the “Pristina dash” aimed at facilitating drug flows to strengthen Islamism in the Balkans. They also confirm the criticism, by the Indian analyst B. Raman and others, that American studies of Islamism and jihadism err in their restrictive focus on al-Qaeda. (7) The full range of Islamic jihadism is far more complex.

It appears that Russia and America, believing that they can use Islamist traffickers as assets, are also in fact being used by them. 

 1: Dunlop, “Storm in Moscow,” 42. Dunlop’s important and truncated description of Mekhmet has a strange and irrelevant citation: “On Erbakan, see Shireen T. Hunter, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 365.” But there is no need to identify Erbakan, and Hunter is silent about Mekhmet.

2: Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 91: “It was partly thanks to [IMU leader] Namangiani’s contacts in Chechnya that heroin reached Europe. According to Interpol, about 60 percent of exported Afghan narcotics in 2002 passed through Central Asia. The IMU controlled 70 percent of the opium that moved through this area.”

3: “For the past 10 years…Ayman al-Zawahiri has operated terrorist training … and drug-trading networks throughout Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey and Bosnia” (Wall Street Journal, 11/1/01). Cf. Independent (London), 8/5/05.

4: “Russia is also concerned about the HT [Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami], for it fears that the movement will spread to Muslim regions of Russia. Russian intelligence is now collaborating closely with the Central Asian states to combat the HT” (Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia [New Haven: Yale UP, 2002], 132). Cf. Surikov statement to Sufis below. Rashid regards the Hizb ut-Tahrir as essentially non-violent, but others have seen it as a target for terrorist recruitment by Osama bin Laden. Cf. Bakhram Tursunov, “Extremism in Uzbekistan,” Conflict Studies Research Centre, 12, “It should also be noted that bin Laden’s scheme, under which the unification of all extremist forces and movements in the cause of establishing a caliphate was supposed to occur, also envisaged sponsoring activities inside the Islamic underground in states selected by him as appropriate subjects for his efforts. The religious and political movement Hizb-ut-Takhrir, widespread in the countries of Central Asia and among Muslim minorities in China, can quite justifiably be regarded as one of the underground movements.”

5: The goal of splitting up Russia, attributed here to Surikov, is that which, in an earlier text co-authored by Surikov, is attributed by Russian “radicals” to the United States (Graeme Herd with Ene Rôngelep and Anton Surikov, Crisis for Estonia? Russia, Estonia and a Post-Chechen Cold War [London: Brassey’s for the Centre for Defence Studies, 1994], 33).

6: Surikov, like Saidov, may not be Russian. A recent article refers to “Ret. Colonel Anton Surikov (Turkish citizen Mansur Natkhoev) and Ret. Major Ruslan Saidov (Turkish citizen Ugur Mehmed)” (Andrei Petrov and Valentin Zorin, Academician Anton Surikov Confirms Professor Peter Dale Scott's "Prishtina Dash".

7: Cf. B. Raman, “Istanbul: The enemy within,” Asia Times, 11/22/03, In this essay Raman shows the direct links between Turkish terrorists (former disciples of Erbakan) and groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba sponsored by Pakistan’s ISI.

linkPart I: History and the Political Requirements of the Global Drug Traffic
linkPart II: The Meta-Group, West, and East
linkPart III: The Meta-Group, BCCI, and Adnan Khashoggi
linkPart IV: Dunlop’s Account of the Beaulieu Meeting’s Purpose: The “Russian 9/11” in 1999
linkPart V: Dunlop’s Redactions of His Source Yasenev
linkPart VI: The Khashoggi Villa Meeting, Kosovo, and the “Pristina Dash”
linkPart VII: The Role of Anton Surikov: The Dunlop and Yasenev Versions
linkPart VIII: Saidov, Surikov, Muslim Insurrectionism, and Drug Trafficking
linkPart IX: Allegations of Drug-Trafficking and Far West Ltd.
linkPart X: Far West Ltd, Halliburton, Diligence LLC, New Bridge, and Neil Bush
sendenPart XI: The U.S. Contribution to the Afghan-Kosovo Drug Traffic. 
sendenLast Part XII: Concluding Remarks: Meta-Groups and Transpolitics. 

sendenPeter Dale Scott, a former Canadian diplomat and English Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, is a poet, writer, and researcher.
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Nemtsov in a "Caucasian Knot"': chechens, drugs, ISIS, Batman and Kolomoisky - Fort Russ

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March 8, 2015
Translated by Kristina Rus

Blogger Scofield collected a series of quotes from open sources to shed the light on the characters surrounding the murder of Nemtsov, and possible motives. His comments are in blue.

Таинственная смерть таинственного офицера ГРУ (Блог Марко Михкельсона) [Архив] - ИНОСМИ

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12.12.2009, 17:02
23 ноября в Ижевске, предположительно с помощью «укола», имитирующего естественную смерть от остановки сердца, был убит генерал-майор ГРУ ГШ МО РФ Антон Суриков (Мансур Натхоев). Это был один из важнейших закулисных игроков российской политики и один из наиболее сильных, последовательных и опасных врагов русского народа. Незадолго до своей гибели Суриков-Натхоев имел плотные контакты с известным майором Дымовским с Youtube. Это, а также многое другое позволяет сделать выводы о том, что Фарвест (отделение которого в России возглавлял Суриков-Натхоев) был самым непосредственным образом причастен к раскрутке Дымовского с целью удара по руководству МВД, с конечной задачей выбивания из кресла Министра МВД ключевого путинского ставленника – Р. Нургалиева. Силовики в окружении Медведева начали, наконец, активную игру с путинскими за свой кусок сокращающегося пирога.
В сентябре 2009 Суриков сказал: "Если это случится (удаление Путина и освобождение Ходорковского), начнётся перестройка-2 и нерусским народам РФ предстоит готовиться к независимости. Если не случится - ещё 10-15 лет продолжится гниение в формате «примитивной сырьевой экономики», а народам РФ и бывшего СССР предстоит готовиться к войне. Третьего не дано".

Это тот редкий случай, когда работа «силовиков системы» радует. Это хороший «ветер в наши паруса». Мы, наконец, видим, как русофобские пауки из разных группировок начали мочить друг друга по-настоящему. Пожелаем им комсомольского задора в этом благородном деле взаимного истребления уродов. Больше ударов, хороших и разных!

Задача русских националистов в грядущей дестабилизации – собрать с поля боя трофеи, с помощью которых обеспечить материально-техническую мощь своих автономных групп, и затем добить раненых врагов. Действовать осторожно и осмотрительно. По-умному.

Кто же такой Мансур Натхоев (по паспорту Антон Суриков)?

По национальности наполовину адыгеец, на четверть - еврей, на четверть – поляк. Предки Сурикова-Натхоева по адыгейской линии имеют долгую традицию борьбы против русских на Кавказе. Отец Сурикова-Натхоева, видный советский инженер-ракетчик, в конце жизни совершивший хадж, - яркий пример исторического регресса в архаику религиозного фундаментализма после гибели СССР.
Суриков-Натхоев - генерал-майор запаса.
Государственный советник РФ I класса.
Окончил МАИ, кандидат технических наук.
Действительный член Академии космонавтики.
Проживал попеременно в Москве и Швейцарии.
Вдова Сурикова-Натхоева - еврейка Эстер Сурикова.

На Сурикова-Натхоева работали такие российские общественно-политические деятели, как Гарри Каспаров (Вайнштейн), Михаил Делягин, Александр Проханов, Гейдар Джемаль, Михаил Касьянов, Сергей Глазьев, Илья Пономарёв, Анатолий Баранов, Владимир Милов, Сергей Кургинян, Владимир Линдерман (Абель), Юлия Латынина, Андрей Пионтковский, Алексей Подберёзкин, Олег Шеин, Карин Клеман, Марина Литвинович, Иван Стариков и др.
Левый Фронт, Левая партия и Черкесский конгресс, по сути - личные проекты Сурикова-Натхоевa. Курировал он и оппозиционную либерально-левацкую Национальную ассамблею.
Суриков-Натхоев - главный идеолог Фарвеста (русофобской организации, подконтрольной высшим британским и американским властным элитам). Интересовался исключительно политикой.
Мастер информационной провокации.
Был глубоко вписан в элиту научно-технической ветви ВПК, а также российских и турецких спецслужб.
Суриков-Натхоев – адыгейский националист и пантюркист. Его идея – это светский Великий Туран на обломках южной России милостью турецкого Генштаба. Искренне презирал русских и любил «показать язык» – сказать двусмысленность, намекающую на его тайную антирусскую активность.
В 1983-96 - кадровый сотрудник ГРУ ГШ.
Со второй половины 80-х, занимался в составе группы генерала ГРУ Гусева (состав которой был исключительно нерусским) под прикрытием ГРУ международной торговлей оружием и организацией международного наркотрафика.
(Гусев погиб в автомобильной катастрофе. Когда генерал ГРУ или КГБ гибнет в автокатастрофе, многие загадочно улыбаются.)
В 1990-96 по приглашению будущего замминистра обороны и секретаря Совбеза РФ Андрея Кокошина работал в Институте США и Канады АН СССР.
В 1994-95 - научный сотрудник Департамента оборонных исследований (детище британской разведки) Королевского колледжа Лондонского университета; началось сотрудничество с МИ-6 и саудовскими спецслужбами.
В 1994-96 - заместитель гендиректора Института оборонных исследований (ИНОБИС).
В 1998-99 - помощник 1-го вице-премьера РФ Юрия Маслюкова. Тогда же премьер-министр Евгений Примаков предложил Сурикову-Натхоеву возглавить государственную компанию «Росвооружение», но назначение в последний момент не состоялось.
Отмечен высокий уровень способности Сурикова-Натхоевa в искусстве вербовки и влияния на людей в целом. Большое впечатление на нас произвела его перевербовка правозащитника Олега Греченевского, выступавшего с острыми разоблачениями Фарвеста. Причем Суриков-Натхоев сумел нейтрализовать Греченевского через публичную переписку, не вступая в физический контакт. Другой известной нам «жертвой» психологического манипулирования со стороны Сурикова-Натхоевa еще раньше стала правозащитница Людмила Евстифеева, корректор «Новой газеты». Евстифеева выступает в прессе и Сети под псевдонимом Марк Уленш. Внешне, Суриков-Натхоев и Евстифеева относились к противоположным концам идеологического спектра.
Под полным идеологическим влияением Сурикова-Натхоева находился совково-патриотический спектр, прежде всего газета Завтра и её давно впавший в маразм Александр Проханов. В то время как Евстифеева – активистка самого отмороженного крыла либералов, близкая к Радикальной партии и группе Стомахина. Но по существу, оба являются врагами русских, делают одно дело под разными флагами. Сама по себе Евстифеева незначительна, но это яркий пример успехов Сурикова в идеологической и даже оперативной вербовке либеральной интеллигенции. Кстати, известный предатель и ФСБ-шный стукач Петя Хомяков в последнее время активно работал в проектах Фарвеста по «распилу рашки», пиарил Дымовского, готовил международный антиимперский съезд вместе с фарвестовским «Движением порабощенных народов России» (в которое русский народ, конечно же, не входил).

Суриков-Натхоев сыграл ключевую роль в миссии российской армии, возглавляемой Павлом Грачевым, в помощи Абхазии в Абхазо-Грузинской войне. Он курировал подготовку кадров Абхазской армии, снабжение оружием. Он же завербовал тогда Ш.Басаева от имени ГРУ МО РФ. После окончания Грузино-Абхазской войны им было организовано уничтожение костяка боевых отрядов русской общины (русских казаков) Абхазии, в том числе - убийство главы Русской общины Абхазии Воронова. Уничтожены они были силами спецназов ГРУ и ФСБ РФ.
Эта русская община Абхазии отличалась сплоченостью. И очень грамотно вела себя во время Абхазо-Грузинской войны. Берегла своих людей и многим русским добровольцам вправляла мозги, чтобы не лезли впереди горных обезьян чмошников-абхазов на грузинские позиции. К концу войны община сильно укрепила свои позиции в Абхазии, так как сохранила людей, объединила бойцов в отличные, хорошо вооруженные формирования.

Много времени и сил Суриков-Натхоев затратил на главный свой проект «Великая Адыгея» или «Великая Черкессия». 30.12.2004 по турецкому частному телеканалу показали репортаж о встрече членов черкесской диаспоры Стамбула (включая старших офицеров и генералов турецкой армии) с приехавшим в Стамбул Али-Мансуром Натхоевым (он же бывший грушник, «политолог» Антон Суриков). Турецких черкесов интересовало, «когда родина адыгов (то есть черкесов) будет освобождена от русских оккупантов». На это «амир Хаджи – Мансур» (так они называли Сурикова- Натхоева) на дикой смеси плохого адыгейского и плохого турецкого языков сказал, что это произойдет в ближайшие несколько лет, до принятия Турции в Евросоюз. Он утверждал, что сейчас выступление против России преждевременно, потому что «гяуры снова устроят нам геноцид». Однако скоро, «башни Кремля упадут», «фашистский режим» будет якобы «свергнут» «чеченскими братьями» и «оранжевой революцией». Тогда, по его словам, «Кремлю будет не до адыгов и мы должны не упустить этот исторический шанс». Дальше «амир Хаджи – Мансур» изложил план захвата территории «по всему левому берегу Кубани, всему побережью Черного моря от Псоу до Тамани», а также Кабарды, Моздока и Пятигорска. По его словам 50 тысяч «адыгов-моджахедов» готовы это сделать, когда поступит приказ. При этом «наши братья из Турции, Сирии и Иордании» должны будут прислать «нам на помощь» еще 50 тысяч «соотечественников-моджахедов», которых надо срочно обучить русскому языку, так как «язык ненавистного врага надо знать». По его словам, если Москва не вмешается, «мы быстро очистим нашу землю от карнавальных казаков, чтобы ни один потомок царских палачей ее не осквернял». Интересно, что это говорилось совершенно открыто и показывалось по ТВ в Стамбуле и Эдирне (Адрианополе). При этом около сотни действующих турецких военных в форме стоя приветствовали Сурикова-Натхоева и орали «Аллах-акбар».
Из выступления двухмесячной давности на совещании "Движения порабощённых народов" в Донецке: "Евреи всего мира после 2000 лет изгнания собрались в Палестине и создали Израиль, который оказался жизнеспособен во враждебном окружении. Чем хуже черкесы? Почему они через 145 или через 160 лет после геноцида и изгнания не могут сделать то же самое - собраться на своих землях и воссоздать Черкесию от Сочи до Анапы и до Моздока? Именно в этом состоит наша конечная цель...".

Суриков-Натхоев вел довольно скромный образ жизни по сравнению с его финансовыми возможностями (многомиллионное состояние нажито на операциях с международным наркотрафиком и оружием – под крышей спецслужб СССР и позже РФ). Это потому, что он не пустышка вроде Лугового и Ковтуна, и бизнес его интересовал только постольку, поскольку это необходимо для достижения «духовных» целей.
Большинство завидует Прохоровым и мечтает «развлекаться с красивыми женщинами во Франции». Но для меньшинства есть более сильные наслаждения. Например, уничтожить русский народ раз и навсегда.

Нейтрализован последовательный и опасный враг Русского народа, обладавший и опытом, и ресурсами, и связями, и знанием подпольной политической борьбы. Но его русофобское дело живет... На примере его жизни и борьбы мы видим, что не существует никакого братства народов РФ, как не существовало братства народов СССР. Все "братские" чувства можно наблюдать на примере геноцида Русских людей - учителей, врачей, инженеров, пенсионеров в республиках Закавказья, Средней Азии и Северного Кавказа.

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Антон Суриков/Мансур Натхоев (слева) со своим подельником Русланом Саидовым (Садулаевым), возглавляющим отделение Фарвеста в Стамбуле
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Never Ask the Wolves to | JR Nyquist

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On Aug. 16 we read in the comments of Vladimir Filin, a self-described Marxist and former GRU officer living in Kiev, well-connected to KGB structures, supposedly aligned against Putin, marching in the "revolutionary movement of all enslaved peoples" (especially those in Finland, according to his Live Journal blog). Filin's business interests reach from the poppy fields of Tajikistan to the lumber mills and chicken farms of Brazil. He has been accused of narcotics and arms trafficking, with supposed connections to subversive political activities (like coup-plotting). He is the president and chairman of a private intelligence company called "Far West, LLC." As it happens, he has a reputation to maintain in the world of political-military gossip
Perhaps you've heard or read about the Maltese-flagged freighter named Arctic Sea, which recently disappeared in the Atlantic Ocean and was subsequently recovered after various contradictory reports. According to Filin, the Arctic Sea had been loaded with four X-55 cruise missiles while docked at the Baltic Sea port of Kaliningrad. The missiles were without warheads, as the warheads were shipped separately on another vessel . Filin alleges that the warheads were customized for carrying Soviet-produced biochemical material previously "shipped to Iran from Russia by air."  
According to Filin, the contraband aboard the Arctic Sea was masked by timber loaded in Finland, and the ship's destination was Algeria, where representatives of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard were waiting to take delivery. Filin wrote: "Russian specialists would arrive in Iran within the near future, who would prepare the aviation system of Iranian Su-24 aircraft to use the X-55 in combat conditions and train representatives of the Iranian armed forces in the operational use of the system." The reason for the transfer of biochemical material to Iran, along with modified warheads and missiles, is to give Iran a counterstrike potential in the event of an Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear weapons facilities.
In this way Russia strengthens Iran while weakening the position of Israel and the United States.  It goes without saying that Moscow envisions the destabilization of the Middle East and the disruption of its main centers of oil production and shipping.  Should Iran unleash biochemical warheads against Israel, there would be a further escalation of violence with the result that oil prices would reach -- according to Filin -- $200-$300 per barrell. The consequences, of course, would be devastating for the oil-dependent Western economies, which are already suffering from widespread financial troubles. 
On the Russian side, however, high oil prices would empower the Russian state while stabilizing the Iranian clerical regime under a defiant nationalist banner. Moscow also envisions the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, a massive mobilization of terrorists, and a fresh violence in Iraq. According to Filin, "Upon learning of the Arctic Sea and its cargo, a major Western state that favors a strategic partnership with Ukraine, was prepared to intercept the ship. But fearing this would cause a serious international scandal that would disrupt the 'reboot' of its relations with the Putin regime, the [aforesaid] state decided to act informally, which it did."
In other words, the pirates that siezed the Arctic Sea off the coast of Sweden were American special forces (disguised as Swedish police). This embarrassing episode, according to Filin, enraged the Kremlin which subsequently lashed out at the pro-American regime in Ukraine. For reasons unstated by Filin, the Kremlin believes that Ukraine was responsible for alerting the Americans about the Arctic Sea and its cargo. Consequently, Russian President Medvedev wrote a scathing open letter to Ukrainian President Yuschenko, calling his policies "deliberately anti-Russian." This resulted in heightened tensions between Russia and Ukraine.
But the reader must stop and set all this aside. In Russia all facts are attended by a bodyguard of fiction. Wild opinions bearing the character of insanity, mixed with conspiracy theory, mixed with rumor, mixed with fantastic speculations and a dash of truth -- leaves everyone hypnotized by an illusory parade of vivid images.  In Filin's account of the Arctic Sea, everything is probable except for the concluding details; and nothing is independently verified. The story is about a superpower struggle involving the Middle East, but ends up centering on the conflict between Moscow and Kiev. The president of Ukraine, who was poisoned by the KGB five years ago, is fighting against pro-Russian forces in the Ukrainian government. He struggles against pro-Russian voices in the Ukrainian media. He struggles against a parliament dominated by Russian agents.
Is it not outrageous that American special forces siezed the Arctic Sea? Is it not outrageous that Ukraine's president should take the side of the United States? One may assume there were negotiations between Moscow and Washington, and a resolution of the matter. (Perhaps the missiles would have to return to Russia.) But the truth of the matter? 
If you want to find the truth about Russia, if you want to penetrate the reality of Russia's KGB regime, then you should not seek the truth among the paid minions and military hangers-on of the Soviet past. The truth, in our time, is more likely to come from people who have no ties to Russian military intelligence, no professorships, no large book deals, and no part in Moscow's ongoing disinformation campaign. On the American side, the situation is no different. The deepest truths do not appear in the major media, at the offices of the CIA or NSA, or within Congress, or the State Department.
The fictionalization of minor events, and the building of myths from these and other building blocks, has become a way of life with us. Self deception is our preference.  What we know about Russia is its role as the motherland of modern terrorism. What we know about Russia is that its economy is dominated by the minions of the KGB and other Soviet structures. What we know about Russia -- and should never forget -- is that America has been targeted for destruction by Russian strategists. This is not speculation, but fact. It has been testified to by defectors like Sergei Tretyakov, dissidents like Marina and Victor Kalashnikov, and by the Russian General Staff which confesses its hostility to the United States by war preparations that cannot otherwise be explained.  
To drive home the point, I would like to conclude with recent comments from a disillusioned Russian democracy activist, who described to a friend the political situation in Russia (in the following terms): "Putin and the opposition are part of the same team. To be exact, they are two teams, but they are sharing power. The borders between the first and second are very fuzzy."
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Far West LLC A company behind many black operations. Some names and information for further research

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Sep 2008
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Default Far West LLC A company behind many black operations. Some names and information for further research

Below are a series of articles mentioning activities of Far West LLC A consulting firm with an odd way of doing business. Also some pictures of players in the company and some background information on them. Researchers and readers familiar with Peter Dale Scott (see his work in the Global Drug Meta Group which I think we have in the drugs board here) will recognise many here. I have only included the English articles. There is much more in Russian at ????.??

IPROG "Experts" Update Their Mug Shots
Ruslan Saidov aka Ugur Mehmed (left) and Vladimir Filin aka "Ilyich", "El Buho". Photos courtesy

"Somewhere near Moscow": Anton Surikov (center) with Shatbai Shavit (left) and Dov Kontorer at the recent conference of Israeli and Russian intelligence services organized by Sergei Kurginyan and his Experimental Creative Center. Photo courtesy

Owners of Far West Ltd (from the left): Ruslan Saidov, Vladimir Filin, Anton Surikov

Davidoviz-Muller's ties to LA fascism, to death squads, his double game with FARC are logical outcome of the social nature of FarWest -- the mafiiso-political society born out of the New World Order, new fascism.

From the left: Filin, Saidov, Surikov. Recent photo from Finland 

Vladimir Vladimirovich Litovchenko (b. 1960)
General-Major of the Main Intelligence Directorate, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense,
Vice-president of Far West LLC
Owner of several ethanol factories in Brazil,
business partner of George Soros
Known cover names:
Vladimir Ilyich Filin (Ukrainian and British passports)
F. P. Carvallo (Brazilian passport)
Stoikovich (Serbian passport)
Known handles: 
"Ilyich," "El Buho"

Anton Surikov -- Mansour Nathoev
Rt. Colonel of GRU, commander of the "security service" of the Cherkess Congress. Received special training in guerilla war and psychological operations. 

Fritz Ermarth of the Nixon Center and SAIC.
"Former" CIA officer, probably partly ethnic Adygei and distant relative of Surikov-Natkhoev. Main contact of Farwest in the United States. Specialist in disinformation and false-flag operations. Representative of the US military-industrial complex and post-Nazi elites in the Atlantic intelligence community. Member of the Bushes' inner circle of political and intelligence operatives. Ideologically motivated Russophobe, one of the central figures in the ongoing secret war against Russia.

Sir Rodric Braithwaite of
Deutsche Bank and
David Cameron's Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs

Ruslan Saidovich Sadulaev (b. 1960)
Major-General, Advisor to the Minister of Defense, Republic Uzbekistan, head of the illegal "external intelligence service of Chechen Republic," formerly "The Istambul Bureau" under President Maskhadov. Close associate of Khozh Nukhaev, wanted for the murder of Paul Khlebnikov.
Known cover names
Ruslan Saidov (Russian passport),
Ruslan Muhammedovich Muhammedov (Uzbek passport), Nihat (Turkish passport) 

Alexei Kolosovskii (b. 1960)
Ulrainian and British passports on
Alexei Likhvintsev 

Major-General of
Ukrainian military intelligence, in charge of the Special Department "R" (Russia). Married to Liudmilla Rozkina, US and British passports, former GRU agent.
Handles: "Pribalt"
Photo circa 1988-89 

Igor Sechin (b. 1960), Kremlin functionary and the informal leader of Russian silovikiServed in Angola under Kolosovskii's command as military interpretor. 
Major-General Valery Lunev (cover name)
KGB, Belarus
Handle: Lun

Alfonso Davidoviz-Mueller,
Cuban-Soviet double agent, banker, involved in narcotrafficking and money laundering, known to major secret services and used by them. Married to the relative of Venezuelan General Mueller Rojas.
Handle: "Felix"
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Фарвест и примкнувший к ним Кургинян...

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Наташа Барч, Антон Баумгартен, Рудольф Гаримов и Виктор Зайцев
С фронтов Третьей Барбароссы: Фарвест и примкнувший к ним Кургинян...
(Круглый стол Московской редакции бурцев.ру по ситуации в России)
16 ноября в г. Люберцы прошел очередной круглый стол Московской редакции бурцев.ру, обсудивший развитие событий за последние недели. Мы предлагаем читателям частичный и отредактированный транскрипт нашего обсуждения.


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