"We expect Moscow's authority to weaken substantially, leading to the formal and informal fragmentation of Russia" the report states, adding, "It is unlikely that the Russian Federation will survive in its current form." - Stratfor has 11 chilling predictions for what the world will look like a decade from now - Business Insider
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Stratfor has 11 chilling predictions for what the world will look like a decade from now
Ilia Yefimovich
The private intelligence firm Strategic Forecasting, or Stratfor, recently published its Decade Forecastin which it projects the next 10 years of global political and economic developments.
In many ways, Stratfor thinks the world of 10 years from now will be more dangerous place, with US power waning and other prominent countries experiencing a period of chaos and decline.
Russia will collapse ...
"There will not be an uprising against Moscow, but Moscow's withering ability to support and control the Russian Federation will leave a vacuum," Stratfor warns. "What will exist in this vacuum will be the individual fragments of the Russian Federation."
Sanctions, declining oil prices, a plunging ruble, rising military expenses, and increasing internal discord will weaken the hold of Russia's central government over the world's largest country. Russia will not officially split into multiple countries, but Moscow's power may loosen to the point that Russia will effectively become a string of semi-autonomous regions that might not even get along with one another.
"We expect Moscow's authority to weaken substantially, leading to the formal and informal fragmentation of Russia" the report states, adding, "It is unlikely that the Russian Federation will survive in its current form."
... and the US will have to use its military to secure the country's nukes.
A deactivated Soviet-era SS-4 medium-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile.
Russia's nuclear-weapons infrastructure is spread across a vast geographic area. If the political disintegration Stratfor predicts ever happens, it means that weapons, uranium stocks, and delivery systems could end up exposed in what will suddenly become the world's most dangerous power vacuum.
The breakout of Russia's nuclear weapons stockpile will be "the greatest crisis of the next decade," according to Stratfor.
And the US will have to figure out what to do about it, even if it means dispatching ground troops to secure loose weapons, materials, and delivery systems.
"Washington is the only power able to address the issue, but it will not be able to seize control of the vast numbers of sites militarily and guarantee that no missile is fired in the process," the Decade Forecast states. "The United States will either have to invent a military solution that is difficult to conceive of now, accept the threat of rogue launches, or try to create a stable and economically viable government in the regions involved to neutralize the missiles over time."
Germany is going to have problems ...
Germany has an export-dependent economy that has richly benefitted from the continent-wide trade liberalization ushered in by the European Union and the euro, but that just means the country has the most to lose from a worsening euro crisis and a resulting wave of euroscepticism.
The country's domestic consumption can't make up for this dip in Germany's export economy or for a projected decline in population. The result is Japan-style stagnation.
"We expect Germany to suffer severe economic reversals in the next decade," the Decade Forecast says.
... and Poland will be one of Europe's leaders.
Look a little to Germany's east, and things won't be quite so bad. "At the center of economic growth and increasing political influence will be Poland," the report says.
Poland's population won't decline as much as those of the other major European economies. The fact that it's the largest and most prosperous European state on Russia's western border will also thrust it into a position of regional leadership that the country could leverage into greater political and economic prestige.
And it only helps to have the kind of close, longstanding strategic partnership with the US that Poland enjoys.
There will be four Europes.
It wasn't long ago that European unity seemed like an unstoppable historical force, with political and economic barriers between countries dissolving and regionalism and nationalism disappearing from the continent's politics.
In 10 years, that may all seem like a distant memory. The Decade Forecast talks about four Europes that will becoming increasingly estranged from one another: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and the British islands. They will still have to share the same neighborhood, but they won't be as closely connected as they were before.
"The European Union might survive in some sense, but European economic, political, and military relations will be governed primarily by bilateral or limited multilateral relationships that will be small in scope and not binding," the report says. "Some states might maintain a residual membership in a highly modified European Union, but this will not define Europe."
Turkey and the US will have to be close allies but for an unexpected reason.
Several Arab countries are in a state of free fall, and the Decade Forecast doesn't see the chaos ending anytime soon. The major beneficiary from all of this will be Turkey, a strong, relatively stable country whose borders stretch from the Black Sea all the way down to Syria and Iraq.
Turkey will be reluctant to intervene in conflicts on its borders but will inevitably have to, according to the forecast. As Ankara's strength and assertiveness increases relative to its neighbors, the country will become an indispensable US partner.
But Turkey will want something in return: a line of defense against a certain powerful and aggression-minded country on the other side of the Black Sea that has military bases in neighboring Armenia. Turkey will want the help of the US in keeping Moscow out of its backyard.
"Turkey will continue to need US involvement for political and military reasons," the report says. "The United States will oblige, but there will be a price: participation in the containment of Russia. The United States does not expect Turkey to assume a war-fighting role and does not intend one for itself. It does, however, want a degree of cooperation in managing the Black Sea."
China will face one huge problem.
China may have a rough decade ahead as economic growth slows, leading to widespread discontent toward the ruling Communist Party. But the party will not liberalize, which means its only viable option for controlling the gathering chaos while remaining in power will be to increase internal oppression.
Beijing also faces another, perhaps even bigger problem: China's growth hasn't been geographically distributed very evenly. Coastal cities are thriving, but China's interior has less access to international markets and is comparatively much poorer. That problem will only get worse as China continues to urbanize.
"The expectation that the interior — beyond parts of the more urbanized Yangtze River Delta — will grow as rapidly as the coast is being dashed," the report says. And the growing rift between China's coast and its interior could presage even deeper, more ominous splits.
As the report notes, regional fissures have been a persistent driver of political chaos throughout China's history, and there is an unlikely but "still conceivable outcome in which political interests along the coast rebel against Beijing's policy of transferring wealth to the interior to contain political unrest."
Japan will be Asia's rising naval power.
Japan has a maritime tradition going back centuries, and as an island nation it is pretty dependent on imports. China is building a state-of-the-art navy of its own, and it may become even more aggressive in controlling shipping routes in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean that Japan depends upon.
Japan will have no option but to project power into the region to counter China and protect its supply routes. With US power waning, it will have to do this on its own.
"Right now [Japan] depends on the United States to guarantee access," the forecast states. "But given that we are forecasting more cautious US involvement in foreign ventures and that the United States is not dependent on imports, the reliability of the United States is in question. Therefore, the Japanese will increase their naval power in the coming years."
The South China Sea islands won't start a war — but there's a catch.
The regional powers will decide that South China Sea island disputes aren't worth a major military escalation, but they will still be a symptom of a hazardous power dynamic.
"Fighting over the minor islands producing low-cost and unprofitable energy will not be the primary issue in the region," the report predicts. "Rather, an old three-player game will emerge. Russia, the declining power, will increasingly lose the ability to protect its maritime interests. The Chinese and the Japanese will both be interested in acquiring these and in preventing each other from having them."
Dangerous great-power dynamics are returning to East Asia, even if it may not result in armed conflict in the South China and East China seas.
There will be 16 mini-Chinas.
China's economy will slow down, and growth in its production capacity will flatline. That's actually good news for a handful of countries. The entry-level manufacturing jobs that China used to gobble up will migrate to 16 emerging economies with a combined population of 1.15 billion.
So while China's growth will stall, leading to unforeseeable political and economic consequences, Mexico, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia could see improving economic fortunes over the next decade as more manufacturing jobs arrive.
US power will decline.
With the world becoming an even more disorderly and unpredictable place over the next 10 years, the US will respond by being increasingly judicious about how it picks its challenges rather than taking an active leadership role in solving the world's problems.
A growing economy, surging domestic energy production, declining exports, and the safety of being in the most stable corner of the world will give the US the luxury of being able to insulate itself against the world's crises. While this more restrained US role in global affairs will make the world an even less predictable place, it's a reality that other countries will just have to deal with.
"The United States will continue to be the major economic, political, and military power in the world but will be less engaged than in the past," the forecast says. "It will be a disorderly world, with a changing of the guard in many regions. The one constant will be the continued and maturing power of the United States — a power that will be much less visible and that will be utilized far less in the next decade."
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A picture taken on May 23, 2015 shows Russian military vehicles on a freight train in the Russian southern town of Matveev Kurgan in the Rostov region, some 20 km from the Russian-Ukrainian border.
© AFP
© AFP
MOSCOW - Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov accused NATO on June 16 of seeking to drag Moscow into a new arms race, RIA news agency reported.
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The Kyiv Post is hosting comments to foster lively public debate through the Disqus system. Criticism is fine, but stick to the issues. Comments that include profanity or personal attacks will be removed from the site. The Kyiv Post will ban flagrant violators. If you think that a comment or commentator should be banned, please flag the offending material.
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IDF establishes new cyber command
DEBKAfile June 16, 2015, 5:05 PM (IDT)
The new cyber command announced Monday by IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen Gady Eisenkott will oversee all activity related to cyber warfare operations, cyber defense, cyber attacks, cyber intelligence-gathering and operational planning. It is expected to take two years to launch. Eisenkott said that the new command will empower the IDF to perform better in these areas and utilized the technological and human advantages with which Israel is endowed.
The historic theft of millions of government workers’ data was “honorable espionage work” and a “legitimate foreign intelligence target,” according to former CIA Director Michael Hayden.
“This is not ‘shame on China.’ This is ‘shame on us’ for not protecting that kind of information,” Hayden, who also previously served as head of the National Security Agency, said at The Wall Street Journal’s CFO Network meeting in Washington on Monday evening.
“If I as director of CIA or NSA would have had the opportunity to grab the equivalent in the Chinese system, I would not have thought twice,” he said. “I would not have asked permission. I would have launched the Starfleet, and we would have brought those suckers home at the speed of light.”
The comments increase the pressure on the Obama administration and amount to the clearest signs of frustration from former intelligence leaders about the inability to securely guard records at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
“My deepest emotion is embarrassment,” Hayden said.
In recent weeks, the Obama administration has acknowledged that millions of current, former and retired government workers’ data had been stolen. As many as 14 million people might have been affected in that breach.
Last week, reports emerged about a second hack that resulted in the theft of detailed background information about intelligence agents and military personnel.
Behind closed doors, officials have claimed that the fingerprints lead back to China, which has amassed a robust team of hackers and could be able to use the information to turn spies, blackmail government officials or otherwise steal sensitive American secrets.
Hayden’s comments appeared to go into more detail, saying the breach was the work of China’s Ministry of State Security, a top intelligence arm that is “very roughly” the Chinese equivalent of the CIA.
China has denied involvement in the data theft.
While many government officials are focused on cyberwarfare following a spate of high-profile cyberattacks including the recent Office of Personnel Management data breach allegedly by Chinese hackers, a new paper states that another concept called "netwar" – a psychological force that's increasingly related to cyber – deserves more attention.
The paper (pdf), released June 11 by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, defines netwar as "intentional activities [meant] to influence the domain of human perception via either overt or hidden channels, in which one or more actors seeks to impose a desired change upon the perception of another actor, in order that this change facilitate second-and third order effects of benefit to them."
Specifically, the term, coined in the 1990s and redefined in this paper, refers not to physical force but to elements of psychological force such as propaganda, although netwar perpetrators might use cyber systems and tools to carry out their objectives.
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"Would any national security scholar or practitioner dispute that at least some components of netwar – for example, deliberate combinations of diplomacy, propaganda, and manipulation of media – seem to be growing in the modern geopolitical space?" poses the paper's author, Robert Brose, who is lead for futures and capability development at ODNI.
"And do we not recognize an increasing potential for delivery of psychological campaigns to our doorstep, and the mobilization of 'dissident or opposition movements,' whether at the behest of state or non-state actors, via the Internet?" he adds.
Two countries frequently blamed for cyberattacks – China and Russia – provide perspective on netwar defense and response. Citing examples including Sun-Tzu's famous "Art of War," Brose points to such teachings that show how multiple nonviolent mechanisms of attack can affect opponents and how the goal is not absolute victory.
Instead, "'the accomplishment of objectives through persistent persuasion, dissuasion, and manipulation is preferable to a resort to conflict in the physical domain,'" according to the paper.
In early June, OPM officials announced that Chinese hackers accessed personal data of about 4 million current and former federal workers.
In Russia, military doctrine separates into "information technical" elements akin to cyber warfare and "information psychological" ones, according to the paper. And, as recently as 2013, Russian Gen. Valery Gerasimov wrote about the advantages of using "'nonmilitary means'" to achieve political goals. Dubbed the Gerasimov Doctrine, the document exemplifies thinking in that country, Brose writes.
China and Russia have also been mastering the use of the so-called United Front Theory – a strategy of shifting alliances according to whatever ideology is most favorable at the time – and legal warfare, which aims to instill doubts "'about the legality of adversary actions, thereby diminishing political will and support and potentially retarding military activity,'" Brose writes.
The information age puts the United States at increased risk of netwar because even as the free flow of information is crucial to culture and commerce, it creates vulnerabilities to "tailored deceptions veiled as gossip, market preference, opinion, or social interaction," Brose notes. But netwar can be fought in three main ways, he adds:
- Cyber-defense organizations could identify netwar actions in open content.
- Tools could reconstruct, track and attribute netwar activities.
- Cyber-defense agencies should be ready to respond to netwar attacks with various tactics.
"Fortunately, the antidote to netwar poison is active transparency, a function democracies excel in," Brose adds.
For more:
- read the ODNI paper (pdf) on netwar
- read the ODNI paper (pdf) on netwar
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· · ·
Federal investigators arrested a third suspect in the shooting attack on a "Draw the Prophet" contest in Garland, Texas in May. A federal grand jury indicted Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem, also known as Decarus Thomas, on conspiracy and weapons charges. VPC
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Reuters
BY: Reuters
JERUSALEM (Reuters) – U.S. President Barack Obama has invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for talks in Washington next month after a deadline for reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran, an Israeli newspaper reported on Tuesday, quoting State Department sources.
A spokesman for Netanyahu’s office had no immediate official comment on the report. Officials speaking on condition of anonymity, however, told reporters that no such invitation had been received.
The mass-circulation Yedioth Ahronoth daily quoted unidentified sources at the State Department as saying Obama had invited Netanyahu for talks in mid-July, after a June 30 deadline for a major powers deal with Iran on its nuclear program.
Netanyahu has criticized the emerging deal Israel fears will allow Iran the means of making a bomb, while also granting it sanctions relief that could help bankroll its guerrilla allies in the region.
Iran says its nuclear projects are peaceful.
(Writing by Allyn Fisher-Ilan; Editing by Edmund Klamann and Nick Macfie)
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TEL AVIV, Israel, June 16 (UPI) -- Israel will develop a military command to deal exclusively with cyberwarfare, an Israeli Defense Force official said.
The new command, on a par with the Air Force and the Navy, will unify the cyber corps within two years, pending approval by the defense minister. Israel currently has the responsibilities dispersed throughout its military structure, with the military Intelligence Directorate of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) dealing with offensive capabilities and C4I involved in national protection. The Shin Bet security service, the Mossad intelligence Service and National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minister's Office also operate without a hierarchy or unified order.
Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, IDF Chief of Staff, commented, "The IDF is required to excel in every aspect of war, including the cyber dimension, which is becoming more significant every day. This new command will empower the IDF to perform better in these fronts."
Maj. Gen. Nimrod Sheffer, head of Israeli military planning, said in a Tel Aviv conference last week, "Israel has been wise enough to invest in becoming one of the greatest cyber powers in the world. And we'll do everything necessary to maintain our place there, including organizational changes. The cyber world is developing swiftly. We have to invest a lot in the cyber world."
Iran is developing cyber weapons that Gadi Siboni, director of the Cyber Security Program at Tel Aviv's National Security Studies called "evidence of the beginning of a process in which cyber war replaces the classic terror as a central tool in Iran's doctrine of asymmetric warfare." Israel has, as well, notably a computer virus that caused havoc at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility, and alleged spying on hotels in Europe which hosted nuclear talks between Iran and the United States. Israel also routinely deals with attacks to its government portals and websites by pro-Palestinian activists.
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June 16, 2015 The director of the Office and Personnel Management struck a defensive tone during her appearance before a congressional panel Tuesday, saying that the agency had greatly expanded its cybersecurity in recent years while partly blaming the recent hack of federal-employee data on a lack of funding for information technology.
Appearing before the House Oversight Committee nearly two weeks after a massive breach affecting the personal data of millions of current and former employees was publicly disclosed, OPM Director Katherine Archuleta acknowledged security vulnerabilities in the agency's outdated technology infrastructure. But she also hailed the strides OPM had taken under her stewardship to bolster its cyberdefenses.
"Cybersecurity issues that the government is facing is a problem that has been decades in the making, due to a lack of investment in federal IT systems and a lack of efforts in both the public and private sectors to secure our Internet infrastructure," Archuleta wrote in her three-page written testimony, which she read portions of during the hearing. "We discovered these intrusions because of our increased efforts in the last 18 months to improve cybersecurity at OPM, not despite them."
Archuleta also acknowledged that OPM was aware of a second, potentially far more devastating hack of security-clearance information when it publicly announced the first breach earlier this month.
According to Archuleta's written testimony, investigators discovered in May that "additional systems were likely compromised" and began notifying congressional leadership and select committees. Other agencies were notified in early June of the second breach, the testimony reads, and that "there was a high degree of confidence that OPM systems related to background investigations of current, former, and prospective federal-government employees, and those for whom a federal background investigation was conducted, may have been compromised."
The second breach was first disclosed publicly on Friday after news reports concerning it emerged.
Oversight Chairman Jason Chaffetz said OPM had not done enough to mitigate risk of potential hacks. The Utah Republican ran through a litany of audits and Inspector General reports issued over the past several years finding that OPM had been insufficient in upgrading its cybersecurity, which he said amounted to "leaving all of the doors and windows open in your house" for "what may have been the most devastating cyberattack in our nation's history."
"This has been going on for a long time, and yet when I read the testimony that was provided here—we're about to hear, 'Hey we're doing a great job,'" Chaffetz said. "You're not. It's failing."
Archuleta said that cyberattacks had become exponentially more frequent and sophisticated in recent years and called for more to be done across government and the private sector to better defend against data breaches.
"Government and nongovernment entities are under constant attack by evolving and advanced persistent threats and criminal actors," she said. "These adversaries are sophisticated, well-funded, and focused. In an average month, OPM, for example, thwarts 10 million confirmed intrusion attempts targeting our network. These attacks will not stop—if anything, they will increase."
Archuleta also made a direct appeal to federal workers, saying, "The security of your personal data is of paramount importance." She added that OPM was "committed to a full and complete investigation of these incidents and are taking action to mitigate vulnerabilities exposed by intrusions."
OPM announced earlier this month that the personal data—such as Social Security numbers, names, birthdays, and addresses—of approximately 4 million former and current federal employees was swiped in a breach that began last year, was detected in April, and China is believed to have committed. Reports have surfaced since to suggest the hack was far broader and more debilitating than has been publicly acknowledged.
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On Friday, the government announced that the hackers had succeeded in staging a second, potentially far more comprehensive hack of the agency that exposed sensitive security-clearance information of intelligence and military personnel. The White House and others have not yet commented on how damaging that hack—also believed to be orchestrated by China—could be for American agents and spies, some of whom would likely be stationed abroad.
Chaffetz pressed Archuleta to provide more detail about the size of the OPM intrusion, citing reports that it may implicate as many as 14 million individuals, but she repeatedly demurred on grounds that an investigation into the hack is ongoing. Chaffetz also tried repeatedly to force an answer out of Archuleta as to whether sensitive information of military personnel, contractors, or CIA agents was compromised, but each time she said she would need to discuss that information in a classified setting.
"You have completely and utterly failed," Chaffetz told Archuleta, noting that the Inspector General's Office had found the security systems so flawed last year that a recommendation was made to temporarily take the databases offline.
"You made a conscious decision not to do that, you kept it open, the information was vulnerable, and the hackers got it," Chaffetz, raising his voice, said. "They're going to prey on the American people."
Sylvia Burns, the chief information officer for the Department of Interior, said officials believed that only OPM data had been accessed during the hack and that other government agencies were likely not compromised, though she noted that the investigation is still ongoing.
OPM Assistant Inspector General Michael Esser criticized the office for having a "history of struggling to comply with" the Federal Information Security Management Act. Esser also highlighted concerns about the use of IT systems that lack valid authorization checks.
At least one lawmaker suggested Tuesday that some members of OPM leadership should resign. Rep. Ted Lieu, a California Democrat who holds a degree in computer science from Stanford, used the hearing to condemn a "high level of technological incompetence" across government and noted that when other agencies are beset by scandal, high-ranking officials are often forced to step down.
"I'm looking here today for a few good people to step forward, take responsibility and resign for the good of the nation," Lieu said. Chaffetz promptly responded: "Well said."
This story has been updated.
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· · · · ·
WASHINGTON — The F.B.I. and Justice Department prosecutors are investigating whether front-office officials for the St. Louis Cardinals, one of the most successful teams in baseball over the past two decades, hacked into internal networks of a rival team to steal closely guarded information about player personnel.
Investigators have uncovered evidence that Cardinals officials broke into a network of the Houston Astros that housed special databases the team had built, according to law enforcement officials. Internal discussions about trades, proprietary statistics and scouting reports were compromised, the officials said.
The officials did not say which employees were the focus of the investigation or whether the team’s highest-ranking officials were aware of the hacking or authorized it. The investigation is being led by the F.B.I.’s Houston field office and has progressed to the point that subpoenas have been served on the Cardinals and Major League Baseball for electronic correspondence.
The attack would represent the first known case of corporate espionage in which a professional sports team hacked the network of another team. Illegal intrusions into companies’ networks have become commonplace, but they are generally conducted by hackers operating in foreign countries, like Russia and China, who steal large tranches of data or trade secrets for military equipment and electronics.
Major League Baseball “has been aware of and has fully cooperated with the federal investigation into the illegal breach of the Astros’ baseball operations database,” a spokesman for baseball’s commissioner, Rob Manfred, said in a written statement.
The Cardinals officials under investigation have not been put on leave, suspended or fired. The commissioner’s office is likely to wait until the conclusion of the government’s investigation to determine whether to take disciplinary action against the officials or the team.
“The St. Louis Cardinals are aware of the investigation into the security breach of the Houston Astros’ database,” the team said in a statement. “The team has fully cooperated with the investigation and will continue to do so. Given that this is an ongoing federal investigation, it is not appropriate for us to comment further.”
The case is a rare mark of ignominy for the Cardinals, one of the sport’s most revered and popular organizations. The team has the best record in baseball this season (42-21), regularly commands outsize television ratings and has reached the National League Championship Series nine times since 2000. The Cardinals, who last won the World Series in 2011, have 11 titles over all, second only to the Yankees.
Law enforcement officials believe the hacking was executed by vengeful front-office employees for the Cardinals hoping to wreak havoc on the work of Jeff Luhnow, the Astros’ general manager who had been a successful and polarizing executive with the Cardinals until 2011.
From 1994 to 2012, the Astros and the Cardinals were division rivals, in the National League. For a part of that time, Mr. Luhnow was a Cardinals executive, primarily handling scouting and player development. One of many innovative thinkers drawn to the sport by the “Moneyball” phenomenon, he was credited with building baseball’s best minor league system, as well as drafting several players who would become linchpins of the Cardinals’ 2011 World Series-winning team.
The Astros hired Mr. Luhnow as general manager in December 2011, and he quickly began applying his unconventional approach to running a baseball team. In an exploration of the team’s radical transformation, Bloomberg Business called it “a project unlike anything baseball has seen before.”
Under Mr. Luhnow, the Astros have accomplished a striking turnaround; they are in first place in the American League West division. But in 2013, before their revival at the major league level, their internal deliberations about statistics and players were compromised, law enforcement officials said.
The intrusion did not appear to be sophisticated, the law enforcement officials said. When Mr. Luhnow was with the Cardinals, the organization built a computer network, called Redbird, to house all of their baseball operations information — including scouting reports and player personnel information. After leaving to join the Astros, and bringing some front-office personnel with him from the Cardinals, Houston created a similar program known as Ground Control.
Ground Control contained the Astros’ “collective baseball knowledge,” according to a Bloomberg Business article published last year. The program took a series of variables and “weights them according to the values determined by the team’s statisticians, physicist, doctors, scouts and coaches,” the article said.
Investigators believe Cardinals officials, concerned that Mr. Luhnow had taken their idea and proprietary baseball information to the Astros, examined a master list of passwords used by Mr. Luhnow and the other officials who had joined the Astros when they worked for the Cardinals. The Cardinals officials are believed to have used those passwords to gain access to the Astros’ network, law enforcement officials said.
That tactic is often used by cybercriminals, who sell passwords from one breach on the underground market, where others buy them and test them on other websites, including banking and brokerage services. The breach on the Astros would be one of the first known instances of a corporate competitor using the tactic against a rival. It is also, security experts say, just one more reason people are advised not to use the same passwords across different sites and services.
Last year, some of the information was posted anonymously online, according to an article on Deadspin. Among the details that were exposed were trade discussions that the Astros had with other teams. Mr. Luhnow was asked at the time whether the breach would affect how he dealt with other teams. “Today I used a pencil and paper in all my conversations,” he said.
Believing that the Astros’ network had been compromised by a rogue hacker, Major League Baseball notified the F.B.I., and the authorities in Houston opened an investigation. Agents soon found that the Astros’ network had been entered from a computer at a home that some Cardinals officials had lived in. The agents then turned their attention to the team’s front office.
“The F.B.I. aggressively investigates all potential threats to public and private sector systems,” an F.B.I. spokeswoman said. “Once our investigations are complete, we pursue all appropriate avenues to hold accountable those who pose a threat in cyberspace.”
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· · · ·
Toronto skyline / Wikimedia Commons
BY: Adam Kredo
Anti-Semitic incidents in Canada skyrocketed over the last year and have now hit the highest levels “ever recorded” by human rights groups tracking the number of anti-Jewish episodes, according to a new study.
Canadians across the country reported experiencing more anti-Semitism than in the past four years, with anti-Semitic incidents having risen a total of 28 percent from 2013 to 2014, according to the global Jewish advocacy group B’nai B’rith International (BBI).
This made 2014 the “worst year” for anti-Semitism since advocacy groups began tracking incidents in 1982.
The majority of those who reported an instance of anti-Semitism faced harassment, while others faced forms of violence and vandalism as a result of being Jewish, according to the report.
The rise coincides with a global surge in anti-Semitism, including a rash of terrorist attacks against Jewish communities in countries such as France.
In Canada alone, there were 1,627 anti-Jewish incidents in 2014, a nearly 30 percent rise since the previous year. Such cases “can vary from slurs, name calling, and graffiti, to assault, arson, and bomb threats,” the report states.
“The year 2014 saw the highest number of anti-Semitic incidents ever recorded by B’nai B’rith and the League for Human Rights,” according to the report. “At 1,627 incidents, this year saw a 28 percent increase over 2013. This is consistent with data gathered by other human rights organizations around the world, such as the Anti-Defamation League, who reported a 21 percent increase over the previous year.”
At least 1,370 of reported incidents included forms of anti-Semitic harassment, while 238 reported vandalism and another 19 reported being the victims of violence.
The report’s authors warn that anti-Semitism is becoming a serious threat in Canada and that it follows with larger trends across the globe.
“It would be easy to allow the events of 2014 and the rising prevalence of occurrences to convince Canadians that anti-Semitism has become an inevitable and insurmountable problem in this country, and to allow fear and anger to take hold,” the report states.
“However, the events unfolding in other parts of the world should serve to illustrate the need for increased ties between the Jewish community and the larger Canadian society. It is not by building barriers that we will eliminate anti-Semitism, but rather by building relationships, and encouraging inter-community education and dialogue,” it says.
Toronto police have reported similar finding, with one recent report concluding: “Toronto’s Jewish community was the most victimized group, on the receiving end of nearly one in every three reported hate crime incidents.”
In addition, “similar results were seen in other municipalities around Canada, and this disturbing trend is indicative of a larger, global rise in anti-Semitism, with 2014 seeing multiple high-profile anti-Semitic incidents across Europe and around the world.”
Researchers attribute growing anti-Semitism to the ongoing conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians and a growth in anti-Israel activity on college campuses.
“On college and university campuses across Canada, on the streets in protests and in the media, one drum-beat is being pounded again and again: Jews, via the state of Israel, are responsible for some of the worst types of human rights violations and the genocide of the Palestinian people,” the report states. “Criticism of Israeli policy has become a condemnation of the Jewish people as a whole, legitimized by movements such as BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) [movement].”
In 2014 alone, Jewish individuals reported being targeted for wearing yarmulkes in public and having their homes vandalized with anti-Semitic graffiti.
In April of last year, for instance, several Hasidic homes were vandalized, with one being completely destroyed by arson, according to the report.
Another individual reported that a mattress was set on fire “with the words ‘burnt Jew’ written across the top.”
The Washington Free Beacon reported in July that a family of pro-Israel supporters were assaulted and strangled by pro-Palestinian protestors and an anti-Israel event in Calgary.
Family members reported protestors shouting, “Kill Jews,” “Hitler should finish you off,” and “baby killers.” Events then turned violent when some of the protestors punched family members and spat on them.
A vandal smeared dog feces onto the door of a synagogue in Toronto in September.
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Sectarianism in the Middle East
by Abukar Arman | on June 16th, 2015 | 
This Ramadan comes at a time when the world is facing a catastrophic leadership deficiency, and nowhere is that catastrophe more evident than in the Middle East. This resource-rich, predominantly Muslim region has produced some of the worst tyrants that the world has ever known — Bashar Assad, Saddam Hussein, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Muammar Gaddafi and many more.
Ramadan is the Islamic holy season in which the faithful diligently tries to maximize his/her spiritual benefit by seeking purification of the soul, enhancement of one’s moral vision and boosting one’s conscience. It is a time in which the faithful works hard to restrain all of material and flesh temptations by turning inward and increasing his or her level of worship, altruism and reflection.
However, Ramadan is not only about the individual’s relationship with God, but also about his/her relationship with other creatures on earth, especially human beings, regardless of their beliefs.
Dysfunctionality of the World Order
Never before in recorded history has the world — specifically the Islamic world — simultaneously experienced so many national and transnational challenges of economic, social, ecological, political and spiritual nature.
The actual and the perceptual order of things have been turned upside down. In a number of countries, the role of the state is being redefined, and the state’s power has diminished drastically. The role of the younger generations and disenfranchised communities has been systematically increasing; thus, setting the stage for reform, but also a power-vacuum, insecurity and chaos.
While the elements that created such daunting conditions are many, chief among them is leadership deficiency.
Many Muslim nations are in a functionally broken or a deplorable state of existence. Some, like Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen are already junglified. According to UNICEF, over 20 million Yemenis need humanitarian aid. Others, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Nigeria and Mali are perfectly placed on the conveyor belt while periodically projecting artificial agency or state authority. Meanwhile, economic predators continue to enhance their exploitation strategies into fine arts.
The Perilous Protection
Some monarchies and emirates have entrusted all their own personal security and that of their respective nations into the hands of mercenaries. Countries such as United Arab Emirates have cultivated deeply-rooted business relationships with the likes of the ever-elusive and infamous Blackwater, which is now known as Academi.
Ironic as it may seem, the UAE became the center where private security companies gravitate towards or the global trade fair where international mercenaries showcase their lethal services.
Unfortunately, times have profoundly changed from the day when Marzabaan the Persian emissary arrived at Medina and could not find a royal palace in the city. When the emissary was lead to Umar — the Second Caliph — took a nap under a shady tree in the outskirt of the city. That was the day when the wise emissary was compelled to make this famous observation: “You assumed authority over them, you served them justly, you felt safe among them, and earned to sleep (exposed and without guards).”
Today, most of the so-called Muslim leaders are known as dictators, kleptocrats and absolute monarchs. Many of them lack the trustworthiness needed to earn public confidence. They lack the vision to lead and the fairness and empathy to care for the least represented of their fellow citizens. But, make no mistake — the real power still rests with the people. Rulers need justice more than their subjects.
Nature of the Deficiency
Throughout today’s world, leaders who are morally anchored, who have the confidence to stand alone, the courage to make tough decisions, and the compassion to listen to the needs of those in whose affairs are entrusted upon them, are in short supply.
What’s needed are leaders who can be trusted by their people and are agents for positive change. Leaders need to possess a broader vision and refrain from letting their own interests define their country’s national interests. They need to be driven by causes that transcend themselves their clan or region interests. They also need to recognize that their authority is a time-constrained privilege, not a right. Leadership, after all, should protect the rights of others and ensure that no grievance is left unaddressed.
At all levels — social, economic and political — these dire times demand transformational leaders who can inspire visions that transcend time and space, who have the capacity to translate those visions into actions, and who could cultivate the right minds and institutions to sustain that vision.
The Metaphor of the Double-decked Ship
In this month of reflection, it is worth remembering the many examples of bad endings of all bad leaders. History is peppered with such examples.
Warning against the abuse of privilege, Prophet Muhammad used the two-decked ship parable in which the morally pompous people were housed in the upper deck and the laity in the lower deck. Whenever the people on the lower deck needed water, they had to go to the upper deck, where they were given a hard time. This went on for a while until one day, out of frustration, one of the lower deck people decided to bust a hole in the ship in order to access the water beneath. It wasn’t long before they all perished.
Transformational leaders are trend watcher. They are always vigilant of any seemingly small problem with the potential to develop into a major crisis.
Counsel to the Leaders
There is no good leadership without good ethics — the two go hand in hand. Ethics is as a code of conduct or values that distinguish right from wrong, the moral from the immoral, virtuous from the vile in governing the lives of individuals, groups, and societies. In Islam it is known as khuluq. “Deal with people in the best and the most ethical way,” said Prophet Muhammad.
As you reflect and refine your leadership qualities, you should consider these five points.
First, know your advisers as well as they know you, especially those in charge of national security.
Second, always keep in mind that anyone who would kill others for money or greed would have no moral obligation to compromise you and your nation for the right price.
Third, never assess your political crisis based solely on current events. If you are not into history, at least, try to rewind your memory database to recall how events came to be in the first place.
Fourth, keep your passions in check. Never become enamored with the seat of power; it is the only way to spare yourself, your people and your country’s imminent destruction.
Fifth, the best protection that a leader can have is the authentic confidence of the people. Always listen to the people to know what might matter to them the most, and who among them might be disenfranchised, deprived or aggrieved.
The alternative is a roller coaster ride into a perpetual state of chaos, exploitation and suicidal extremism.
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HUNTSVILLE, Al. (WHNT) – The FBI is using social media in its search for a top ten fugitive – William Bradford Bishop, Jr.
Bishop is accused of using a sledgehammer to murder his wife, mother, and three children in Potomac, Maryland in 1976. Authorities believe he then fled south to Tennessee and possibly into Alabama.
In 2014, investigators with the FBI exhumed the body of an unknown man at a Scottsboro cemetery, believing he could be Bishop. Tests later showed the body was not Bishop’s.
The FBI is now asking Facebook users to visit this specially created page and share a post highlighting Bishop’s case. The post features a three-dimensional, age-enhanced bust, of what Bishop might look like now, at age 79.
If the social media push leads to a break in the case, FBI investigators will get a new model for finding their most wanted.
If a tipster offers up information that leads to Bishop’s capture, they could get a reward of up to $100,000.
Filed in: Digital Life
Appropriations
Senate panel OKs cybersecurity funding
- By Mark Rockwell
- Jun 16, 2015
The Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee approved a $47.1 billion DHS spending bill June 16 that includes funding for the cybersecurity programs DHS provides to other federal agencies.
The bill includes $1.638 billion for DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate, an increase of $135 million above the fiscal 2015 enacted level. Cybersecurity efforts, including protection of civilian federal networks "are fully supported at $830 million," according to a summary released by the panel. The bill also includes $16 million for extra cybersecurity pay.
Ranking Democrat Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire applauded the funding for DHS’s continuous diagnostics and mitigation program, in light of the massive breach at the Office of Personnel Management, calling the money "a critical investment."
Overall, the measure would provide $765 million more than was enacted for fiscal 2015, but is $1.02 billion below President Barack Obama's budget request, according to a statement from Subcommittee Chairman John Hoeven (R-N.D.).
Among other notable funding provisions in the measure are:
n -- Departmental Management and Operations – The bill includes $1.1 billion for DMO, a $39 million increase above fiscal 2015. According to the committee, the increase supports critical information technology security measures, information-sharing enhancements, and a $16 million increase to the Office of the Inspector General to bolster audit and oversight activities. In addition, a general provision includes $212 million for the DHS headquarters consolidation at St. Elizabeths in Washington, D.C.
n -- Customs and Border Protection – The bill contains $11.08 billion for CBP, an increase of $385 million above fiscal 2015. It supports 21,370 Border Patrol agents and 23,775 CBP officers and intelligence and targeting system enhancements. It also includes funding for recapitalization of Non-Intrusive Inspection equipment, replacement and maintenance of border fencing, procurement of additional mobile surveillance systems and other situational awareness technology, two multi-role enforcement aircraft, and unmanned aerial system capabilities.
n -- Transportation Security Administration – TSA is funded at $4.72 billion under the bill, which is $63 million below the president’s budget request. The funding targets training and checkpoint security following recent testing by the DHS inspector general, including an additional $13 million for screener training, $24 million for checkpoint support, and $2.5 million for Federal Flight Deck Officer and Flight Crew Training Program.
n -- Science and Technology Directorate – The bill includes $765 million for S&T, including $39 million to maintain all current Centers of Excellence within S&T's University Programs.
n -- Citizenship and Immigration Services – The bill contains $120 million in appropriations for E-Verify, and requires an analysis of the costs and timeline necessary to make use of the system permanent for employers.
The full committee is scheduled to take up the measure June 18.
About the Author
Mark Rockwell is a staff writer covering acquisition, procurement and homeland security. Contact him at mrockwell@fcw.com or follow him on Twitter at @MRockwell4.
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Memo: Our Winning Strategy in Europe
From: Russian Strategic Planning Cell
To: President Vladimir Putin
1. Let me begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on our outstanding series of strategic moves in Europe. We have consolidated our annexation of Crimea, which now finds its rightful place back as part of Mother Russia. Your series of “snap exercises” all around the periphery of our country have clearly frightened NATO. Additionally, the brilliant concept of “hybrid warfare,” combining the deployment of Spetsnaz special forces, additional Russian troops and trainers in unmarked uniforms, vigorous propaganda, information warfare, and cyberattacks has everyone’s attention. And NATOfreely admits it is not ready to face our new mix of tactics.
2. While we have lost a little bit of economic muscle from the combination of Western sanctions and falling oil prices from their glorious peak, we are a tough people — and naturally your approval ratings within Russia remain at stratospheric levels. We assess that by working with our Chinese friends, over time, we may be able to improve our international balance of trade positions despite the sanctions; and the future of our Eurasian Customs Union (despite an oddly small number of participating nations) is bright.
3. Geopolitically, we are reassembling a “ring of steel” of alliances around Russia with powerful allies like Belorussia, Armenia, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the newly formed emerging nations of Luhansk and Donetsk in the Donbas of Ukraine. Not quite what we enjoyed with the Warsaw Pact, but you can’t have everything.
4. There is one small problem I would like to bring to your attention, however: the intention of the United States to pre-position heavy military equipment in Eastern Europe. Thus far, the NATO nations have been “keeping an eye” to the east, but have not significantly raised their defense spending from an anemic level of 1.5 percent, well below the 2 percent goal they aspire to and that the United States continues to champion. But we are somewhat concerned that the addition of these pre-positioned units may actually galvanize the Western alliance. Let me explain.
First, these pre-positioned military stocks represent a real improvement in response times for NATO forces. If we were to rightfully intervene in one of the NATO Baltic nations on behalf of the down-trodden Russian minorities there (a case you have elucidated with extreme eloquence and brilliance, as always), the presence of these pre-positioned stocks of armor, artillery, ammunition, communications, transport, and missiles will be available to NATO — and especially U.S. troops — sent from bases in Germany, Italy, and in the United States.
Second, this will probably be only the first step toward permanently stationing other NATO and especially U.S. troops in Eastern Europe. This, of course, is something we have fought against with all our might since the tragedy of the implosion of the USSR and the fall of the Berlin Wall. (You were right to call this a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century, of course). Given Western perceptions about our “threat to the Baltics,” there will be a steady drumbeat from the Eastern European NATO members to add troops to the forward-positioned military stockpiles.
Third, given the presence of the stockpiles, there will inevitably be a whole series of NATO exercisesrevolving around using them. We can expect a great deal of rotational deployment in and around the area of these caches, to include not only troops coming to work with the equipment, but inevitably their supporting arms — high-performance aircraft, guided-missile ships, Special Forces and their V-22 Osprey transports, and on and on. This will be problematic from a number of dimensions, including the need for us to conduct frequent (and costly) demonstrations and exercises ourselves. Recently, our deployments have been somewhat less than perfect.
5. So the question for us is simple: How do we respond? Our planning cell has been looking closely at the options, and unfortunately they are not very compelling.
Assuming you will want to follow through on our bold and absolutely correct comments about moving our forces to the borders of NATO countries, this will put an expensive burden on our armed-forces budget. Despite raising it significantly over the past several years, we are still in need of modernization for our strategic rocket forces, our advanced fighter aircraft, and our maritime power projection — especially submarines. Moving troops around is expensive and will reduce resources to these priority systems. We could move more missiles into Kaliningrad, of course, but this does not seem to have gotten NATO’s attention.
We could respond politically, perhaps by obstructing Western efforts with Iran to obtain a nuclear agreement, find a sensible solution in Syria, or make difficulties in Afghanistan. Here the problem is that we actually do not have a great deal of leverage (with the possible exception of Iran). We have rightfully departed the old and tired G-8 (now pathetically called the G-7) and have little ability to influence via that route. So not much is available to us along these political and diplomatic lines. And so long as oil prices remain relatively low, our economic tools are limited.
Mr. President, I am sure you have already rejected any idea of actually executing the Minsk agreements in Ukraine? While I fully recognize the vital importance of supporting the heroic leaders of Luhansk and Donetsk, I am just a bit worried about the long-term cost of rebuilding that part of Ukraine, as well as the entire Crimea. What else can we consider?
I know this is delicate, but perhaps it is time for a little Maskirovka?I know this is delicate, but perhaps it is time for a little Maskirovka? Perhaps we should at least think about a sort of feint, wherein we nominally abide by the Minsk accords, settle for another “frozen conflict” with Ukraine (we can continue to manipulate events easily), and thus splinter the resolve of the Europeans? Brussels no doubt would be thrilled to have the chance to get back to “business as usual” (read: doing nothing) and is desperately seeking any excuse to do so. Even a hint of a relaxation in our posture — and something of a military withdrawal of some of our units from Ukraine — would be sufficient enough to begin breaking apart Western solidarity on this issue.
The good news is that the Americans have not made a final decision yet on the pre-positioned military stocks, and we would encourage the soft power advocates in their government to stop this idea. It would also reduce the growing possibility of the Americans (or others) providing some level of offensive weapons to the Ukrainian government.
If you agree, we could provide options to appear more accommodating on the surface, perhaps reducing easily traceable weapons, trainers, and forces in Ukraine. We could adjust our strategic public messaging to take a more conciliatory line. Naturally, we would redouble our more easily obscured support via cyber, cash, untraceable weapons, deep-cover agents, and the like — all the things you personally did so masterfully in your career in the KGB.
6. Please do not mistake our enthusiasm for all that is happening! If you don’t like this idea, we will continue with our current approach. As you often say in reference to having a “Plan B,” the best Plan B is so often simply to work harder at Plan A! After all, with our new Armata tanks, we can still roll to Kiev anytime we want. As Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin so cleverly mentioned a few weeks ago, “tanks don’t need visas.” His Twitter account is fabulous, by the way, and an inspiration to all right-thinking Russians.
7. The future is bright!
Very respectfully,
Your Strategic Planning Cell
Photo credit: Alexander Aksakov/Getty Images News
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An aerial view of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters in Langley, Virginia. (Reed/Reuters)
Last week, in response to long-standing FOIA requests, the CIA declassified—with significant redactions—five documents related to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The most notable was a June 2005 Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report into CIA accountability regarding the findings of the Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, which was produced by the House and Senate intelligence committees. That joint inquiry was published in December 2002—long before the 9/11 Commission report—and served as the most comprehensive public investigation into Intelligence Community (IC) shortcomings. The 2005 OIG report reviewed the joint inquiry’s central findings to determine if senior CIA officials should be reprimanded for their actions.
Most attention on the OIG report has focused on the now-declassified finding about allegations of Saudi Arabia’s support for al-Qaeda. Those who believed that the CIA had intentionally hid evidence of Saudi Arabia-al-Qaeda connections were surely disappointed by this key passage:
The [OIG Accountability Review] Team encountered no evidence that the Saudi Government knowingly and willingly supported al-Qa’ida terrorists. Individuals in both the Near East Division (NE) and the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) [redacted] told the Team they had not seen any reliable reporting confirming Saudi Government involvement with the financial support for terrorism prior to 9/11, although a few also speculated that dissident sympathizers within the government may have aided al-Qa’ida. (p. 440)
Beyond this brief declassified portion of the OIG report, there were many fascinating findings and insights, which are useful to understand the IC’s approach to terrorism before 9/11, as well as the type of constraints and organizational biases that make intelligence analysis so inherently difficult. One wonders which of these pre-9/11 shortcomings—so obvious with the benefit of hindsight—are having a comparable impact on intelligence collection and analysis today.
The following consists of the top ten insights from the June 2005 CIA OIG report, with context and commentary provided for each:
The Team found:
• No comprehensive strategic assessment of al-Qa’ida by CTC or any other component.
• No comprehensive report focusing on UBL since 1993.
• No examination of the potential for terrorists to use aircraft as weapons, as distinguished from traditional hijackings.
• Limited analytic focus on the United States as a potential target.
• No comprehensive analysis that put into context the threats received in the spring and summer of 2001.
• No comprehensive report focusing on UBL since 1993.
• No examination of the potential for terrorists to use aircraft as weapons, as distinguished from traditional hijackings.
• Limited analytic focus on the United States as a potential target.
• No comprehensive analysis that put into context the threats received in the spring and summer of 2001.
That said, the CTC’s analytic component, the Assessments and Information Group (AIG), addressed aspects of these issues in several more narrowly focused strategic papers and other analytic products. The personnel resources of AIG were heavily dedicated to policy support and operational-support activities. Analysis focused primarily on current and tactical issues rather than on strategic analysis. (pp. xvii-xviii)
(3PA: Intelligence analysts, then and now, rarely have the amount of time that they would like to conduct the sort of in-depth strategic analyses that policymakers want. Another document that the CIA published last week, with fewer redactions than previous versions, was an August 2001 OIGInspection Report of the DCI Counterterrorism Center (CTC) Directorate of Operations. That report found that the CTC’s primary analytical arm, the AIG (Assessment and Information Group) devoted “a significant amount of time—interviewees estimated between 30 and 50 percent—to counterterrorism operations support, working closely with their colleagues in the [redacted] operations groups on targeting and planning aimed at penetrations, recruitments, renditions, and disruptions.” In other words, they were helping to capture and kill terrorists rather than undertake long-range analysis of terrorism.)
…Differences between the CIA and the Department of Defense over the cost of replacing lost Predators also hampered collaboration over the use of that platform in Afghanistan. The Team concludes, however, that other impediments, including the slow-moving policy process, reduced the importance of these CIA-military differences. (p. xxii)
(3PA: The pre-9/11 fight between the Pentagon and CIA over who would pay for the Predator, and have the final authority to approve drone strikes, was what led to the CIA becoming the lead executive agency for drone strikes after 9/11. This historical act of bureaucratic happenstance was never intended to be a permanent solution, yet remains with us today.)
…The intelligence priorities in place on 11 September 2001 were based on Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-35, signed by President Clinton on 2 March 1995. [redacted]
The Intelligence Community’s approach to priorities in the years following PDD-35 was to add issues to the various tiers, but not to remove any. Nor was there any significant effort to connect intelligence priorities to resource issues–providing increases to some while decreasing resources provided to lower priority issues. The 9/11 Team believes that a formal reprioritization of intelligence priorities in the years leading up to 9/11 might have provided important context for resource decisions relating to counterterrorism. A number of senior leaders, including the DCI, have stated that the IC had to deal with major challenges that competed for available resources. Indeed, as a Tier 1B issue, terrorism remained at the same level–at least in the formal prioritization [redacted] until after 9/11. (pp. 137-139)
(3PA: It is amazing to think that this was the haphazard manner by which the IC provided guidance for intelligence collection and analysis, with such incomplete prioritization. Starting in February 2003, this process was replaced by the more rigorous National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which is reviewed annually, at least, by the president and senior national security officials.)
…The budget-related actions of the former Chief of CTC might also have contributed to a negative perception of CTC within OMB. [redacted] stated that OMB officers were skeptical when the Agency pushed for permanent increases in its counterterrorism budget because they thought a lot of it was “crying wolf;” this officer recalled that the then-Chief of CTC would give what he called the “dead baby” speech. (pp. 191-192)
(3PA: Employing the threat of terrorist fatalities to obtain more resources remains a consistent tactic, as does the disbelief of budget officials and congressional appropriators that more money is needed by the military and IC.)
…CTC also hired contractors to help address personnel needs. The number of term employees (blue-badge contractors) was relatively small, however, the Team was unable to obtain reliable data on the number of independent and industrial contractors working in the CTC during FY 1996-2001. Thus, the Team was not able to assess the full extent of CTC’s efforts to augment its staff using contractors. (p. 197)
(3PA: Just as today, the military and IC use contractors to enhance their workforce, but fail to compile good data about those contractors, or use that data to employ contractors in a more effective and less costly manner. In July 2010, when the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was asked how many contractors were in the IC, he replied, “We can certainly count up the number of government employees that we have, absolutely. Counting contractors is a little bit more difficult.”)
…The Team therefore cannot accurately determine the overall size of the analyst cadre devoted to working on al-Qa’ida immediately prior to 9/11. The Team believes it is probably somewhat higher than the Joint Inquiry’s figure of “fewer than 40” but, based on our analysis, it is below the 49 – 34 in AIG plus 15 in the DI–which CTC offered in 2002 as the number of analysts working on al-Qa’ida prior to 9/11. (p. 228)
(3PA: Before 9/11, there were only forty to fifty analysts working on al-Qaeda.)
…AIG analysts in [redacted] who worked most closely on al-Qa’ida undertook only limited alternative analysis in the years prior to 9/11, however. In a review of analytic papers produced by [redacted] the Team found only one example of such analysis; [redacted]. In interviews, most of the analysis in [redacted] recall utilizing no alternative analysis, and “did not have the luxury to do so.” That said, the [redacted] FY 02 Research Plan listed a paper, “Key UBL Assumptions Check,” which was to take a comprehensive look at the key assumptions underlying analysis of the entire Bin Ladin issue and which likely would have employed alternative analysis techniques; 9/11 occurred before the branch could get to this paper.
Probably in response to this dearth of pre-9/11 alternative analysis, on 12 September 2001, the DCI created the Red Cell, a unit of senior DI analysts and other IC officers tasked with thinking “outside the box” on counterterrorism. In short order, the Red Cell’s nontraditional approach began receiving praise from the President, Vice President, and other senior policymakers. Later, the Red Cell’s mandate expanded to other intelligence topics. (pp. 247-249)
(3PA: IC analysts and policymaker-consumers constantly express their desire to produce and receive alternative analysis, which is distinct from main-line authoritative analysis. However, the “tyranny of the inbox” often makes this an impractical task—a concern that remains prevalent in the CIA and elsewhere to this day. Also, my forthcoming book, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, includes a case study on the creation and development of the CIA’s Red Cell.)
…The price of the dashed hopes of action against the UBL by the tribal assets became clearer in December. On 20 December, [redacted] reported Bin Ladin’s return to Kandahar where the tribal assets could most easily monitor his activities. This set up an intense period during which the assets considered a ground attack on Bin Ladin, while policymakers and CIA considered a cruise missile attack. [redacted] After some delays, on 23 December they picked either 25 or 26 December for their operation to capture Bin Ladin.
The Chief of the UBL Station, [redacted] meanwhile, reported [redacted] on 22 December that [redacted]. He predicted that the interest in this [redacted] among the CIA leadership and at the NSC would be “intense.” Asset-reporting problems on the 22nd prevented any action on that date. On 23 December, at noon and then again at 7:30 pm Islamabad time, [redacted] reported that Bin Ladin [redacted].
With this information in hand, the CIA and policymakers, including the National Security Advisor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Attorney General, the DCI, and the Assistant DCI for Collection (ADCI/C), among others, deliberated on launching a cruise missile attack against Bin Ladin while he slept. Recollections vary slightly in detail but agree on the most important point: the outcome of the meeting. The CIA presented its information derived from the tribal assets. CTC appeared confident that the information was accurate, initially offering an estimate of 75-percent reliability; under questioning from the National Security Advisor [Sandy Berger], however, it lowered the estimate to 50 percent.
According to one participant [in the White House meeting], in response to concerns from some Principals about the potential for killing innocent civilians, the military presented two estimates that diverged greatly on the anticipated extent of collateral damage. One participant recalls that the JCS-2 asserted that the collateral damage would be tolerable. Then officers from the [redacted] gave numbers perhaps three times as high as those from the J-2. In the end, the session ended with the decision not to act. The DCI in his testimony later said that, in this case, as in others where policymakers contemplated missile attacks against Bin Ladin, information on the Saudi terrorist’s location was based on a single thread of intelligence, and they made the decision that it was not good enough. Others told the Team that the estimated collateral damage was also an important factor.
The ADCI for Collection recalls that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Gen. Hugh Shelton] pulled out charts estimating a high number of deaths and injuries and that he said the proponents of launching the missiles “want me to kill 600 people.” (pp. 375-376)
(3PA: The CIA lowering its probability estimate of the accuracy of the intelligence from 75 percent to 50 percent after questioning from Berger violates every principle of providing analytical support to policymakers. Similarly, different military officers providing differing estimates of the collateral damage from a cruise missile strike against bin Ladin is not the sort of sound military advice that civilian officials require when authorizing the use of force.)
…A more general explanation for deciding against collective action that was applicable to all contemplated cruise missile attacks was the inherent delay in the process. According to UBL Station’s late May 1999 assessment of the 13-16 May period, even with improvement in timeliness, the normal delays from the time [redacted] observed events to the time the information about those events arrived at CIA Headquarters would be from one to three hours. The time needed first to process the information at Headquarters and to get the National Command Authority decision to launch missiles and then for the cruise missile to arrive at their target made for great uncertainty whether the person targeted (Bin Ladin) would remain in place long enough to be hit. (p. 378)
(3PA: The impossibility of knowing bin Ladin’s location one to three hours into the future was what compelled the Clinton administration to push the CIA and military to find a weapons platform that would “collapse the kill chain.” Thus, by February 16, 2001, the United States had successfully developed and tested the armed Predator drone.)
…Judging by the available evidence, the Agency was unable to satisfy the demands of the top leadership in the US military for precise, actionable intelligence before the military leadership would endorse a decision to deploy US troops on the ground in Afghanistan or to launch cruise missile attacks against UBL-related sites beyond the 1998 retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan. The military demanded a precision that, in CIA’s view, the Intelligence Community was incapable of providing.
Military interviewees offered their views on why senior military officials (and policymakers) generally were reluctant to act on intelligence. One senior military interviewee [redacted] told the 9/11 Team that the military had a cultural reluctance and distrust about working with CIA prior to 9/11. [redacted] said some in the military feared that, if the military went into Afghanistan and the going got rough, the CIA would leave them in the lurch. (p. 401)
(3PA: Again, it is difficult to remember that the military and CIA once had an inherent dislike of each other, and routinely protected their own bureaucratic interests at the expense of achieving shared national missions.)
CFR seeks to foster civil and informed discussion of foreign policy issues. Opinions expressed on CFR blogs are solely those of the author or commenter, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions. All comments must abide by CFR's guidelines and will be moderated prior to posting.
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Sectarianism in the Middle East
by Paul Mutter | on June 16th, 2015 | 
The majority of the estimated 250,000 people displaced by the Houthi conflict scattered across the vast landscape of north Yemen, seeking shelter and food among the local rural populations.
Photo: Hugh Macleod / IRIN / 201003170737560353
Photo: Hugh Macleod / IRIN / 201003170737560353
U.S. policymakers face many difficult choices in pursuing rapprochement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is little chance that Iran and the Arab monarchies, led by Saudi Arabia, can countenance each another’s respective aspirations. The U.S. is trying to make a deal with Iran while still tying itself to the demands of its other security partners in the region.
Iran’s ambitions are not new or “revolutionary”: Before the overthrow of the last Shah, a number of modern Iranian leaders had hegemonic aspirations in the Gulf, expressed in terms of past imperial grandeurs. The revolution in 1979 unleashed a torrent of anti-Americanism, but it did not diminish Iranian leaders’ aspirations. Instead, it emboldened them, as they were now animated by true revolutionary zeal, and not the reactionary imaginations of some “pan-Iranists” who called for a “Greater Iran.”
Today, such naked ethnic supremacism holds little stock among even the most hardline Iranian policymakers. While Supreme Leader Khomeini expressed himself in religious terms, he and his colleagues still yearned for national greatness beyond Iran’s borders, to export their model of governance so that would be surrounded by far friendlier regimes. Now they must balance this desire with the realization that their rule cannot survive without better international relations and a lessening of economic sanctions.
Iranian leaders still fear that offensive action might topple them from power — they know full well Western powers could stoke discontent against the ruling class — but they also want be feared and treated as equals. Iranian influence is seen in much of the Arab world as Shia, Persian chauvinism – an unsurprising view given the way Tehran carries itself. But that chauvinism is only exceeded in pretensions by the chauvinism of the Gulf States arrayed against the so-called Shia Crescent.
These Arab powers have many of the same underlying fears of their own citizenry that Iranian leaders do, though there are several notable differences. For one, the Arab states are not under the same sanctions as Iran and need to fear the socioeconomic impact of decades-long censure. Yet the underlying economic and political contracts they have with their subjects are under strain, because of the simple fact that people cannot be bought off forever, especially those who seek to overthrow the state, remove all “undesirables,” and institute a new Islamist order. Yet even with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) at the House of Saud’s doorstep, the Gulf States collectively seem to fear dissidents who may look to the Islamic Republic even more – and do too little to quell the extremist messaging emanating from their own religious establishments that has empowered ISIS and AQAP.
This shortsightedness is why the outcome of the current Gulf-led intervention in Yemen will prove decisive. Saudi leadership has sought to build up a consensus on Yemen among other predominantly Sunni nations. In drawing in as many of these countries as possible, including apparent outliers such as Sudan, Malaysia and Senegal, they wish to obscure that any political solution Riyadh finds acceptable will be unacceptable to many Yemenis.
Iran, for its part, seems content to let the coalition bleed itself. The previous beneficiary of Saudi (and American) largesse, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was tossed aside in 2011 not because he suddenly discovered reform or sided with the Houthis (as he did after losing power), but because he had so badly bungled things that domestic unrest threatened to embolden al Qaeda – which, we now learn, may have deeply infiltrated his security services. Riyadh fails to realize that its actions could deepen the quagmire that Saleh dug himself into with U.S. military assistance.
For now, the U.S. is content to distance itself from the Saudi campaign over Yemen while pursuing a grand bargain with Tehran. The coming months will tell if this remains doable, or if Washington will have to truly set down the rationale for its courting of Tehran while still upholding sanctions andarming the Gulf Arab and Israeli militaries.
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Last week, the Wikimedia Foundation announced that it was moving to
encrypting access to all Wikipedia sites
via HTTPS. This was really big news, and a
long
time coming. Wikipedia had been
trying
to move in this direction
for years
with fairly
slow progress
-- in part because some in the Wikimedia community had an irrational dislike of HTTPS. Thankfully, the Wikimedia Foundation pushed forward anyway, recognizing that the privacy of what you're browsing can be quite important.
And yet, I don't think that was the most significant website shift to HTTPS-by-default in the last week. Instead, that honor has to go to... [drumroll please]...
FBI.gov
. No, seriously. This may surprise you. After all, this is the very same FBI that just a couple of weeks ago had its assistant director Michael Steinbach tell Congress that companies needed to
"prevent encryption above all else."
Really. And it's the same FBI whose director has been deliberately
scaremongering
about the evils of encryption. The same director who insisted the world's foremost cybersecurity experts
didn't understand
when they told him that his plan to backdoor encryption was bonkers. The very same FBI who
used to
recommend mobile encryption to keep your data safe, but quietly
deleted
that page (the FBI claims it was moved to another site, but...).
But that very same FBI that has spent the past few months disparaging encryption at every opportunity apparently went over to Cloudflare and had the company help it get HTTPS set up. No joke.
The FBI.gov site now
automatically pushes you to an encrypted connection
. Because, no matter what the FBI says, encryption is good. And the FBI's techies know that.
Remember how, just last week, the US CIO announced that all federal governments would be
moving to HTTPS
. Well, thankfully, the CIO's office is also
tracking how well it's doing
. Just yesterday, here's what it said about FBI.gov:
And, here's what it says now:
(If you're interested, you can
see the pull request
at Github that has the change as well).
Either way, kudos to the FBI for letting us encrypt our connections. Now, please don't get in the way of us encrypting our data as well.
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Source: Pravda.Ru photo archive
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russian Armed Forces would receive more than 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2015, Interfax reports.
Putin said at the opening of the international military-technical forum "Army 2015" that the new missiles would be capable of overcoming any, even most technically advanced missile defense systems.
According to the Russian President, Russia "was paying and will be paying special attention to the implementation of a large-scale state program of armaments and modernization of the defense complex."
President Putin also said that Russia would build two new radar hubs. In April, the works on the project were launched in the town of Armavir. The tests of the new radar hub to detect beyond-the-horizon air targets will be conducted in the next coming months. The hubs will be built both for western and eastern strategic direction.
Meanwhile, the Russian army started receiving first units of armored vehicles on standardized platforms, the combat capabilities of which have no analogues in the world. It goes about such military vehicles as Armata, Kurganets, Boomerang, as well as self-propelled Coalition SV vehicles.
As part of the "Army 2015" military forum, participants discussed prospects of the Russian defense industry, production of new weapons and modernization of the Russian Armed Forces. The Russian president stressed out that by 2020, Russia's military arsenal would be replenished with state-of-the-art models of military hardware.
Noteworthy, Russia's Nevsky Design Bureau has developed a project of a new amphibious assault ship that is said to replace the French Mistrals.
Also read: Russia works on 100-ton ballistic missile
"The versatile amphibious ship by the Nevsky Design Bureau, known as the Priboi project, with a displacement of 14,000 tons, will be able to carry up to eight Ka-52K and Ka-27 helicopters. Its construction is scheduled to begin next year," a source from the defense industry said on conditions of anonymity.
According to the source, the Priboi ship will be armed with Pantsir-M anti-aircraft complex. The vessel will be able to carry up to 500 paratroopers and about 40-60 units of hardware. The ship will be 25 meters wide and 165 meters long.
Pravda.Ru has reported before that Paris refused to deliver two Mistral type helicopter carries to Russia because of political disagreement that appeared as a result of the Ukrainian crisis. The contract is worth 1.2 billion euros. Under the terms of the contract, France will have to pay a penalty in the amount of 10 billion euros. During most recent negotiations, French representatives offered Russia to "forget" about the Mistral ships for 785 million euros.
Pravda.Ru
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NEWS
Texas Mexican Mafia member denied bond in federal hearing
SAN ANTONIO - Slain Balcones Heights police Officer Julian Pesina was being investigated by the FBI and the Texas Department of Public Safety prior to his murder on May 4, 2014.
According to testimony from an FBI special agent Tuesday during a Federal Court hearing, surveillance footage set up by the FBI at Pesina's tattoo shop was used as evidence in his murder.
Tuesday's hearing was for Jesse Santibanez, one of three men alleged to have killed Pesina outside the tattoo parlor Pesina owned. Santibanez, a Texas Mexican Mafia member, is suspected of being one of two shooters in the murder.
In Tuesday's hearing, an FBI special agent discussed how surveillance footage from Pesina's tattoo shop and from a camera set up by the FBI at the location was used as evidence.
Defense attorney Thomas McHugh questioned the testimony of co-defendant Jerry Idrogo that Santibanez (pictured below) was one of the shooters.
McHugh also requested bond be set for Santibanez. U.S. Magistrate Judge John Primomo later denied that request, saying Santibanez was a danger to the community.
Idrogo, Santibanez and Alfredo Cardona are accused of taking part in Pesina's slaying. Idrogo was accused of being the getaway driver, according to an arrest affidavit.
Copyright 2015 by KSAT - All rights reserved.
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